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Abstract
Cryptographic primitives are the basic components of any cryptographic
tool. Block ciphers, stream ciphers and hash functions are the fundamental
primitives of symmetric cryptography. In symmetric cryptography, the com-
municating parties perform essentially the same operation and use the same
key, if any. This thesis concerns cryptanalysis of stream ciphers and hash
functions. The main contribution of this work is introducing the concept of
probabilistic neutrality for the arguments of a function, a generalization of
the definition of neutrality. An input argument of a given function is called
neutral if it does not affect the output of the function. This simple idea has
already been implicitly used in key recovery cryptanalysis of block ciphers
and stream ciphers. However, in 2004, Biham and Chen explicitly used the
idea of neutrality to speed up collision finding algorithms for hash functions.
We call an input argument of a function probabilistic neutral if it does not
have a “significant” influence on the output of the function. Simply stated,
it means that if the input argument is changed, the output of the function
stays the same with a probability “close” to one. We will exploit the idea
of probabilistic neutrality to assess the security of several stream ciphers
and hash functions. Interestingly, all our cryptanalyses rely on neutrality
and/or probabilistic neutrality. In other words, these concepts will appear
as a common ingredient in all of our cryptanalytic algorithms. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time that the probabilistic neutrality has
found diverse applications in cryptanalysis.
Keywords: cryptanalysis, cryptography, hash function, stream cipher.
Re´sume´
Les primitives cryptographiques sont les composants de base de tous les out-
ils cryptographiques. Les Chiffrements par bloc, les chiffrements par flot et
les fonctions de hachage sont les primitives fondamentales de la cryptogra-
phie syme´trique. En cryptographie syme´trique, chaque participant effectue
essentiellement la meˆme ope´ration et emploie la meˆme clef, s’il y en a. Cette
the`se concerne la cryptanalyse des chiffrements par flot et des fonctions de
hachage. La contribution principale de ce travail est de pre´senter le con-
cept de neutralite´ probabiliste au niveau des arguments d’une fonction, qui
est une ge´ne´ralisation de la de´finition de neutralite´. Un argument d’entre´e
d’une fonction donne´e est neutre s’il n’affecte pas la sortie de la fonction.
Cette ide´e simple a de´ja` e´te´ implicitement employe´e dans la cryptanalyse des
chiffrements par bloc et des chiffrements par flot pour trouver la clef secre`te.
Cependant, en 2004, Biham et Chen ont explicitement employe´ l’ide´e de la
neutralite´ pour acce´le´rer les algorithmes qui trouvent des collisions sur des
fonctions de hachage. Nous qualifions un argument d’entre´e d’une fonction
de neutre probabiliste s’il n’a pas une influence “significative” sur la sortie
de la fonction. Plus simplement, c¸a veut dire que si on change l’argument
d’entre´e, la sortie de la fonction reste la meˆme avec une probabilite´ “proche”
de 1. Nous exploiterons l’ide´e de la neutralite´ probabiliste pour e´valuer la
se´curite´ de plusieurs chiffrements par flot et fonctions de hachage. Toutes
nos cryptanalyses se fondent sur la neutralite´ et/ou la neutralite´ proba-
biliste. Autrement dit, ces concepts apparaˆıtront comme des ingre´dients
communs pour tous nos algorithmes de cryptanalyse. Cela semble eˆtre la
premie`re fois que la neutralite´ probabiliste trouve des applications diverses
en cryptanalyse.
Mots cle´s: cryptanalyse, cryptographie, fonction de hachage, chiffrement
par flot.
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1Introduction
1.1 Cryptography– goals and tenets
The need to protect valuable information goes back to the very old days. As a con-
sequence, cryptology has developed over the centuries from an art, in which only few
were skillful, into a science. There are several goals which security professionals seek to
achieve. These include confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and
privacy. Cryptology is known as the science of information protection against unau-
thorized parties [174] aiming to concretely address some of these goals. Cryptology is
further subdivided into cryptography and cryptanalysis. ‘ Cryptography is the art of
making cryptosystems, a major part of which concerns confidentiality, authentication,
integrity and non-repudiation. When constructing cryptosystems, designers (known as
cryptographers) share the task as follows. Some focus on designing well-established,
low-level building blocks called cryptographic primitives. Others design cryptographic
protocols by combining cryptographic primitives. Cryptographic primitives are ex-
tremely important; a vast amount of effort is devoted to studying the construction of
some cryptographic primitives based on others. Block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash
functions, message authentication codes and digital signatures are among the most
fundamental primitives of cryptography. In cryptography, it is attempted to provide
concrete definitions for these components. The properties of a cryptographic primitive
are inspired by the security threats (known as attacks) which cryptographic protocols
that use the primitive might be faced with. In other words, a cryptographic protocol
imposes some requirements on the cryptographic primitives that it is using. Cryp-
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tography is performed in one of the following two fashions: symmetric cryptography
(or secret key cryptography) and asymmetric cryptography (or public key cryptography).
Whereas symmetric key cryptography has been used since antiquity, public key cryptog-
raphy appeared in the 1970s. Public key cryptography can be used to construct some
cryptographic primitives, like digital signatures, which are out of scope of symmetric
cryptography.
Cryptanalysis, on the other hand, concerns the analysis and evaluation of cryp-
tosystems. A cryptanalyst examines cryptographic primitives and protocols to see if
they have any weakness. A weakness might be a violation of any requirements which
the designer imposed, or a new threat, previously unaddressed. Cryptanalysis is a very
difficult task; hence, cryptanalysts usually first attempt to break simplified variants of
their targets. History has proved that dealing with reduced versions of primitives is a
reasonable start for cryptanalysts to understand how to cryptanalyze the target and
incrementally reach the analysis of the full version. Moreover, handling simplified in-
stances of primitives gives cryptographers an intuition of the strength of their designs.
The struggle between cryptographers and cryptanalysts keeps the field of cryptography
a very challenging and lively area.
Despite the elegant features of cryptography and the cryptographers’ efforts formal-
izing security notions, security goals in real life might not be an easy aim to achieve.
Real-world security systems are a combination of a complicated series of interactions.
Modern systems have so many components and connections – some even unknown to
the systems’ designers, implementers, or users. Cryptography is not a panacea– you
need a lot more than cryptography to have security– but it is essential [217].
This thesis concerns cryptanalysis of stream ciphers and hash functions, two crypto-
graphic primitives which lie in the category of symmetric cryptography. Stream ciphers
are deployed as pseudo-random number generators mainly to provide confidentiality,
whereas hash functions are used in a wide spectrum of cryptographic applications such
as message integrity, authentication and secure timestamping.
1.2 Ciphers and confidentiality
Confidentiality has ever been a main goal of secure communication. This goal attempts
to restrict access to data to only those who have a legitimate need for it. A cryptosystem
2
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which provides confidentiality is normally referred to as a cipher. However, these two
words (cryptosystem and cipher) are often used interchangeably. A cipher is formally
described as follows (see [225] for example).
Definition 1. A cipher is a five tuple (P,C,K,E,D) where
• P is the plaintext space,
• C is the ciphertext space,
• K is the key space,
• for each key k ∈ K, there is an encryption rule Ek ∈ E and a corresponding
decryption rule Dk ∈ D,
• for every key k ∈ K, the function pairs Ek : P → C and Dk : C → P satisfy
Dk(Ek(p)) = p for every plaintext p ∈ P.
The ultimate goal of a cipher is to enable two entities, who have already shared a
key through a secure channel, to securely communicate over an insecure channel. The
above definition of a cipher does not carry any notion of security. Claude Shannon was
the first one who, in his seminal work in 1949, established the theory of secrecy by
introducing two notions of security, perfect security and computational security.
1.2.1 Perfect security
Ideally, we would like that no information of the plaintext leaks from the ciphertext.
In other words, any adversary, even with unlimited computational power, must not be
able to reduce his ambiguity about the plaintext once he observes the corresponding
ciphertext. In probability theory, this translates to Pr{P = p|C = c} = Pr{P = p} for
any p ∈ P and c ∈ C, where P and C represent the random variables corresponding to
the plaintext and ciphertext. From an information theory perspective, Shannon [218]
has shown that in order to achieve perfect security the entropy of the plaintext, H(P ),
must not exceed that of the key, H(K), where H(X) is the Shannon entropy of a
random variable X.
Theorem 1 (Shannon, 1949). Perfect secrecy implies H(K) ≥ H(P ).
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Vernam cipher [230] provides perfect security in which the plaintext is bit-wise
XORed with a key of the same length to generate the ciphertext. However, the Vernam
cipher is impractical in almost all real-world applications. The main bottleneck is that
the key length must be at least as large as the message length itself. This problem,
however, is inherent to perfect secrecy according to Theorem 1. In Vernam cipher a
key cannot be used more than once, hence bearing the name of one-time pad as well.
Moreover, the key must be a truly random sequence, a task that is not very easy to
achieve in practice.
1.2.2 Computational security
Due to the intrinsic problem of key length in perfect security, in real-life applications
people are using encryption schemes with keys much shorter than the message size
to encrypt sensitive information. This alternative solution profits from the fact that
cryptanalysts in practice have limited computational power. A cryptosystem is said
to be computationally secure if the best algorithm for breaking it requires at least 2n
operations, where n is some specified number, e.g., n = 128. Such a cryptosystem is
then said to provide n bits of security or to have a security level of n bits. Even under
this definition, no known practical cryptosystem can be proved to be computationally
secure. In practice, however, there are two approaches. In the provable security ap-
proach, which is mostly taken in public key cryptography, the evidence of security is
provided by means of a reduction. In other words, it is shown that if the cryptosystem
can be broken in some specific way, then it would be possible to efficiently solve some
well-studied problem that is believed to be difficult. Problems closely related to integer
factorization and discrete logarithm, which respectively underlie the RSA [207] and
ElGamal [119] public key cryptosystems, are such widely-accepted examples. Shannon
suggested that breaking a good cipher should require “as much work as solving a sys-
tem of simultaneous equations in a large number of unknowns of a complex type”. It
is known that solving a set of random multivariate polynomial equations over a finite
field is an NP-hard problem [120]. Nevertheless, this problem is not a very suitable
choice in practice for provable security since it may not be easy to prove that the re-
sulting system of equations is random. However, Shannon’s suggestion still leaves us a
second approach which might be called ad-hoc security, commonly taken in symmetric
cryptography. Using this approach, cryptosystems are designed in a way such that the
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resulting system of equations seems to be complex. To this end, normally, a security
parameter (e.g., the number of rounds) is defined for the system such that increasing
it makes the cryptosystem look more complex. The computational security evidence,
on the other hand, is provided with respect to certain specific type of threats or the
best methods cryptanalysts have managed to discover. Of course, security against one
specific type of cryptanalytic algorithm does not guarantee security against some other
methods. The astute reader then may ask why bother with symmetric cryptography?
The answer comes from practical utilization. Symmetric cryptosystems are not only
few hundred times faster than the known asymmetric ones, they also need keys of much
shorter length to provide similar security levels. Finally, if enough care is taken, it is
possible to design cryptosystems which are practically suitable for several decades.
1.3 Stream ciphers
In symmetric key cryptography, confidentiality is provided by using stream ciphers or
block ciphers. Block ciphers are the most well known symmetric primitives and, as the
name indicates, operate on fixed-length data blocks. The best-known block ciphers are
the data encryption standard (DES) [185] and its replacement, the advanced encryption
standard (AES) [186]. AES takes a 128-bit block of plaintext as input together with a
secret key, which can be 128, 192 or 256 bits long, to produce a 128-bit ciphertext block.
The oldest, simplest, and most natural way of encrypting larger amounts of data using
a block cipher is known as the electronic code book (ECB) mode. To use AES in the
ECB mode, the message is padded (if necessary) and divided into 128-bit blocks, and
then each one is encrypted separately. Unfortunately, this easy way of utilizing a block
cipher is insecure as identical plaintext blocks are encrypted into identical ciphertext
blocks. In order to securely encrypt larger amounts of data with a block cipher, some
other mode of operation such as cipher block chaining (CBC) is used.
Stream ciphers, in general, are preferred to block ciphers in software applications
with very high throughput requirements, and in hardware applications with restricted
resources such as limited storage, gate count, or power consumption. Very loosely
speaking, stream ciphers can be thought of as cryptographically secure pseudo-random
number generators with some extra bells and whistles. Modern stream ciphers use
a secret key (typically 80 to 256 bits long) and a publicly known initial value (IV)
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(typically 64 to 256 bits long) to produce a sequence of random-looking symbols (usually
bits), known as the keystream. Incorporating a publicly known IV in a stream cipher
not only avoids several time-memory trade-off threats [133, 54, 105], but also makes it
possible to reuse the same key just by sending a new IV without having to agree on a
new key. The sender and receiver must ensure that they are using the same IV. This
can be done in a number of ways: by transmitting the IV along with the ciphertext,
by agreeing on it in a handshake phase, by calculating it deterministically (usually
incrementally), or with the help of a public parameter such as current time, packet
number, etc. Stream ciphers are meant to imitate the Vernam cipher. Therefore,
in order to encrypt a plaintext {pi}Ni=1 of length N bits, a random-looking binary
keystream {zi}Ni=1 of the same length is produced and then XORed with the plaintext
to produce the ciphertext {ci}Ni=1. That is,
ci = pi ⊕ zi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . (1.1)
Trivially, decryption is performed by XORing the same keystream with the ciphertext
in order to get the original plaintext. The keystream bits depend on the secret key K
and the publicly known initial value IV . Moreover, in order to keep the keystream bits
and ciphertext bits synchronized, the keystream bit at time i, i.e., zi, depends either
on the value i or on a limited number of the previous ciphertext bits. Depending on
either of these cases, stream ciphers are divided in two categories: synchronous stream
ciphers and self-synchronizing stream ciphers.
Synchronous stream ciphers are adopted more widely in practice and, in the liter-
ature, are shortly referred to as stream ciphers. In a synchronous stream cipher the
keystream is independent of the ciphertext and is simply produced as a mapping of the
secret key K and initial value IV , see Figure 1.1. More precisely the ith keystream bit
can be expressed as follows
zi = fi(K, IV ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N . (1.2)
There is no error propagation in the synchronous stream ciphers, making them very
suitable for situations where transmission errors are likely to occur. For example,
if a single ciphertext bit is received erroneously, the receiver will decrypt only the
corresponding plaintext bit wrongly whereas all the remaining plaintext bits will be
decrypted correctly. However, the synchronous stream ciphers are highly sensitive to
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insertion and deletion errors; the keystream sequence must be kept synchronized with
the received ciphertext sequence at the receiver side for correct decryption. In other
words, the receiver must know the exact position of the ciphertext bits so that the
correct corresponding keystream bits are used in order to decrypt them. As mentioned,
the main role of using an IV in a stream cipher is to be able to use the same key several
times. Furthermore, in the case of synchronous stream ciphers, using a fresh IV is
useful to ensure that the sender and receiver are resynchronized.
Figure 1.1: Synchronous stream cipher - A high level view of a synchronous stream
cipher.
In contrast to synchronous stream ciphers, the keystream bits of the self-synchronizing
stream ciphers do not depend on their position in the keystream sequence. In order to
make the synchronization still possible, the previous ciphertext bits are used to produce
a new keystream bit, see Figure 1.2. More precisely, each keystream bit is computed
as a function of the secret key, the publicly known IV and the previous ciphertext bits.
In order to limit the error propagation, in practice, the keystream is generated as a
function of a limited number of r previous ciphertext bits, and of course the key and
IV. That is,
zi = f(K, IV, ci−r, ci−r+1, . . . , ci−1), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , (1.3)
where one can assume c−r+1 = · · · = c0 = 0 for example. The value r is known
as the resynchronization memory of the cipher and should be kept quite small for
practical reasons. A direct advantage of this property is that the receiver automatically
synchronizes itself with the sender after having received r ciphertext bits correctly. This
makes self-synchronizing stream ciphers suitable for the insertion/deletion channels,
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that is, those channels which tend to drop message bits or add some garbage bits.
However, the self-synchronizing stream ciphers suffer from single bit errors. Though,
the effect is limited and only affects up to r keystream bits.
Figure 1.2: Self-synchronizing stream cipher - The figure shows a high level view of
a self-synchronizing stream cipher. For practical reasons, each keystream bit must depend
on a limited number of the previous cipher text bits.
Dedicated self-synchronizing stream cipher proposals are very rare [89, 215, 11,
213, 91, 152, 92], all of which have shown weaknesses [137, 244, 176, 138, 94, 139, 149,
144]. All the well-known widely used stream ciphers are synchronous stream ciphers.
Real-world examples of synchronous stream ciphers include RC4 [3, 216] (used for
WEP/WPA, by Bittorrent, and by SSL, to name a few), A5/1 and A5/2 [64] (used
in GSM telephony standard) and E0 [61] (used in Bluetooth protocol). Synchronous
stream ciphers commonly operate in two phases: initialization phase and keystream
generation phase. The initialization algorithm computes the initial value of the internal
state as a function of the key and IV. The key generation algorithm then expands the
initial state into the keystream sequence. Traditionally, keystream generators for stream
cipher applications are generally realized as autonomous finite state machines whose
components, state update function and output filter function, can be key dependent.
Nevertheless, in practice designers avoid using key dependent components for their
finite state machines which not only simplifies the design but also avoids unwanted
weak key classes, see Figure 1.3. It is important to mention that some block cipher
modes of operation turn a block cipher into a stream cipher. Notably, the output
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feedback mode (OFB) and the counter mode (CTR) give rise to synchronous stream
ciphers whereas the cipher feedback mode (CFB) results in a self-synchronizing stream
cipher.
Figure 1.3: Finite state machine for stream cipher applications - The figure shows
how stream ciphers can be realized based on finite state machines.
1.3.1 Cryptanalytic model and security of stream ciphers
As stream ciphers are supposed to imitate the Vernam cipher, their ultimate goal is to
provide keystreams which look like truly random sequences. However, since the only
source of the entropy for the keystream is the secret key, one uses the term pseudo-
random versus truly random.
The security of pseudo-random number generators is then measured in terms of the
best algorithm which can distinguish their keystreams from truly random sequences. We
analyze stream ciphers in a very strong security model used in symmetric cryptography.
In this model the cryptanalyst has access to many ciphertext/plaintext pairs which have
been encrypted under a fixed key, unknown to the cryptanalyst. The cryptanalyst can
choose the ciphertexts (or plaintexts) as well as the IV’s (if any). The selection can
be done adaptively if necessary. For block ciphers there is no IV and these models
are known as chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext scenarios. For stream ciphers,
however, knowing the ciphertext and plaintext is equivalent to having access to the
keystream. Consequently, for synchronous stream ciphers this model is simply referred
to as chosen IV cryptanalysis scenario. In other words, the cryptanalyst has access
to a large amount of the keystream generated under a number of different IV’s and
a fixed key. In contrast, for self-synchronizing stream ciphers, both chosen IV chosen
plaintext and chosen IV chosen ciphertext cryptanalytic models make sense. As already
mentioned, one goal of a cryptanalyst is to distinguish the stream cipher from a truly
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random number generator. A more ambitious cryptanalyst might aim at predicting
future keystream bits produced by the cipher for the same key, no matter if this happens
by recovering the secret key, recovering the internal state of the cipher at some point,
or otherwise. The quality of a cryptanalytic algorithm (distinguishing, key-recovery,
internal state recovery, etc.) is determined according to the following four parameters:
• Time complexity: the amount of computation required for the algorithm to
terminate.
• Memory complexity: the amount of memory needed for the algorithm to run.
• Data complexity: the total amount of keystream required to apply the algo-
rithm.
• Success probability: the success probability of the algorithm.
Time, memory and data complexities are measured in some specified fixed unit. The
amount of memory and data could be expressed in bits or bytes for example. However,
the time unit is more delicate. Some cryptographers vaguely consider the time unit in
terms of the required time to perform some simple operations, for example, modular
addition or multiplication. Others mention it in terms of the average required time to
test the correctness of a guess for the secret key, which sounds more reasonable. In this
thesis, we use the later time unit unless otherwise specified. The success probability
of a cryptanalytic algorithm is measured over random keys and over any source of
randomness which might have been used in the cryptanalytic algorithm. In this thesis
we use the following definition for the security of stream ciphers.
Definition 2. A stream cipher, which uses k-bit long secret keys, is said to provide a
security level of n bits, if there is no cryptanalytic algorithm with success probability
2−p, p ∈ [0, k], requiring time, data and memory complexities limited to 2n−p.
In symmetric cryptography, it is usually attempted to design k-bit ciphers which
provide a security level of k bits.
1.3.2 State of the art of stream ciphers
Stream ciphers are expected to be faster in software or have a smaller implementation
footprint than comparable block ciphers. This, in general, forces their structure to be
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much simpler than block ciphers, making them not only more difficult to design but
also more attractive targets for cryptanalysis. History has seen a noticeable number of
weak stream ciphers. The most well-known examples are A5/1 and A5/2 stream ciphers
used in the GSM cellular telephone standard. A5/2 is so weak that it can be broken
instantly in a ciphertext-only scenario which requires just a few dozen milliseconds of
the encrypted conversation [23]. Several cryptanalyses of A5/1 have been published,
the most serious of which [57, 184] requires an expensive preprocessing stage to produce
a huge table after which the cipher can be broken in a matter of minutes or seconds.
Unfortunately the state of two other popular stream ciphers, RC4 and E0, is only
a little less dreadful. Although they do not cower in front of cryptanalysts as A5/1
and A5/2 do, they cannot be considered secure according to modern standards due to
several revealed weaknesses. We refer to [173, 192, 163] for the latest results on RC4
and E0, and to the references therein for older ones.
The first attempt to create a portfolio of secure stream ciphers was done by the
NESSIE project [183], which ran from March 2000 to February 2003. NESSIE did not
select any of the proposed stream ciphers for its portfolio, as none of the submissions
withstood cryptanalysts’ might. The second effort to identify new stream ciphers that
may become suitable for widespread adoption was made by the eSTREAM project [106].
This project started in November 2004 and was finalized in April 2008 after three
evaluation phases. At the end, four stream ciphers were chosen for software-oriented
applications and another four for hardware implementations [19], see Table 1.1. Shortly
after the portfolio was revised [20] due to a severe cryptanalytic result on F-FCSR
family [10], published in [125]. As of April 2010, the eSTREAM portfolio consists of
the remaining seven candidates.
Software Hardware
HC-128 [241] Grain [128, 127]
Rabbit [62] Trivium [72]
Salsa20/12 [35] MICKEY v.2 [21]
SOSEMANUK [28] ////////////F-FCSR-H v2
Table 1.1: The eSTREAM final portfolio. The table shows the current eSTREAM
portfolio. The original one included F-FCSR-H v2 but it was removed later.
We would like to emphasize that unlike the accomplished AES competition [182]
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and the current SHA-3 competition [181], both organized by the U.S. National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), the goal of eSTREAM was not to develop a new
international standard for stream ciphers. But rather merely to act as a focus for
academic interest and an attempt to identify the best candidates among the various
designs. While the eSTREAM recommended algorithms are still quite new and new
weaknesses may yet be found, the portfolio can be considered to represent the current
state of academic research on stream ciphers.
1.4 Hash functions
Very generally speaking, a hash function is an efficiently computable algorithm that
maps arbitrary-length messages to fixed length outputs, called message digests. Hash-
ing is traditionally used in non-cryptographic applications such as performance im-
provement and error checking [130]. In the field of cryptography, hash functions are
among the most fundamental primitives and are sometimes referred to as cryptographic
hash functions. Originally deployed to make digital signatures more efficient, crypto-
graphic hash functions are now used in a broad spectrum of cryptographic applications
including message integrity, authentication and secure timestamping. Aforementioned
cryptographic applications as well as a host of other uses in various cryptographic pro-
tocols often rely on several assumptions about the underlying hash functions. If the
hash function fails to be as secure as believed, then the application also fails to be se-
cure in most cases. Ideally, we would like to have a cryptographic hash function which
behaves like a random oracle [26]. A random oracle is a black box that responds to
every query with a truly random response chosen uniformly from its output domain,
except that for any specific query, it responds the same way every time it receives that
query. Protocols, such as OAEP [27], that use cryptographic hash functions are often
proved secure in the random oracle model [26], see also [219]. Unfortunately, random
oracles do not actually exist in real life, and therefore proofs in the random oracle
model only provide a heuristic for security [67].
1.4.1 Cryptographic properties of hash functions
In cryptographic practice, a hash function is typically a fixed public algorithm H :
{0, 1}? → {0, 1}n, for some fixed n (typically between 128 and 512). The security of
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most practical applications involving hash functions often relies on the following three
properties of the underlying hash functions.
• Collision resistance: there is no algorithm running in time less than 2n/2 which
can find two distinct messages x and y such that H(x) = H(y).
• Preimage resistance: given a digest value D ∈ {0, 1}n, there is no algorithm
running in time less than 2n which can find a message x such that H(x) = D.
• Second preimage resistance: given a message x, there is no algorithm running
in time less than 2n which can find a message y different from x such that H(x) =
H(y).
In theory, however, these definitions are not considered to be precise enough. In
order to study hash function security on a solid formal footing, one has to consider
keyed hash functions [96, 97, 180]. In this case, the hash function is thought of as a
collection or family of hash functions {HK : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}n,K ∈ K}. Some valuable
attempts to concretely formalize the above three definitions were done in [208], in which
seven notions of security related to these properties are introduced. In this thesis we,
however, stick to the informal definitions. We would like to emphasize that we consider
the time unit of a cryptanalytic algorithm in terms of hashing a short message, or less
precisely the number of required simple operations. The upper-bound complexity 2n/2
for the collision resistance of an n-bit hash function is due to birthday paradox, see
section 1.5.2.
1.4.2 Hash function design
The design of hash functions usually proceeds in two stages. First, one designs a com-
pression function with fixed domain. A compression function transforms one short
fixed-length input into a shorter fixed-length output. One then applies a domain ex-
tension method, also known as mode of operation, to the compression function in order
to construct a hash function for messages of arbitrary length. In practice, the message
length is limited to an enormous number, e.g., 264 or 2128 bits.
One of the popular ways to create a compression function is to base it on a block
cipher. The emphasis on block cipher-based hashing can be understood both histori-
cally and practically. Block ciphers have long been the central primitives in symmetric
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key cryptography, and there exists some measure of confidence in block cipher designs.
From a practical perspective, one might like to reuse optimized code or hardware de-
signs of block ciphers that have already been implemented. Collision resistance and
preimage resistance are the minimum requirements one expects from a secure block
cipher based compression function. The oldest block cipher based compression func-
tions are commonly referred to as Davies-Meyer [174], Matyas-Meyer-Oseas [169] and
Miyaguchi-Preneel [198, 177], see Figure 1.4. The security of block cipher based com-
pression functions has been extensively studied in the literature; see, e.g., [198, 60, 224].
Figure 1.4: The three most famous block cipher based compression functions
- a) Davies-Meyer f(h,m) = Em(h) ⊕ h, b) Matyas-Meyer-Oseas f(h,m) = Eh(m) ⊕m,
and c) Miyaguchi-Preneel f(h,m) = Eh(m) ⊕ m ⊕ h. The compression functions f :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, mapping 2n bits into n bits, are both collision and preimage
resistant, where E is an ideal block cipher with equal block and key length of n bits.
A compression function can be turned into a hash function by plugging it in some
mode of operation. The most common way, known as the Merkle-Damg˚ard [175, 97]
construction, is based on iteratively updating a chaining variable. The standard Merkle-
Damg˚ard construction uses a compression function f : {0, 1}b × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, an
initial n-bit chaining value h0 and some injective padding function P : {0, 1}? →({0, 1}b)? \∅. The message M ∈ {0, 1}? to be hashed is first padded (transformed) into
a message whose length in bits is a positive multiple of b, i.e., P (M) = (m0, . . . ,ml−1)
with l ≥ 1. The mi’s are called message blocks. Message blocks then recursively update
the chaining value according to the relation hi = f(mi−1, hi−1), i = 1, . . . , l. The final
chaining value is considered as the message digest, i.e., H(M) = hl; see Figure 1.5.
The security of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction and its variants has been inten-
sively studied in the literature with respect to several cryptographic properties. The
most widely used hash functions, including MD5 [205], SHA-1 [188] and SHA-2 fam-
ily [189, 190], use a Davies-Meyer compression function with the strengthened Merkle-
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Figure 1.5: The standard Merkle-Damg˚ard construction - The message M is first
padded and divided into l message blocks (m0, . . . ,ml−1) where each mi is b bits long.
The message blocks iteratively update the initial chaining value h0 to produce the message
digest hl.
Damg˚ard mode of operation. The strengthened Merkle-Damg˚ard requires to encode
the length of the original message in the padding in order to preclude several trivial
weaknesses [174]. It is easy to see that the strengthened Merkle-Damg˚ard construction
preserves collision-resistance when instantiated with a collision-resistant compression
function [175, 97]. Other variants of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction can provide
secure domain extenders for some specific properties of the corresponding primitive in
question such as pseudorandomness [24], MAC unforgeability [6, 172] and randomness
extraction [102]. However, the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction does not work to yield
a random oracle even if the underlying compression function is modeled as a random
oracle. The most notable weaknesses of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction are due to
the length extension [174], multi-collision [135], second preimage [147] and herding [145]
attacks. In order to to prevent the weaknesses of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction,
many researchers have considered alternative construction methods, see [59, 166, 39]
for example. Building a framework to prove the indifferentiability of domain extenders
from a random oracle provided that the underlying compression function is modeled
as a random oracle was proposed in [171]. Since then there has been an increased
popularity of the indifferentiability framework in the design and analysis of hash func-
tions [80, 25, 76, 103, 40, 104].
1.4.3 History and the state of the art of practical hash functions
Rivest is probably the first to develop a publicly known dedicated cryptographic hash
function. His design, called MD2 [142, 161], was developed in 1989. It has a unique
non-Merkle-Damg˚ard-based construction, suitable for 8-bit processors. MD2 was soon
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superseded by other designs, not because it had been broken, but because its perfor-
mance on 32-bit processors could not compete with the more modern designs. Never-
theless, MD2 is still part of several (de facto) standards, e.g., PKCS#1 v2.1 [1] and
Verisign [2]. Shortly after, Rivest designed MD4 [204] which is a Merkle-Damg˚ard con-
struction with a Davies-Meyer compression function. Despite early cryptanalysis of its
simplified variants [98], MD4 inspired most of the hash functions designed afterwards.
A newer version of MD4, called MD5 [205], was designed in 1991 to become one of
the most widely used hash functions. Two years later, the U.S. National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) developed the Secure Hash Standard (SHA) [187],
unofficially referred to as SHA-0, based on the same principles of MD4 and MD5. In
1995, NIST revised SHA-0 with a subtle tweak to introduce SHA-1 [188]. NIST pub-
lished two new hash functions in 2001, called SHA-256 and SHA-512 [189], still following
the design principles of MD4, MD5 and SHA-1. These hash functions along with two
other variants, SHA-224 and SHA-384, are collectively referred to as the SHA-2 fam-
ily [189, 190], the number indicating the digest length in bits. The later two members,
SHA-224 and SHA-384, are respectively truncated variants of SHA-256 and SHA-512,
computed with different initial chaining values. Nevertheless, the SHA-2 family mem-
bers have not found widespread acceptance. In contrast, the popular hash functions
MD5 and SHA-1 (with respective digests of size 128 and 160 bits) are still used almost
universally.
Despite the quite fast progress in hash function design, it took cryptanalysts quite
some time to gradually grasp and tackle them. Collisions for the compression function
of MD5 were found in 1993 [99]; but it was not yet clear how to produce collisions
for the hash function itself. The first collision for MD4 was found by Dobbertin in
1996 [101]. In 1998, Chabaud and Joux took a major step in hash function cryptanaly-
sis [75] by introducing the linear differential cryptanalysis of hash functions. However,
since the run time of the algorithm was too high to be carried out in practice, the
cryptanalysts had to wait a few more years to produce real collisions with further
progress in cryptanalysis. In 2004, Biham and Chen [44] introduced neutral bits to
speed up the collision finding algorithms on SHA-0. Even though the collisions were
not yet achievable, they produced near collisions for SHA-0 (two messages whose di-
gests differ on a few number of bit positions). However, the year after proved to be
fruitful for hash function cryptanalysis, mostly thanks to the Chinese cryptographer
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Xiaoyun Wang. Improved collision cryptanalyses on SHA-0 were published [45, 236],
and the first collision examples on the full MD5 hash function were produced [238].
Real collision examples on SHA-0 were published later the same year [239], and so was
the first collision cryptanalysis on the full SHA-1 [237]. As of April 2010 real collision
examples of SHA-1 have not been found, simply because the task is still enormous.
Surprisingly, despite several attempts, MD2 has still remained quite resistant toward
serious cryptanalysis [196, 211, 178, 156, 157].
Although the SHA-2 family of hash functions has not yet succumbed to the new
collision-finding cryptanalytic algorithms that have plagued MD5 and SHA-1, the cryp-
tographic community has lost their confidence in them. Although this may be mainly
due to their design principles, being similar to those underlying MD5 and SHA-1, some
undesirable properties of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction have also highlighted the
situation. These unwanted weaknesses include the length extension, multi-collision,
second preimage and herding attacks. Although the length extension property has
been folklore knowledge for many years, the other ones were respectively discovered in
2004 by Joux [135], in 2005 by Kelsey and Schneier [147], and in 2006 by Kelsey and
Kohno [145]. In response to the shocking cryptanalytic results on MD5 and SHA-1
and in order to improve the current state of the art concerning hash functions, NIST
initiated the SHA-3 competition to develop a new set of hash functions. Expected
to finish in 2012, the SHA-3 competition is still on-going. Unlike SHA-1 and SHA-2
which were designed internally, the new procedure goes through an open competition
similar to that of AES [182]. The call for candidate algorithms was made in November
2007 [181] and 64 candidates were submitted by the call deadline, 31 October 2008. For
the first round of the competition, 51 candidates were accepted of which 14 survived
to the second round [202]. Table 1.2 shows the 14 second round candidates according
to the elimination done by NIST on September 2009. NIST plans to select approxi-
mately five finalists for the third round of the competition in the fall of 2010. Due to
the weaknesses of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, many of the SHA-3 candidates
are based on the alternative designs such as permutation-based [59, 210, 223, 209] and
wide-pipe [166] constructions.
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BLAKE Grøstl Shabal
BLUE MIDNIGHT WISH Hamsi SHAvite-3
CubeHash JH SIMD
ECHO Keccak Skein
Fugue Luffa
Table 1.2: SHA-3 second round candidates. The table includes the 14 surviving
SHA-3 candidates of the second round. The list is going to shrink in the fall 2010 to about
five candidates for the next round.
1.5 Techniques for symmetric cryptanalysis
Regardless of how computationally secure a cryptographic algorithm is, there always
exist a set of generic cryptanalytic methods. The most trivial generic cryptanalytic
methods are brute force search for keyed primitives and birthday paradox for finding
hash collisions. These methods can be applied to relevant primitives, independent of
the design details. On the other hand, there are many other cryptanalytic tools that,
while still enjoying some sort of generality, specifically target the internal structure of
the primitives. A well-designed primitive has at least one tunable parameter, such as
the number of rounds. There is, however, a trade-off between security and efficiency of
the primitive when playing with the tunable parameter. For example, increasing the
number of rounds normally decreases efficiency while increasing security. A designer’s
job is to find a good balance between security and efficiency. In the following we give
the intuition behind some of the well-known methods which are applicable to symmetric
primitives. The interested reader may refer to [229] for other cryptanalytic techniques.
1.5.1 Brute force method
The brute force method is the most na¨ıve generic cryptanalytic algorithm. Having a
few ciphertext/plaintext pairs in hand, the correct key is simply found by exhaustively
searching the key space. The complexity to recover the key with certainty is 2k for k-bit
long keys. This method is academically important since it determines the maximum
level of security level which a security scheme can provide. In general, if the cryptanalyst
restricts the search space to a subset of the keys of size 2k−p, p ∈ [0, p], he expects to
recover the key with success probability 2−p. This justifies our definition of a secure
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stream cipher, see Definition 2.
1.5.2 Birthday paradox
In probability theory, the birthday problem pertains to the probability that in a set of
randomly chosen people some pair of them would have the same birthday. In a group of
at least 23 randomly chosen people, this chance is more than 50%. This problem is also
known as birthday paradox since this result is counter-intuitive to many. In general,
the probability that among d independent and identically distributed random variables
with uniform distribution over a set of size N , two of them would be equal is about
1− exp(−d(d−1)2N ).
A direct application of this paradox is the collision finding problem for hash func-
tions, first pointed out by Yuval [243] in 1979. For a hash function with n-bit message
digests, the number of message digests one needs to observe before a collision is found
is approximately 2n/2. For this application, one can substantially reduce the mem-
ory requirements by translating the problem to the detection of a cycle in an iterated
mapping [201]. See [228] for an efficient parallel collision search algorithm.
1.5.3 Time-memory trade-offs
Time-memory trade-offs were first introduced by Hellman [129] in 1980 as a generic way
to cryptanalyze block ciphers, but can be generalized to the general problem of inverting
one-way functions. Hellman’s method uses a precomputed table of total size M which
allows to recover a block cipher’s key in time complexity T . In a precomputation phase
several starting points are randomly chosen. Then from each starting point a chain is
constructed to get an end point. The chains are built by successively applying a function
which is derived from the underlying block cipher. Then the end point/starting point
pairs are sorted based on the end point values and stored in a Table of size M . In
the on-line phase, which takes time T , the goal is to find the predecessor of a given
point. This is done by constructing a long chain of points from the given point. Each
time a new point is computed, it is looked up in the precomputed table. If it exists, in
the table, from the corresponding starting point, the predecessor of the given point is
found. It can be shown that the values of M and T satisfy the relation TM2 = 22k (up
to logarithmic factors), where k is the key size of the block cipher. A convenient choice
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of M and T is M = T = 2
2
3
k. Nonetheless, the precomputation phase still requires a
time complexity of 2k encryptions.
For stream ciphers based on finite state machines whose structures are independent
of the key, there is a well-known time-memory-data trade-off cryptanalysis [17, 121].
This threat does not apply to modern stream ciphers since it is worse than exhaustive
key search when a large internal state is deployed. This method can be explained
as follows. For a stream cipher with an s-bit internal state, the goal is to invert the
function which maps an internal state to the first s bits of the keystream generated from
that state. To this end, in a preprocessing phase, the cryptanalyst chooses 2s/2 random
inputs (internal states) and applies this function to them to get their corresponding
outputs (the prefix of length s of the corresponding keystream). He then sorts the
output/input pairs in approximate time 2s/2 and stores them, based on the output
value, in a table of the same size. The cryptanalyst then observes a keystream of
length 2s/2, from which he can construct about 2s/2 overlapping output values. For
each output value he can examine the sorted table and find the corresponding internal
state value if it exists in the table. According to the birthday paradox a match between
the saved points and the observed output values is quite likely. Since, time, memory
and data complexities of this cryptanalytic algorithm is about 2s/2, it can be easily
thwarted by choosing an internal state which is at least twice bigger than the key
size. Other variants of time-memory-data trade-offs on stream ciphers can be found
in [55, 133, 54, 105].
1.5.4 Differential cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis is a general cryptanalytic method applicable primarily to
block ciphers, but also to stream ciphers and cryptographic hash functions. In a very
broad sense, it is the study of how specific differences in the input of a particular trans-
formation affect the resulting output. Differential cryptanalysis was first publicized by
Biham and Shamir in 1990 [47] to analyze reduced-round variants of DES [47, 48, 52] in
a chosen plaintext scenario, followed by the first cryptanalysis on DES, in 1991, which
recovers the key faster than exhaustive search [51]. Nevertheless, it turned out that
IBM was already aware of this method [79] and so DES was designed to be resistant
to differential cryptanalysis.
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Differential cryptanalysis studies the differences, usually by means of the XOR, as
they evolve through the various rounds and different operations of a symmetric primi-
tive. One first considers a transformation Z = F (X) which is related to the primitive
specification. In the case of block ciphers, the input X is the combination of the secret
key and the plaintext, i.e., X = (K,P ). Moreover, the mapping F is constructed by
tracing the network of transformations which gradually convert the plaintext into the
ciphertext. Any non-random behaviour of this transformation can be exploited to re-
cover the secret key or part of it. In particular, a cryptanalyst tries to find an input
difference ∆x and an output difference ∆z. The input difference ∆x is the combination
of the differences in the plaintext and the difference in the key which we assume to
be zero, i.e., ∆x = (0,∆p). The cryptanalyst then estimates the probability of the
differential (∆p → ∆z), i.e., Pr{F (K,P ) ⊕ F (K,P ⊕ ∆p) = ∆z}. The probability of
the differential (∆p → ∆z) can be computed over the whole input domain or a sub-
set of it. Moreover, for block ciphers, and in general for keyed symmetric primitives,
the mapping F is constructed in a way that the output difference ∆z is a function
of some part of the key, called subkey. For example, when the ciphertext is partially
decrypted using the last subkey, one gets the output value of F . Any abnormality in
the probability of the differential can be exploited to recover the subkey or get some
information about it by means of statistical methods. To this end, the cryptanalyst
collects many quadruples of plaintext pairs and their corresponding ciphertext pairs
where each plaintext pair has the desired difference ∆p. It is possible that some of the
plaintext pairs, which already satisfy the required input difference ∆x for the transfor-
mation F , provide the desired output difference ∆z as well. Having at least one such
pair, called a right pair, is essential to eliminate some of the wrong keys. The exact
number of the required right pairs is determined by the best statistical method which
the cryptanalyst can apply to recover the subkey.
Several refinements to differential cryptanalysis have attempted to improve the tech-
nique for some circumstances. A variant of differential cryptanalysis uses an extended
form of differences, in which some of the bits of the output difference are not fixed.
Because part of the output difference is left unspecified, this is equivalent to clustering
several differentials together. This type of cryptanalysis is called truncated differential
cryptanalysis [155]. Another extension of differential cryptanalysis takes advantage of
differentials which occur with probability zero [153, 43]; these differentials are called
21
1. INTRODUCTION
impossible differentials [43]. There are also non-XOR differential cryptanalysis vari-
ants [160], such as modular subtraction, modular division, or a combination of different
differences in various places. The generalization of differential cryptanalysis which
considers differences between differences is called higher-order differential cryptanaly-
sis [155]. Higher-order differences prove to be successful in several cases where ordinary
differential cryptanalysis is not applicable. Furthermore, there are also cryptanalytic
methods that combine differentials in various ways, the most promising of which are the
boomerang [232], amplified boomerang [146], and rectangle [46] cryptanalyses. Lastly,
in related key cryptanalysis [42, 154], which is less desirable and highly disputed, a
nonzero difference in the keys is also permitted.
Differential cryptanalysis of block ciphers and stream ciphers is closely related to
that of hash functions, but also disparate in some aspects. The dissimilarities were
recognized in early works [50, 49, 41, 197] and were later developed in hash crypt-
analyses [98, 99, 101, 75, 212, 44, 45, 236, 238, 239, 237, 73, 179, 70, 168], still used
extensively. A major dissimilarity is that the goal of the cryptanalyst is different. In
the first case, the aim is to obtain the secret key while in the later case there is no key
to be recovered and the goal is mostly to find a hash collision. Another main difference
is the freedom which the cryptanalyst has in playing with the plaintext/message. In
differential cryptanalysis of block ciphers, the only restriction on the chosen plaintext
pairs is their imposed difference. Remember that the input X is the combination of the
secret key and the plaintext, X = (K,P ). Although for a plaintext pair (P, P ⊕∆p),
the cryptanalyst has still the ability to choose the plaintext value P , this freedom can
be hardly exploited in practice (e.g., to increase the chance of getting a right pair).
This is mainly because of the fact that the secret key influences the way the input
difference propagates through the cipher from the very beginning. For hash functions,
however, there is no secret key involved and full control over the input X is available.
Any input X for which F (X ⊕∆x)⊕ F (X) = ∆z, called conforming message, yields a
collision for the underlying hash function. The recent collision finding algorithms have
investigated extensive methods to use this freedom in order to efficiently find such con-
forming messages by means of satisfying some conditions. These methods are referred
to as message modification techniques which apparently have been used by Xiaoyun
Wang as early as 1997 [233, 234]. However, they were brought to the attention of the
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international cryptographic community only in 2005 [236, 238, 239, 237]. Message mod-
ification techniques use concepts such as neutral bits [44], semi-neutral bits [167, 226]
and tunnels [151]. When it comes to implementation, backtracking algorithms [38, 73]
are used to find a conforming message.
1.5.5 Integral cryptanalysis
The dual of differential cryptanalysis is integral cryptanalysis [158]. There are several
cryptanalytic methods related to integral cryptanalysis in the literature, including the
square [93], saturation [165], AIDA [231] and Cube [100] cryptanalytic methods. These
methods are collectively referred to as multiset cryptanalytic method [56]. Unlike
differential cryptanalysis, which uses pairs of chosen inputs with a fixed difference,
integral cryptanalysis uses sets or even multisets of chosen inputs. In most of the cases
the input is divided into two parts, of which one part is held constant and the other part
varies through all possibilities. Furthermore, in integral cryptanalysis one considers
the sum of the outputs over the multiset, whereas in differential cryptanalysis the
subtraction between the output pair is the center of concentration. For example, if we
are considering integral cryptanalysis of the function F (X) where X = (x0, x1, x2, x3) ∈
Z4256, we might choose 256 different inputs that are the same in the last three positions.
In other words we compute
∑
x∈Z256 F (x, c1, c2, c3) where c1, c2, c3 are some constants.
For finite fields with characteristic two, however, the subtraction and addition are the
same. Therefore, integral cryptanalysis can be considered as a variant of the previously
mentioned higher-order differential cryptanalysis [155].
1.5.6 Algebraic cryptanalysis
The basic principle of algebraic cryptanalysis goes back to Shannon’s seminal work [218]
in 1949. It consists of expressing the whole cryptographic algorithm as a large system
of multivariate algebraic equations, which can then be solved to recover, e.g., the secret
key. Despite much research in algebraic cryptanalysis of block ciphers [84, 78, 4, 53],
thus far, the proposed methods have had very limited success in targeting modern
block ciphers. In fact, there is no modern block cipher (with practical relevance)
that has been successfully cryptanalyzed using algebraic cryptanalysis faster than with
other techniques. This is also true for the case of algebraic cryptanalysis of hash
functions. There is limited work on algebraic cryptanalysis against hash functions
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and algebraic techniques have thus far been relatively unexplored for hash function
cryptanalysis. In contrast to block ciphers and hash functions, algebraic cryptanalysis
has been successfully used in the analysis of several LFSR-based stream ciphers [83,
81, 8, 7, 82]. Algebraic cryptanalysis as a method for stream cipher cryptanalysis was
originally introduced by Courtois and Meier [83], and it generally applies to nonlinear
combiner generators and nonlinear filter generators. Algebraic cryptanalysis of these
keystream generators exploits the fact that each new keystream bit gives rise to a new
simple equation on the initial state. Thus, the cryptanalyst can collect a large number
of bits from the keystream to construct a system of equations, which can then be solved.
The interested reader is referred to [107] for an overview of the main techniques used
for solving systems of multivariate polynomial equations, with special focus on methods
used in cryptanalysis.
1.6 Contribution of the thesis
This thesis concerns cryptanalysis of stream ciphers and hash functions with emphasis
on some of the eSTREAM [106] and NIST SHA-3 [181] candidates.
1.6.1 Target algorithms
In particular, we have contributed to the cryptanalysis of reduced-round variants of the
following algorithms.
1. Salsa20 [31, 35]: One of the eSTREAM final candidates in the software profile,
designed by D. Bernstein in 2005.
2. ChaCha [30, 33]: A variant of the Salsa20 stream cipher, designed by D. Bern-
stein in 2008.
3. Trivium [71, 68, 72]: One of the eSTREAM final candidates in the hardware
profile, designed by C. De Cannie`re and B. Preneel in 2005.
4. Grain-128 [126, 127]: One of the eSTREAM phase 3 candidates designed by
M. Hell, T. Johansson, A. Maximov and W. Meier in 2005. It is a variant of
the Grain [128, 127] stream cipher, one of the eSTREAM final candidates in the
hardware profile.
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5. Klimov-Shamir SSSC [152]: A self-synchronizing stream cipher proposed by
A. Klimov and A. Shamir in 2005 at the Fast Software Encryption workshop
(FSE’05).
6. MD6 [206]: One of the first round candidates of the NIST SHA-3 competition,
designed by Rivest et al. in 2008.
7. CubeHash [34]: One of the NIST SHA-3 candidates, designed by D. Bernstein
in 2008. It is currently one of the promising second round candidates.
1.6.2 Previous work and main contributions
The main contribution of this work is introducing the concept of probabilistic neutrality
for the arguments of a function, a generalization of definition of neutrality. Interest-
ingly, our cryptanalyses of all the aforementioned algorithms rely on neutrality and/or
probabilistic neutrality. An input argument of a given function is called neutral if it
does not affect the output of the function. This simple idea has already been used in
key recovery cryptanalysis of block ciphers as well as in collision finding algorithms for
hash functions.
To explain how neutrality is used in cryptanalysis of block ciphers, consider a block
cipher C = EK(P ) which maps the plaintext P into the ciphertext C using the secret
key K. As explained in section 1.5.4, a cryptanalyst derives a function Z = F (K,P )
from the block cipher such that the output of F can also be computed from the ci-
phertext, by partially decrypting it. In other words the output of F can be related to
the ciphertext and (some part of) the key. Let’s assume Z = G(K,C), see Figure 1.6.
This method is also known as the meet-in-the-middle technique. A cryptanalyst then
finds some nonrandom behaviour of F (e.g., using differential cryptanalysis) in a chosen
plaintext scenario to get some information about the key with the help of G. The key
point is that the function G does not depend on the whole key. In other words, only
some part of the key, known as subkey, suffices to partially decrypt the ciphertext to
get the output value of the function F . In other words a large part of the key is neutral
for G. Hence, in order to detect the correct subkey, the subkey space is exhaustively
searched instead of the whole key space. This application of neutrality is very trivial
and has mostly been used implicitly.
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Figure 1.6: Meet-in-the-middle technique - For a block cipher C = EK(P ) one
derives two less complex functions F and G such that F (K,P ) = G(K,C). The function
F has some nonrandom behaviour which can be detected using G. The function G does
not depend on the whole key in practice.
However, in 2004 Biham and Chen explicitly used the idea of neutrality to speed
up collision finding algorithms for hash functions [44]. The principle of their idea can
be roughly explained as follows. As mentioned in section 1.5.4, the collision finding
algorithms for hash functions are normally translated into finding a conforming mes-
sage. That is, one needs to find a message X such that F (X) ⊕ F (X ⊕ ∆x) = ∆z
where the function F is derived based on differential cryptanalysis of the underlying
hash function. If p is the probability that a random message X is a conforming one,
a solution can be found after 1/p random tries. However, the task can be performed
faster in two steps by dividing the message in two parts, let say X = X1||X2. In the
first step the cryptanalyst finds the message part X1 such that some conditions are
satisfied. These conditions are such that they are not violated once choosing the sec-
ond message parts X2. In other words, the conditions are neutral with respect to X2.
In the second step, provided that X1 has been chosen to fulfill those conditions of the
first step, X2 is independently found such that X1||X2 is a conforming message. The
probability to randomly accomplish the first and second phases is p1 and p2 respec-
tively where p ≈ p1p2. Therefore, the effort is reduced from 1/(p1p2) to 1/p1 + 1/p2
(p1 and p2 are very small numbers). The multi-block technique [45, 236, 238] as well as
cryptanalysis based on semi-neutral bits [167, 226] can be seen as applications of the
neutrality concept in hash function cryptanalysis.
We call an input argument of a function probabilistic neutral if it does not have a
“significant” influence on the output of the function. Very loosely speaking, it means
that if the input argument is changed, the output of the function stays the same with
a probability “close” to one. We exploit the idea of probabilistic neutrality to crypt-
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analyze several stream ciphers and hash functions. To the best of our knowledge this
is the first time that the probabilistic neutrality has found a concrete application in
cryptanalysis.
1.6.3 Publications and thesis outline
Here is a list of articles which I have published, with the help of my coauthors, during
my Ph.D. studies.
1. Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Simon Fischer, Shahram Khazaei, Willi Meier, and
Christian Rechberger. “New Features of Latin Dances: Analysis of Salsa, ChaCha,
and Rumba”. In Kaisa Nyberg, editor, Fast Software Encryption, 15th Interna-
tional Workshop, FSE 2008, Lausanne, Switzerland, February 10-13, 2008, Re-
vised Selected Papers, volume 5086 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
470–488. Springer, 2008.
2. Simon Fischer, Shahram Khazaei, and Willi Meier. “Chosen IV Statistical Anal-
ysis for Key Recovery Attacks on Stream Ciphers”. In Serge Vaudenay, editor,
Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2008, First International Conference
on Cryptology in Africa, Casablanca, Morocco, June 11–14, 2008. Proceedings,
volume 5023 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 236–245. Springer,
2008.
3. Shahram Khazaei and Willi Meier. “New Directions in Cryptanalysis of Self-
Synchronizing Stream Ciphers”. In Dipanwita Roy Chowdhury, Vincent Rijmen,
and Abhijit Das, editors, Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2008, 9th Inter-
national Conference on Cryptology in India, Kharagpur, India, December 14–17,
2008. Proceedings, volume 5365 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
15–26. Springer, 2008.
4. Eric Brier, Shahram Khazaei, Willi Meier, and Thomas Peyrin. “Linearization
Framework for Collision Attacks: Application to CubeHash and MD6”. In Mit-
suru Matsui, editor, Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2009, 15th Interna-
tional Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information
Security, Tokyo, Japan, December 6–10, 2009. Proceedings, volume 5912 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 560–577. Springer, 2009.
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5. Shahram Khazaei, Simon Knellwolf, Willi Meier, and Deian Stefan. “Improved
Linear Differential Attacks on CubeHash”. In Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja
Lange , editor, Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2010, Third Interna-
tional Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Stellenbosch, South Africa, May 3–6,
2010. Proceedings, volume 6055 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
407–418. Springer, 2010.
6. Shahram Khazaei and Willi Meier. “On Reconstruction of RC4 Keys from In-
ternal States”. In Jacques Calmet, Willi Geiselmann, and Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade,
editors, Mathematical Methods in Computer Science, MMICS 2008, Karlsruhe,
Germany, December 17–19, 2008 – Essays in Memory of Thomas Beth, volume
5393 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 179–189. Springer, 2008.
7. Shahram Khazaei, Simon Fischer, and Willi Meier. “Reduced Complexity At-
tacks on the Alternating Step Generator”. In Carlisle M. Adams, Ali Miri, and
Michael J. Wiener, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography, 14th International
Workshop, SAC 2007, Ottawa, Canada, August 16–17, 2007, Revised Selected
Papers, volume 4876 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1–16. Springer,
2007.
This thesis is based on the first five articles and is organized as follows. Chapter 2
concerns cryptanalysis of Salsa20 and ChaCha stream ciphers and it includes part of
the results from the first paper. Chapter 3 deals with cryptanalysis of Trivium and
Grain-128 stream ciphers, which is based on the material presented in the second arti-
cle. Chapter 4 includes cryptanalysis of the Klimov-Shamir self-synchronizing stream
cipher which is presented in the third publication. Chapter 5 discusses cryptanaly-
sis of CubeHash and MD6 hash function, based on an extended version of the fourth
publication and the fifth. Finally, chapter 6 concludes the dissertation.
The last two articles concern cryptanalysis of two stream ciphers RC4 and Alter-
nating Step Generator. RC4 [3, 216] is the most widely used stream cipher designed
by Rivest in 1994. Alternating Step Generator [124] is one of the well-known classical
LFSR-based constructions, proposed by Gu¨nther in 1987. We do not include these two
papers in the thesis since they do not fit in the probabilistic neutral bit cryptanalysis.
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In this chapter we cryptanalyze the stream cipher Salsa20 [31], one of the eSTREAM fi-
nal candidates in the software profile [20], and its variant ChaCha [33]. These primitives
have unique designs with a trivial state update function and a complex, round-based
output function, similar to that of block ciphers and hash functions. The only oper-
ations used in the designs are modular addition, XOR and rotation of 32-bit words.
Hence, they are suitable targets for differential cryptanalysis. First, we identify suitable
choices of truncated single-bit differentials using common statistical methods. Then we
introduce the notion of probabilistic neutral bits, along with a method to find them,
which lets us correctly detect part of the key using probabilistic backward computa-
tions. The results of this chapter are based on [15] which we published at FSE 2008.
In [15], we also presented a cryptanalysis of Rumba [32], a compression function based
on Salsa20.
2.1 Introduction
Salsa20 [31] is a stream cipher, introduced by Bernstein in 2005 as a candidate to
the eSTREAM project [106], and it was selected as one of the four final candidates
in the software profile. Bernstein later introduced ChaCha [33], a variant of Salsa20
that aims at bringing faster diffusion without slowing down encryption. These designs
have a total number of 20 rounds. The reduced variants are denoted by Salsa20/R and
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ChaChaR, when the number of rounds is reduced to R. These ciphers are meant to
provide 256-bit security; they also accept 128-bit keys, though.
Before our results, three independent cryptanalyses were published [87, 114, 227], re-
porting key-recovery cryptanalyses for reduced versions of Salsa20 with up to 7 rounds.
These cryptanalyses exploit a truncated differential over 3 or 4 rounds. In 2005, Crow-
ley [87] reported a 3-round differential, and built upon this a cryptanalytic algorithm for
Salsa20/5 with time complexity 2165. In 2006, Fischer et al. [114] exploited a 4-round
differential to cryptanalyze Salsa20/6 with time complexity 2177. In 2007, Tsunoo et
al. [227] improved the time complexity of the cryptanalysis results for Salsa20/7 to 2190,
still exploiting a 4-round differential, and also claiming a break of Salsa20/8. However,
the latter cryptanalysis is effectively slower than brute force.
The previous methods use the fact that not a complete knowledge of all key bits is
required to detect the bias of the truncated differential from the backward direction. In
other words, part of the key is neutral and does not need to be guessed. Tsunoo et al.
notably tried to improve the previous results by reducing the guesses to more relevant
bits — rather than guessing the whole relevant key bits — using nonlinear approxima-
tion of integer addition. However, their method is not precise enough to give an exact
estimation of the cryptanalytic cost. To improve the previous cryptanalyses results of
Salsa20, we introduce a novel method, inspired from correlation cryptanalysis [221],
and from the notions of completeness [110, 143] and neutrality [44]. In particular, we
introduce the notion of probabilistic neutral bits (PNBs) in this chapter. This concept
not only allows us to determine the most relevant key bits to be guessed, but also
provides a method to give a precise estimation of the cryptanalytic cost. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first time that PNBs are used for the cryptanalysis of keyed
primitives. As a result, we present the first key-recovery cryptanalysis for Salsa20/8,
with time complexity 2251, and improve the previous cryptanalysis for Salsa20/7 by
a factor of 239, when these ciphers use 256-bit keys. We also consider cryptanalysis
of reduced-round variants of Salsa20 with 128-bit keys as well as the ChaCha stream
cipher.
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2.2 Specification of the primitives
In this section, we give a concise description of the stream ciphers Salsa20 and ChaCha.
The R-round variants of these ciphers are denoted by Salsa20/R and ChaChaR. The
original designs are composed of 20 rounds. These ciphers use a 256-bit key and a
64-bit nonce (or IV) to produce a sequence of 512-bit keystream blocks. They also
accept 128-bit keys, in which case an extended key is used by simply concatenating
two 128-bit keys to increase the length to 256 bits. Unless mentioned otherwise, we
focus on the 256-bit version. These stream ciphers work with 32-bit words and use
three operations on words: XOR (⊕), left rotation (≪) and modulo 232 addition (+).
The eight-word key k = (k0, k1, . . . , k7) and the two-word nonce v = (v0, v1) produce a
sequence of 16-word keystream blocks. The ith keystream block, 0 ≤ i ≤ 264−1, of the
stream cipher is a function of the key, the nonce, and the two-word counter t = (t0, t1)
which corresponds to the integer i (i = t0 + t1232). Both of these ciphers operate on
the 4× 4 matrix X of words of the following form
X =

x0 x1 x2 x3
x4 x5 x6 x7
x8 x9 x10 x11
x12 x13 x14 x15
 . (2.1)
Once the matrix X is filled with the key, the nonce, the counter and some constants,
the ith keystream block Z is defined as
Z = X + RoundR(X) . (2.2)
The “+” denotes wordwise modular addition of two matrices. The major differences
between Salsa20 and ChaCha are initialization of the matrix X and the definition of
RoundR function. We detail the differences below.
2.2.1 Salsa20
For Salsa20 the matrix X is initialized as
X =

x0 x1 x2 x3
x4 x5 x6 x7
x8 x9 x10 x11
x12 x13 x14 x15
 =

c0 k0 k1 k2
k3 c1 v0 v1
t0 t1 c2 k4
k5 k6 k7 c3
 . (2.3)
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where (c0, c1, c2, c3) = (0x61707865, 0x3320646E, 0x79622D32, 0x6B206574) are prede-
fined constants.1 The function RoundR(X) is itself based on a permutation called
quarterround which maps a four-word vector (a0, a1, a2, a3) into the four-word vector
(b0, b1, b2, b3) according to the following sequence of operations
b1 = a1 ⊕
[
(a3 + a0)≪ 7
]
,
b2 = a2 ⊕
[
(a0 + b1)≪ 9
]
,
b3 = a3 ⊕
[
(b1 + b2)≪ 13
]
,
b0 = a0 ⊕
[
(b2 + b3)≪ 18
]
.
(2.4)
For a matrix X, the value of Roundr(X), 1 ≤ r ≤ R is computed in r rounds.
The rounds are counted from one, and at each round the matrix X is updated. In odd
rounds, the quarterround mapping updates the columns (x0, x4, x8, x12), (x5, x9, x13, x1),
(x10, x14, x2, x6) and (x15, x3, x7, x11). Whereas, in even rounds, the rows (x0, x1, x2, x3),
(x5, x6, x7, x4), (x10, x11, x8, x9) and (x15, x12, x13, x14) are updated by the quarterround
function.
2.2.2 ChaCha
ChaCha is similar to Salsa20, with the following modifications.
1. The input words are placed differently in the initial matrix:
X =

x0 x1 x2 x3
x4 x5 x6 x7
x8 x9 x10 x11
x12 x13 x14 x15
 =

c0 c1 c2 c3
k0 k1 k2 k3
k4 k5 k6 k7
t0 t1 v0 v1
 . (2.5)
2. The quarterround permutation transforms a vector (a0, a1, a2, a3) to (b0, b1, b2, b3)
by sequentially computing
u0 = a0 + a1, u3 = (a3 ⊕ u0) ≪ 16 ,
u2 = a2 + u3, u1 = (a1 ⊕ u2) ≪ 12 ,
b0 = u0 + u1, b3 = (u3 ⊕ z0) ≪ 8 ,
b2 = u2 + b3, z1 = (u1 ⊕ z2) ≪ 7 .
(2.6)
3. The Roundr(X) function, 1 ≤ r ≤ R, is defined differently. In odd rounds,
the quarterround function updates the columns (x0, x4, x8, x12), (x1, x5, x9, x13),
1A word is denoted by an eight-digit hexadecimal number and, as it is conventional, we prepend
the hexadecimal numbers with 0x.
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(x2, x6, x10, x14) and (x3, x7, x11, x15). Whereas, in even rounds, the quarterround
mapping updates the diagonals (x0, x5, x10, x15), (x1, x6, x11, x12), (x2, x7, x8, x13)
and (x3, x4, x9, x14).
We refer to the Salsa20 [31] and ChaCha [33] original descriptions for more details
and design philosophies. Note that we did not use the notation Roundr(X) as the input
matrix is updated differently in the odd and even rounds. This would have brought
confusion with r-fold function combination. The Roundr(X), 1 ≤ r ≤ R, function is a
permutation and trivially invertible for both Salsa20 and ChaCha. We use the notation
Round−1R,r, 1 ≤ r ≤ R, for the function which maps RoundR(X) into Roundr(X).
2.3 Cryptanalytic model
The most reasonable cryptanalytic model for Salsa20 and ChaCha is a chosen nonce,
chosen counter scenario. In this model an adversary wants to recover the key k of one
of the stream ciphers Salsa20/R or ChaChaR. As shown in Figure 2.1, the adversary is
allowed to interact with the stream cipher oracle as follows. The adversary can submit
as many pairs of nonces and counters (v, t) of his choice as he wants. Then the oracle
responds to each request with the corresponding keystream block Z created from a fixed
random key k, unknown to the adversary. Once the adversary has collected enough
keystream blocks, he tries to guess the secret key k.
We consider differential cryptanalysis of Salsa20 and ChaCha. Specifically, the
adversary sends two pairs of nonces and counters (v, t) and (v′, t′) with a fixed difference
(∆v,∆t) to the oracle. The oracle then sends back their corresponding keystream blocks
Z and Z ′. In this chapter, the data complexity is given in number of keystream block
pairs collected by the adversary. The time complexity unit is the time required to
produce one keystream block.
2.4 Differential cryptanalysis with probabilistic neutral
bits
This section introduces differential cryptanalysis based on a new technique called prob-
abilistic neutral bits (PNBs). To apply it to Salsa20/R and ChaChaR, we first search
for one-bit truncated differentials in the state matrix after a few rounds. Then we
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Figure 2.1: Cryptanalytic model for the Salsa20 and ChaCha - Cryptanalysis
is done in a chosen nonce, chosen counter scenario. The adversary has access to many
keystream blocks for selected pairs of nonces and counters of his choice. The adversary’s
goal is then to recover the secret key which is unknown to him.
describe a general framework for probabilistic backwards computation, and introduce
the notion of PNBs along with a method to find them.
The intuition behind our method can be sketched as follows. Suppose that we have
identified a suitable non-zero difference (∆v,∆t) in the nonce and counter such that
after r rounds, 1 ≤ r ≤ R, one of the bits in the output of the function Roundr is
biased. Recall that Z = X + RoundR(X) and X depends on the key. If we know
the whole key, we can compute backwards from given keystream blocks to observe the
biased truncated differential bit of Roundr(X). However, if we do not know the key, we
might have to guess it in order to detect the bias which is quite expensive. The idea of
the PNBs is to partially guess the key. That is, we guess only those key bits which are
extremely important. The bias must still be observable when we compute backwards,
even though the other key bits are not correctly guessed.
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2.4.1 Truncated differentials
Let X be an initial state matrix filled with the constants, key k, nonce v and counter t,
see equations (2.3) and (2.5). Consider another initial state matrix X ′ filled with the
constants and the same key k, but with nonce v′ and counter t′, where ∆v = (v0⊕v′0, v1⊕
v′1) and ∆t = (t0 ⊕ t′0, t1 ⊕ t′1). We are interested in the one-bit truncated differential
properties of Roundr function for some small value of r. Let ∆r = Roundr(X) ⊕
Roundr(X ′) where “⊕” is the wordwise XOR of two matrices. Denote the j-th, 0 ≤
j ≤ 31, LSB of the word i, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, of a general 4 × 4 matrix X by [X]i,j . We
consider one-bit truncated differentials at the qth LSB of the word number p. Such a
differential is denoted by ([∆r]p,q | ∆v,∆t) where 1 ≤ r ≤ R, 0 ≤ p ≤ 15, 0 ≤ q ≤ 31.
In this context, the bias εd of the differential for a fixed key is defined by
Pr
v,t
{[∆r]p,q = 1} = 12(1 + εd) , (2.7)
where v and t are considered as random variables. In addition, the value ε?d is defined
to be the median value of εd when key is considered random. Hence, for half of the
keys this differential will have a bias of at least ε?d.
2.4.2 Probabilistic backwards computation
In the following, assume that we are given a differential ([∆r]p,q |∆v,∆t) with bias εd for
an unknown key k. The corresponding keystream blocks to X and X ′ are respectively
denoted by Z and Z ′. Recall that X depends on k, v and t, whereas X ′ depends on k,
v′ = v⊕∆v and t′ = t⊕∆t; see equations (2.3) and (2.5). Having Z, Z ′, k, v and t, one
can invert the operations in Z = X + RoundR(X) and Z ′ = X ′ + RoundR(X ′) in order
to access to the r-round forward differential (with r ≤ R). This is possible by backward
computation thanks to the relations Roundr(X) = Round−1R,r(Z−X) and Roundr(X ′) =
Round−1R,r(Z
′−X ′). More specifically, define f(k, v, t, Z, Z ′) as the function which returns
the qth LSB of the word number p of the matrix Round−1R,r(Z−X)⊕Round−1R,r(Z ′−X ′),
that is,
f(k, v, t, Z, Z ′) = [Round−1R,r(Z −X)⊕ Round−1R,r(Z ′ −X ′)]p,q . (2.8)
Therefore, the relation f(k, v, t, Z, Z ′) = [∆r]p,q holds. Given enough output block
pairs with the presumed difference in the input, one can verify the correctness of a
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guessed candidate kˆ for the key k by evaluating the bias of the function f . This is
possible based on the reasonable assumption that we have Pr{f(kˆ, v, t, Z, Z ′) = 1} =
1
2(1 + εd) conditioned on kˆ = k, whereas for (almost all) kˆ 6= k we expect f to be
unbiased, i.e., Pr{f(kˆ, v, t, Z, Z ′) = 1} = 12 . The classical way of finding the correct
key requires exhaustive search over all possible 2256 guesses kˆ. However, we can search
only over a subkey of m = 256− n bits, provided that an approximation g of f which
effectively depends on m key bits is available. More formally, let ks correspond to the
subkey of m bits of the key k and let f be correlated to g with bias εa; that is,
Pr
v,t,Z,Z′
{f(k, v, t, Z, Z ′) = g(ks, v, t, Z, Z ′)} = 12(1 + εa) . (2.9)
Note that deterministic backwards computation (i.e., ks = k with f = g) is a special
case with εa = 1. Denote the bias of g by ε, i.e., Prv,t{g(ks, v, t, Z, Z ′) = 1} = 12(1 + ε).
Under some reasonable independency assumptions, the equality ε = εd ·εa holds. Again,
we denote ε? the median bias over all keys (we verified in experiments that ε? can be
well estimated by the median of εd · εa). Here, one can verify the correctness of a
guessed candidate kˆs for the subkey ks by evaluating the bias of the function g based
on the fact that we have Pr{g(kˆs, v, t, Z, Z ′) = 1} = 12(1 + ε) for kˆs = ks, whereas
Pr{g(kˆs, v, t, Z, Z ′) = 1} = 12 for kˆs 6= ks. This way we are faced with an exhaustive
search over 2m subkey candidates as opposed to the original 2256 key candidates. This
can potentially lead to a faster cryptanalysis. We stress that the price which we pay is
a higher data complexity as we will see in the following.
In section 2.4.3, we address the problem of finding an approximation function g.
For the moment, assume that such an approximation is available. One can shrink the
set of possible 2m subkeys to a smaller subset if he is given some keystream block pairs.
The number of required keystream block pairs depends on how small one wants the
size of the filtered subset be and the probability that this subset includes the correct
subkey. More precisely, for estimating the number N of keystream block pairs, we need
to consider the following problem of hypothesis testing [222, 85]. We are given a set of
2m sequences of random variables where 2m − 1 of them verify the null hypothesis H0;
that is, the candidate is not the correct subkey. One of them, i.e., the correct subkey,
verifies an alternative hypothesis H1. For a realization a of the corresponding random
variable A, the decision rule D(a) = i to accept Hi can lead to two types of errors:
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1. Non-detection: D(a) = 0 when A ∈ H1. The probability of this event is pnd.
2. False alarm: D(a) = 1 when A ∈ H0. The probability of this event is pfa.
In our case, the random variable A is the vector of length N of the values of
g(kˆs, v, t, Z, Z ′) derived from the N keystream block pairs. Moreover, the optimal
distinguisher is simply constructed by comparing the Hamming weight of a realization
a of this vector with a certain threshold. The Neyman-Pearson lemma [85] gives us
a result to estimate the number N of samples required to get some bounds on the
probabilities. Indeed, it can be shown that for
N ≈
(√
c ln 4 + 3
√
1− ε2
ε
)2
, (2.10)
and for an appropriate threshold value we have pnd = 1.3 × 10−3 and pfa = 2−c.
Calculus details and more details on the construction of the optimal distinguisher can
be found in [222], see also [85, 22] for more general results on the distinguishability
of distributions. In our case, the value of ε is key dependent, so we use the median
bias ε? in place of ε in equation (2.10), resulting in a success probability of at least
1
2(1− pnd) ≈ 12 for the cryptanalytic algorithm.
We will show in section 2.5 that the time complexity of a cryptanalytic algorithm
constructed based on such a distinguisher for Salsa20 and ChaCha is 2mN + 2256−c.
For a given m and ε?, the value of c (or equivalently N or pfa) is chosen such that it
minimizes 2mN + 2256−c.
Remark 1. Previous cryptanalysis of Salsa20 use the rough estimate of N = ε−2
samples in order to identify the correct subkey. This estimate, however, is low and
incorrect as it ignores the numerator of equation (2.10). This value is the number of
samples necessary to distinguish two random variables, one of them coming from a
uniform source (hypothesis H0) and the other from a non-uniform source with bias ε
(hypothesis H1). This is clearly a different problem of hypothesis testing.
2.4.3 Probabilistic neutral bits
Our new view of the problem, described in section 2.4.2, demands efficient ways for
finding suitable approximations g(ks,W ) of a given function f(k,W ) where ks is a
subvector of k. In our case, we have W = (v, t, Z, Z ′) which we treat as a uniformly
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distributed random variable. Finding such approximations, in general, is an interesting
open problem which is related to the completeness/neutrality [110, 143] (see also [44]),
correlation immunity [220] and avalanche properties [116, 240] of Boolean functions.
In this section we introduce a generalized concept of neutral bits, called probabilistic
neutral bits (PNBs). This concept helps us to find suitable approximations in the case
that the Boolean function f does not properly mix its input bits. Generally speaking,
the concept of probabilistic neutrality allows us to divide the key bits into two groups:
significant key bits (of size m) and non-significant key bits (of size n = 256 −m). In
order to identify these two sets, we focus on the amount of influence which each bit of
the key has on the output of f . Definition 3 formally introduces the neutrality measure.
Algorithm 1 Estimation of the neutrality measure
Inputs: key bit index l, number of rounds R, the parameters ∆v,∆t, r, p and q of the
truncated differential.
Output: the estimated neutrality measure γl.
1: Choose the number of samples T and let ctr = 0.
2: for T ′ from 1 to T do
3: Choose k, v, t, Z and Z ′ at random.
4: Construct an initial state matrix X with key k, nonce v and counter t (see
equations (2.3) and (2.5))
5: Similarly construct X ′ with key k, nonce v ⊕∆v and counter t⊕∆t
6: Compute the truncated output difference bit d1 = [Round−1R,r(Z − X) ⊕
Round−1R,r(Z
′ −X ′)]p,q.
7: Flip the lth key bit in X and X ′.
8: Compute the truncated output difference bit d2 = [Round−1R,r(Z − X) ⊕
Round−1R,r(Z
′ −X ′)]p,q.
9: Increment ctr if the output differences are equal, i.e., d1 = d2.
10: end for
11: Output γl = 2 · ctr/T − 1.
Definition 3. The neutrality measure of the lth key bit with respect to the function
f(k,W ) is defined as γl, where 12(1 + γl) is the probability (over all k and W ) that
complementing the lth key bit does not change the output of f(k,W ).
A key bit which has a neutrality measure equal to 1 is called a neutral bit; that is, it
has no effect on the output of the function. More generally, for a given threshold value
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γ, −1 ≤ γ ≤ 1, we call the key bits with γl > γ PNBs; whereas we refer to the other
key bits as significant key bits. We also use the term non-significant key bits for PNBs.
Intuitively, the bigger γ is, the less effect the PNBs have on the output of the function,
and hence the better g approximates f . However, the cryptanalyst must choose an
optimal value for the threshold γ to minimize the cryptanalytic time complexity. We
discuss this issue in section 2.5.
Remark 2. Tsunoo et al. [227] used approximations of integer addition to identify the
dependency of key bits. In their method, each bit of a modular addition is approximated
by a nonlinear Boolean function with a limited algebraic degree. This can be seen as a
special case of our method. In particular, our method lets us give a precise estimation of
the cryptanalytic time and data complexities (see section 2.5), whereas the estimation
of [227] is less reliable.
We use Algorithm 1 to compute the neutrality measure of a single key bit for
Salsa20 or ChaCha. The number of samples T must be adjusted according to the
desired confidence level on the estimated neutrality measure. For cryptanalysis of
these stream ciphers, a threshold γ is chosen and then the key bits are divided into
the set of significant and non-significant key bits according to this threshold value and
their neutrality measure. Then the function g is defined to be the same as f except
that the non-significant key bits are set to a random value in k.
2.5 Cryptanalytic algorithm and time complexity
Let’s assume that we have found a truncated differential ([∆r]p,q | ∆v,∆t), and for a
fixed threshold γ, suppose that we have identified the set of significant key bits for which
the function g has median bias ε?, see section 2.4.2. The cryptanalytic algorithm is then
presented in Algorithm 2. Let us now discuss the time complexity of our cryptanalytic
algorithm. Step 2 is repeated for all 2m subkey candidates. For each subkey, steps (3)
and (4) are always executed which requires roughly N keystream block evaluations.1
The search part of step (6) is performed only with probability pfa = 2−c which brings an
1 More precisely the complexity is about 2N(R − r)/R times the required time for producing one
keystream block. The reason is that R rounds are executed to produce one key stream block, whereas
here we only need to invert R−r rounds for each keystream block pair. Recall that in order to evaluate
f (see equation (2.8)), two partial inversions are required.
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additional cost of 2n in case a subkey passes the optimal distinguisher filter. Therefore,
the complexity of steps (5-8) is 2npfa, resulting in a total complexity of
2m(N + 2npfa) = 2mN + 2256−c , (2.11)
for the cryptanalytic algorithm.
Algorithm 2 : Cryptanalytic algorithm for Salsa20 and ChaCha
Inputs: the parameters p, q, r,∆v and ∆t of the truncated differential, the set of m
significant key bits corresponding to a threshold value γ, number N of keystream block
pairs.
Output: the secret key with some probability.
1: Collect N pairs of keystream blocks, produced under an unknown key, where each
pair satisfies the relevant input difference ∆v for nonce and ∆t for counter.
2: for each of the 2m possible assignments ks to the subkey (i.e., the significant key
bits) do
3: Set the significant key bits of a key k to ks and the non-significant key bits to a
random value.
4: Evaluate the function g with the subkey ks for the N keystream block pairs (to
this end, evaluate the function f with the key k constructed in step 3 for the N
keystream block pairs).
5: if the optimal distinguisher, based on the N evaluations of g, legitimates the
subkey candidate ks as a potentially correct one then
6: Perform an additional exhaustive search over the n = 256−m non-significant
key bits in order to check the correctness of the filtered subkey ks, and to find
the non-significant key bits in case ks is indeed the correct subkey.
7: Stop if the right key is found, and output the recovered key.
8: end if
9: end for
However, there are several issues to be discussed. First, for a given differential
([∆r]p,q | ∆v,∆t) and a threshold γ, one needs to estimate the median bias ε? of the
function g in order to determine the required number N of keystream block pairs. If the
bias is big enough (let say |ε?| > 2−15), one can experimentally estimate it. Otherwise,
some theoretical tools are required. We failed to estimate the bias theoretically. To
cope with this problem, in our simulation results to be presented in section 2.6, we
not only restricted ourselves to small values of R (up to 8) and r (up to 4), but also
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we allowed only one single bit of one of the four words of (∆v,∆t) to be nonzero.
Second, once we have the estimated value ε? for a given threshold γ, we need to choose
the false alarm probability pfa = 2−c such that the time complexity is minimized; see
equation (2.10) (with ε? instead of ε) and equation (2.11). Third, the minimized time
complexity has still the threshold value γ as a degree of freedom. Bigger values of γ
increase the number m of the significant key bits as well as the bias ε?. Since these two
values have opposite effect on the time complexity, the cryptanalyst must still find the
threshold value γ which optimizes the cryptanalytic time complexity.
2.6 Experimental results
As already mentioned, we only consider one bit difference in ∆v or ∆t. This gives
us 128 possible input differentials. In this section, we denote an r-round differential
([∆r]p,q | ∆v,∆t) by ([∆r]p,q | [∆0]i,j) where i, j indicate the position of the difference
in the initial state matrix. We have 0 ≤ q, j ≤ 31 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 15; moreover, for
Salsa20 6 ≤ i ≤ 9 whereas for ChaCha 12 ≤ i ≤ 15, see equations (2.3) and (2.5). We
used automatized search to identify optimal differentials for the reduced-round versions
Salsa20/7, Salsa20/8, ChaCha6, and ChaCha7. This search is based on the following
observation. The number n of PNBs for some fixed threshold γ mostly depends on the
output difference position (i.e., p and q), but not on the input difference position (i.e.,
i and j). Consequently, for each of the 512 possible positions for the truncated bit, we
can assign the input difference with maximum bias εd, and estimate time complexity
of the algorithm. Below we only present the differentials leading to the best cryptanal-
yses. The threshold γ is also an important parameter. Given a fixed differential, time
complexity of the algorithm is minimal for some optimal value of γ. However, this op-
timum may be reached for quite small γ, such that n is large and |ε?a| small. We use at
most 224 random nonces and counters for each of the 210 random keys, so we can only
measure a bias of about |ε?a| > β ·2−12 (where β ≈ 10 for a reasonable estimation error).
In our experiments, the optimum is not reached with these computational possibilities
in some cases (see, e.g., Table 2.2), and we note that the described complexities may
be improved by choosing a smaller γ. Table 2.1 summarizes our cryptanalytic results
on the two target ciphers.
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Cipher Key length Time Data
Salsa20/8 256 2251 231
ChaCha7 256 2248 227
Salsa20/7 256 2151 226
ChaCha6 256 2139 230
Salsa20/7 128 2111 221
ChaCha6 128 2107 230
Table 2.1: Summary of our cryptanalytic results on Salsa and ChaCha. The
table includes the best cryptanalytic results found for reduced-round variants of Salsa and
ChaCha.
Cryptanalysis of the 256-bit Salsa20/7. We use the differential ([∆4]1,14 | [∆0]7,31)
with |ε?d| = 0.131. The output difference is observed after working three rounds back-
ward from a 7-round keystream block. To illustrate the role of the threshold γ, we
present in Table 2.2 complexity estimates along with the number n of PNBs, the values
of |ε?d| and |ε?|, and the optimal values of c for several threshold values. For γ = 0.5,
the algorithm runs in time 2151 and data 226. The previous best cryptanalysis in [227]
required about 2190 trials and 212 data.
γ n |ε?a| |ε?| c Time Data
1.00 39 1.000 0.1310 31 2230 213
0.90 97 0.655 0.0860 88 2174 215
0.80 103 0.482 0.0634 93 2169 216
0.70 113 0.202 0.0265 101 2162 219
0.60 124 0.049 0.0064 108 2155 223
0.50 131 0.017 0.0022 112 2151 226
Table 2.2: Different cryptanalytic trade-offs for Salsa20/7. The table includes
different parameters which we found for our cryptanalysis of the 256-bit Salsa20/7 with
the differential ([∆4]1,14 | [∆0]7,31). We cannot find the optimal value for the threshold γ
since we measure the bias ε? experimentally.
Cryptanalysis of the 256-bit Salsa20/8. We use again the previous differential
([∆4]1,14 | [∆0]7,31) with |ε?d| = 0.131. The output difference is observed after working
four rounds backward from an 8-round keystream block. For the threshold γ = 0.12,
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we find n = 36, |ε?a| = 0.0011, and |ε?| = 0.00015. For c = 8, this results in time
2251 and data 231. The list of PNBs is {26-31, 71, 72, 120-122, 148, 165-177, 210-
212, 224, 225, 242-247}. Note that our cryptanalytic algorithm is 2255−251 = 24 times
faster than brute force for the same success probability of about fifty percent. The
previous cryptanalysis in [227] claims 2255 trials with data 210 for success probability
44% which is worse than exhaustive search, let alone that the required number of
samples is underestimated which increase their complexity even further, see Remark 1.
Therefore, their algorithm does not constitute a break of Salsa20/8.
Cryptanalysis of the 128-bit Salsa20/7. Our cryptanalytic algorithm can be
adapted to the 128-bit version of Salsa20/7. With the differential ([∆4]1,14 | [∆0]7,31)
and γ = 0.4, we find n = 38, |ε?a| = 0.045, and |ε?| = 0.0059. For c = 21, this breaks
Salsa20/7 within 2111 time and 221 data. Our algorithm fails to break 128-bit Salsa20/8
because of the insufficient number of PNBs.
Cryptanalysis of the 256-bit ChaCha6. We use the differential ([∆3]11,0 | [∆0]13,13)
with |ε?d| = 0.026. The output difference is observed after working three rounds back-
ward from a 6-round keystream block. For the threshold γ = 0.6, we find n = 147,
|ε?a| = 0.018, and |ε?| = 0.00048. For c = 123, this results in time 2139 and data 230.
Cryptanalysis of the 256-bit ChaCha7. We use again the previous differential
([∆3]11,0 | [∆0]13,13) with |ε?d| = 0.026. The output difference is observed after working
four rounds backward from a 7-round keystream block. For the threshold γ = 0.5, we
find n = 35, |ε?a| = 0.023, and |ε?| = 0.00059. For c = 11, this results in time 2248 and
data 227. The list of PNBs is {3, 6, 15, 16, 31, 35, 67, 68, 71, 91-100, 103, 104, 127,
136, 191, 223-225, 248-255}.
Cryptanalysis of the 128-bit ChaCha6. Our cryptanalytic algorithm can be
adapted to the 128-bit version of ChaCha6. With the differential ([∆3]11,0 | [∆0]13,13)
and γ = 0.5, we find n = 51, |ε?a| = 0.013, and |ε?| = 0.00036. For c = 26, this breaks
ChaCha6 within 2107 time and 230 data. Our algorithm fails to break 128-bit ChaCha7.
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2.7 Summary
We presented a novel method for cryptanalyzing reduced-round Salsa20 and ChaCha,
inspired by correlation cryptanalysis and by the notion of neutral bits. In particular,
we introduced the notion of probabilistic neutral bits to mount the first cryptanalytic
algorithm faster than exhaustive search on the stream cipher Salsa20/8 with a 256-bit
key. As of April 2010, this is still the best result on the Salsa20 family of stream ciphers.
In [193], Sylvain Pelissier applied our method to reduced-word variants of Salsa20 with
words of size 8 and 16 bits. His results show that the probabilistic neutral bits can
indeed be successfully applied in practice. Nothing in this chapter affects the security
of the full version of Salsa20 and ChaCha. Notably, Salsa20 is widely viewed as a very
promising stream cipher for software applications.
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Synchronous Stream Ciphers
In this chapter we cryptanalyze the initialization procedure of two synchronous stream
ciphers Trivium [68] and Grain-128 [126]. Trivium is one of the three stream ciphers
in the (updated) eSTREAM final portfolio [20] for hardware applications along with
Grain [128, 127] and MICKEY [21]; whereas Grain-128, a variant of Grain, was only
among the eSTREAM Phase 3 candidates. Both of these ciphers are constructed using
finite state machines with very simple state update functions and output filters, making
them highly suitable for restricted environments. The initialization procedures of these
ciphers are rather simple and based on iterating a fixed number of rounds a function,
either the same as or similar to their state update functions. Our cryptanalysis con-
cerns the general problem of finding an unknown key K from the output of an easily
computable keyed function F (V,K), where the adversary has the power to choose the
public variable V . In the case of synchronous stream ciphers, we simply define F as the
function which maps the key K and IV V into the first keystream bit generated from
that key and IV. The goal of the adversary is then to recover the key in a chosen IV sce-
nario. We first derive a function from F , based on a coefficient of its algebraic normal
form, which is less complex than F itself. Based on the idea of probabilistic neutral bits,
introduced in chapter 2, we then examine how much influence each key bit does have
on the value of that coefficient. Our cryptanalytic method exploits such information
to find the key faster than exhaustive search by filtering some of the wrong candidates.
The results of this chapter are based on [113], published at AFRICACRYPT 2008.
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CIPHERS
3.1 Introduction
Synchronous stream ciphers are symmetric cryptosystems which are suitable in soft-
ware applications with high throughput requirements, or in hardware applications with
restricted resources (such as limited storage, gate count, or power consumption). For
synchronization purposes, in many protocols the message is divided into short frames
where each frame is encrypted using a different publicly known initial value (IV) and
the same secret key. Stream ciphers should be designed to resist cryptanalytic algo-
rithms that exploit many known keystreams generated by the same key but different
chosen IVs. In general, the key and the IV are mapped to the initial state of the stream
cipher by an initialization function (and the automaton produces then the keystream
bits, using an output and update function). The security of the initialization function
relies on its mixing (or diffusion) properties: each key and IV bit should affect each
initial state bit in a complex way. This can be achieved with a round-based approach,
where each round consists of some nonlinear operations. On the other hand, using a
large number of rounds or highly involved operations is inefficient for applications with
frequent resynchronizations. Limited resources of hardware oriented stream ciphers
may even preclude the latter, and good mixing should be achieved with simple Boolean
functions and a well-chosen number of rounds. In [109, 191, 214, 111], a framework for
chosen IV statistical analysis of stream ciphers is suggested to investigate the structure
of the initialization function. If mixing is not perfect, then the initialization function
has an algebraic normal form (ANF) which can be distinguished from a uniformly ran-
dom Boolean function. Particularly, the coefficients of high degree monomials in the
IV (i.e., the product of many IV bits) may have some biased distribution. This spe-
cially happens in the reduced-round variants of the cipher due to the fact that it takes
many operations before all of the IV bits meet in the same memory cell. In [109], this
question was raised: “It is an open question how to utilize these weaknesses of state
bits to attack the cipher.”. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to this problem and
present a framework to mount key-recovery cryptanalytic algorithms. As in [109, 191],
one selects a subset of IV bits as variables. Assuming all other IV values as well as
the key fixed, one can write a keystream symbol as a Boolean function. By running
through all possible values of these bits and generating a keystream output each time,
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one can compute the truth table of this Boolean function. Each coefficient in the al-
gebraic normal form of this Boolean function is parametrized by the bits of the secret
key. Based on the idea of probabilistic neutral bits from [15], we now examine if every
key bit in the parametrized expression of a coefficient does occur, or more generally,
how much influence each key bit does have on the value of the coefficient. If a coeffi-
cient does not depend on all the key bits, this fact can be exploited to filter those keys
which do not satisfy the imposed value for the coefficient. It is shown in [231] that for
Trivium [68], one of the eSTREAM final candidates in the hardware profile [20], with
IV initialization reduced to 576 iterations instead of 1192, linear relations on the key
bits can be derived for well chosen sets of variable IV bits. Our framework is more
general, as it works with the concept of (probabilistic) neutral key bits, i.e., key bits
which have no influence on the value of a coefficient with some (high) probability. This
way, we can get information on the key for many more iterations in the IV initialization
of Trivium, and similarly for the eSTREAM Phase 3 candidate Grain-128 [126]. On
the other hand, extensive experimental evidence indicates clear limits to our approach;
with our methods, it is unlikely to get information on the key faster than exhaustive
key search for Trivium or Grain-128 with full IV initialization.
3.2 Notations
We use B = {0, 1} for the binary field with two elements. A general t-bit vector in
Bt is denoted by X = (x1, x2, . . . , xt). By making a partition of X into U ∈ Bl and
W ∈ Bt−l, we mean dividing the variables set {x1, x2, . . . , xt} into two disjoint subsets
{u1, . . . , ul} and {w1, . . . , wt−l} and setting U = (u1, . . . , ul) and W = (w1, . . . , wt−l).
However, whenever we write (U ;W ) we mean the original vector X. For example,
U = (x2, x4) and W = (x1, x3, x5) is a partition for the vector X = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5)
and (U ;W ) is equal to X and not to (x2, x4, x1, x3, x5). We also use the notation
U = X \W and W = X \ U . A vector of size zero is denoted by ∅. For a multi-index
α = (α1, α2, . . . , αt) ∈ Bt and a vector X ∈ Bt, we have the convenient shorthand Xα =∏t
i=1 x
αi
i for monomial expressions. For example, (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5)
(1,0,1,1,0) = x1x3x4.
The Hamming weight of a binary vector X (i.e., the number of nonzero elements of
the vector) is denoted by wt(X). For two binary vectors α and β of equal length t,
whenever we write α ≤ β we mean that αi ≤ βi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
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3.3 Problem formalization
Let F : Bm × Bn → B be a keyed Boolean function which maps the m-bit public
variable V and the n-bit secret variable K into the output bit F (V,K). The function
F could stand, e.g., for the Boolean function which maps the key K and IV V of a
synchronous stream cipher to the (let say) first keystream bit produced from that key
and IV. We consider the following cryptanalytic model which corresponds to the chosen
IV scenario in case of synchronous stream ciphers. An oracle chooses a key K uniformly
at random over Bn and returns F (V,K) ∈ B to an adversary for any chosen V ∈ Bm
of adversary’s choice. The oracle chooses the key K only once and keeps it fixed and
unknown to the adversary. The goal of the adversary is to recover K by dealing with
the oracle assuming that he has also the power to evaluate F for all inputs, i.e., all
secret and public variables. To this end, the adversary can try all possible 2n keys
and filter the wrong ones by asking enough queries from the oracle. Intuitively each
oracle query reveals one bit of information about the secret key if F mixes its input
bits well enough to be treated as a random Boolean function with n + m input bits.
Therefore, assuming log2 n  m, the n key bits can be recovered by sending O(n)
queries to the oracle. More precisely if the adversary asks the oracle n+ β queries for
some integer β  0, then the probability that only the unknown chosen key by the
oracle (i.e., the correct candidate) satisfies these queries while all the remaining 2n− 1
keys fail to satisfy all the queries is (1 − 2−(n+β))2n−1 ≈ e−2−β (for β = 10 it is about
1− 10−3). A wrong key is rejected after two query evaluations on average. Therefore,
the required time complexity is O(2n). However, if F extremely deviates from being
treated as a random function, the secret key bits may not be determined uniquely. It is
easy to argue that F divides Bn into equivalence classes. Two keys K ′ and K ′′ belong
to the same equivalence class if and only if F (V,K ′) = F (V,K ′′) for all V ∈ Bm. The
following lemma is a trivial statement.
Lemma 1. Let F (V,K) =
⊕
κ Γκ(V )K
κ where Kκ = kκ11 · · · kκnn for the multi-index
κ = (κ1, . . . , κn) ∈ Bn. No adversary can distinguish between the two keys K ′ and K ′′
for which K ′κ = K ′′κ for all κ ∈ Bn such that Γκ(V ) 6= 0.
Indeed, given the 2m values of {F (V,K) | V ∈ Bm} for a key K ∈ Bn, it is only
possible to determine the values of {Kκ|∀κ,Γκ(V ) 6= 0} which does not necessarily
have a unique solution for K. As a consequence of Lemma 1, the function F divides
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Bn into J ≤ 2n equivalence classes K1, K2, . . . ,KJ . Let ni denotes the number of keys
which belong to the equivalence class Ki. Note that we have
∑J
i=1 ni = 2
n. A random
key lies in the equivalence class Ki with probability ni/2n in which case (n − log2 ni)
bits of information can be achieved about the key. The adversary on average can get∑J
i=1(n− log2 ni) ni2n bits of information about the n key bits by asking enough queries.
It is difficult to estimate the minimum number of needed queries due to the statistical
dependency between them. It highly depends on the structure of F but we guess that,
often, O(n) queries suffice again. However, in the case where F does not properly mix
its input bits, there might be faster methods than exhaustive search for key recovery.
We are interested in key-recovery algorithms which are faster than exhaustive search
in this case. The remaining part of this chapter probes this issue.
3.4 Basic idea and possible scenarios
The intuition behind our idea, to provide key-recovery cryptanalytic algorithms which
are faster than exhaustive search, is mainly based on [231, 109, 214, 111, 191] and
can be explained as follows. The algebraic description of the function F (V,K) is too
complex in general to be amenable to direct analysis. If one derives a weaker keyed
function Γ(W,K) : Bm−l ×Bn → B from F which depends on the same key and a part
of the public variables, the adversary-oracle interaction can still go on through Γ this
time. Our main idea is to derive such functions from the algebraic expansion of F by
making a partition of the m-bit public variable V into V = (U ;W ) with l-bit vector
U and (m− l)-bit vector W . One can evaluate such derived functions with the help of
F oracle. In our main example, Γ(W,K) is a coefficient of the algebraic normal form
of the function deduced from F by varying over the bits in U only. We return to this
issue in section 3.5. If the function Γ(W,K) does not have a well-distributed algebraic
structure, it can be exploited for cryptanalysis. Let us investigate different scenarios:
1. If Γ(W,K) is imbalanced for (not necessarily uniformly) random W and many
fixed K, then the function F (or equivalently the underlying stream cipher) with
unknown K can be distinguished from a random one.
2. If Γ(W,K) is evaluated for some fixed W , then Γ(W,K) is an expression in the
key bits only. The simpler this expression is, the better it can be exploited.
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3. If Γ(W,K) has many key bits which have (almost) no influence on the values
of Γ(W,K), a suitable approximation may be identified and exploited for key
recovery cryptanalytic algorithms.
Scenario 1 has already been discussed in the introduction. We do not explore it further
since it considers distinguishers while we are interested in key recovery algorithms. The
interested reader is referred to [109, 191, 214, 111] for more details.
In scenario 2, the underlying idea is to find a relation Γ(W,K), evaluated for some
fixed W , which depends only on a subset of t (< n) key bits. The functional form
of this relation can be determined with 2t evaluations of Γ(W,K). By trying all 2t
possibilities for the involved t key bits, one can filter those keys which do not satisfy
the imposed relation. The complexity of this precomputation is 2t times needed to
compute Γ(W,K), see section 3.5. More precisely, if p = Pr{Γ(W,K) = 0} for the fixed
W , the key space is filtered by a factor of p2+(1−p)2. The interesting situation happens
when several simple imposed relations on the key bits are available. For example, if a
lot of linear relations on the key bits are available, one combines them with Gaussian
elimination to reduce the key search space efficiently. This case is essentially, what is
done by Vielhaber in the AIDA attack [231].
In scenario 3, our main idea is to find a function A(W,Ks) which effectively depends
on a subvector Ks of the key of size t < n, and which is correlated to Γ(W,K) with
a nonzero correlation coefficient. Then, by asking the oracle enough queries we get
some information about t bits of the secret key by carefully analyzing the underlying
hypothesis testing problem. This scenario is the target scenario of this chapter and will
be discussed in detail. We will proceed by explaining how to derive such functions Γ
from the coefficients of the ANF of F in section 3.5, and how to find such approximation
functions A in section 3.6.
3.5 Derived functions from polynomial description
In this section we explain how to derive functions Γ from the coefficients of the ANF
of F . Consider the algebraic normal form F (V,K) =
⊕
ν,κ Γν,κV
νKκ, with binary
coefficients Γν,κ where ν ∈ Bm and κ ∈ Bn. Make the partitionings V = (U ;W )
for the public variable V and ν = (α;β) for the multi-index ν with l-bit segments U
and α, and (m − l)-bit segments W and β such that V ν = UαW β. Therefore, we
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have the expression F (V,K) =
⊕
α,β,κ Γ(α;β),κU
αW βKκ =
⊕
α Γα(W,K)U
α, where
Γα(W,K) =
⊕
β,κ Γ(α;β),κW
βKκ. For every α ∈ Bl, the function Γα(W,K) can serve
as a function Γ derived from F . Here is a toy example to illustrate the notation.
Example 1. Let n = m = 3 and F (V,K) = k1v1 ⊕ k2v0v2 ⊕ v2. Take U = (v0, v2)
of l = 2 bits and W = (v1) of m − l = 1 bit. Then Γ0(W,K) = k1v1, Γ1(W,K) = 0,
Γ2(W,K) = 1, Γ3(W,K) = k2.1
Note that an adversary with the help of the oracle can evaluate Γα(W,K) for the
unknown key K at any input W ∈ Bm−l for every α ∈ Bl by sending at most 2l queries
to the oracle. In other words, the partitioning of V has helped us to define a computable
function Γα(W,K) (as a candidate for Γ) for small values of l, even though the explicit
form of Γα(W,K) remains unknown. To obtain the values Γα(W,K) for all α ∈ Bl, an
adversary asks for the output values of all 2l inputs V = (U ;W ) with the fixed part W .
This gives the truth table of a Boolean function in l variables for which the coefficients
of its ANF (i.e., the values of Γα(W,K)) can be found in time l2l and memory 2l using
the so-called binary Mo¨bius transform [86]. Alternatively, a single coefficient Γα(W,K)
for a specific α ∈ Bl can be computed, without memory requirements, by XORing the
output of F for all 2wt(α) inputs V = (U ;W ) for which each bit of U is at most as large
as the corresponding bit of α. In other words, we have the following equation
Γα(W,K) =
⊕
U≤α
F ((U ;W ),K) . (3.1)
One can expect that a subset of public variable bits are not well mixed with other
variables in a not-so-random function F (e.g., in the functions related to the reduced-
round variants of the initialization of stream ciphers). We call such a subset (or vector)
of public variable bits a set of weak public variables in general. In the context of stream
ciphers, we call them a set of weak IV variables. To avoid existence of any set of weak
IV variables, the initialization process of a stream cipher must be long enough such
that all of the IV variables are well mixed with themselves as well as with the key
variables at the end. It is an open question how to identify a set of weak IV variables
by systematic methods.
1We also denote a general multi-index α = (α1, . . . , αt) by its integer representation
Pt
i=1 αt2
t−1.
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3.6 Functions approximation
We are interested in the approximations of a given Boolean function Γ(W,K) : Bm−l×
Bn → B which depend only on a subset of key bits. The astute reader may notice
that our probabilistic neutral bit concept in chapter 2 is a useful tool for this goal.
Therefore, we make an appropriate partition of the key K according to K = (Ks;Kn),
with Ks containing t significant key bits and Kn containing the remaining (n− t) non-
significant key bits, and construct the function A(W,Ks). We also use the term subkey
to refer to the set of significant key bits. Such a partitioning can be systematically
identified, using the definition of neutrality measure, see Definition 3. We bring the
definition here for convenience.
Definition 4. The neutrality measure of the ith key bit with respect to a function
Γ(K,W ) is defined as γi, where 12(1 + γi) is the probability (over all K and W ) that
complementing the ith key bit does not change the output of Γ(K,W ).
In practice, a threshold −1 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is chosen and then the key bits are divided into
the set of significant and non-significant key bits according to this threshold value
and their neutrality measure. A key bit is recognized as significant if and only if its
neutrality measure is not bigger than the threshold value. Then the approximation
function A(W,Ks) is defined to be the same as Γ except that the non-significant key
bits, Kn, are set to a fixed value (e.g. zero) in K. Note that, if Kn consists only of
neutral key bits (with γi = 1), then the approximation A is exact, because Γ(W,K)
does not depend on these key bits.
Example 2. Let n = m = 3, l = 2 and Γ(W,K) = k0k1k2v0v1 ⊕ k0v1 ⊕ k1v0. For
uniformly random K and W , we find γ0 = 1/8, γ1 = 1/8, γ2 = 7/8. Consequently,
it is reasonable to use Ks = (k0, k1) as the subkey. With fixed k2 = 0, we obtain the
approximation A(W,Ks) = k0v1 ⊕ k1v0 which depends on t = 2 key bits only.
3.7 Description and evaluation of the cryptanalytic algo-
rithm
Suppose that we have already a derived function Γ(W,K) for a function F as well as an
approximation A(W,Ks) of Γ for a partitioning K = (Ks;Kn). For example, Γ can be
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constructed from the algebraic coefficients of F by randomly looking for a set of l weak
public variables, see section 3.5. As already mentioned in section 3.6, the partitioning
of the key bits can be easily done according to the neutrality measure of key bits. In
this section we study how to find a small subset of candidates for the subkey Ks by
filtering some of the wrong ones with a probabilistic guess-and-determine procedure.
In order to filter the set of all 2t possible subkeys into a smaller set, we need to
distinguish an incorrect guess for the subkey from the correct subkey. Let Kˆs denote a
guess for the subkey. Our ability in distinguishing subkeys is related to the correlation
coefficient between A(W, Kˆs) and Γ(W,K) with K = (Ks,Kn) under the following two
hypotheses.
• H0 : the guessed part Kˆs is correct
• H1 : the guessed part Kˆs is incorrect.
More precisely, under these two hypotheses, the values of ε0 and ε1 defined in the
following play a crucial role:
Pr
W
{A(W, Kˆs) = Γ(W,K)|K = (Kˆs,Kn)} = 12(1 + ε0) (3.2)
Pr
W,Kˆs
{A(W, Kˆs) = Γ(W,K)|K = (Ks,Kn)} = 12(1 + ε1) . (3.3)
In general, both ε0 and ε1 are random variables, depending on the key. In the case
that the distributions of ε0 and ε1 are separated, we can achieve a small non-detection
probability pmis and false alarm probability pfa by using enough samples. In the special
case where ε0 and ε1 are constants with ε0 > ε1, the optimum distinguisher is Neyman-
Pearson [85]. Then, N values of Γ(W,K) for different W (assuming that the samples
Γ(W,K) are independent) are sufficient to obtain pfa = 2−c and pmis = 1.3 × 10−3,
where
N ≈
(√
c(1− ε20) ln 4 + 3
√
1− ε21
ε1 − ε0
)2
. (3.4)
The filtering will be successful with probability 1−pmis. In other words, with probabil-
ity 1− pmis, the filtered set of subkeys, which has an approximate size of pfa2t = 2t−c,
includes the correct subkey. The complexity of a cryptanalytic algorithm based on this
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filtering is as follows. For each guess Kˆs of the subkey, the correlation coefficient ε of
A(W, Kˆs) ⊕ Γ(W,K) must be computed. This requires computation of the approxi-
mation function A(W, Kˆs) by the adversary, and computation of the function Γ(W,K)
through the oracle, for the same N values of W . The cost of this part is at most
N2l for each guess of the subkey, assuming that Γ is derived from a coefficient of F
using a set of weak public variables of size l. This must be repeated for all 2t possible
guesses Kˆs. The set of filtered candidates for the subkey Ks has a size of about 2t−c.
The whole key can then be verified by an exhaustive search over the non-significant
key part Kn with a cost of 2t−c2n−t evaluations of F . The total complexity becomes
N2l2t + 2t−c2n−t = N2l+t + 2n−c.
Remark 3. In practice, the values of ε0 and ε1 are key dependent. If the key is
considered as a random variable, then ε0 and ε1 are also random variables. However,
their distribution may not be fully separated, and hence a very small pmis and pfa may
not be possible to achieve. We propose the following non-optimal distinguisher: first, we
choose a threshold ε?0 such that p = Pr{ε0 > ε?0} has a significant value, e.g., 1/2. We
also identify a threshold ε?1, if possible, such that Pr{ε1 < ε?1} = 1. Then, we estimate
the sample size using equation (3.4) by replacing ε0 and ε1 by ε?0 and ε
?
1, respectively,
to obtain pfa ≤ 2−c and effective success probability (1 − pmis)p ≈ 1/2. If ε?0 and ε?1
are close, then the estimated number of samples becomes very large. In this case, it is
better to choose the number of samples intuitively, and then estimate the related pfa.
Remark 4. It is reasonable to assume that a false subkey Kˆs, which is close to the
correct subkey, may lead to a larger value of ε, and hence a large pfa. Here, the measure
for being “close” could be the neutrality measure γi and the Hamming weight: if only
a few key bits on positions with large γi are false, one would expect that ε is large.
We believe that the effect of this behaviour on pfa is often negligible because in most of
the cases the portion of “close” subkeys is negligible compared to the size of the whole
subkey space.
3.8 Application to Trivium
Trivium [68] is one of the stream ciphers in the final portfolio of the eSTREAM project.
It consists of three shift registers of different lengths with an internal state of 288 bits.
At each round, a bit is shifted into each of the three shift registers using a non-linear
combination of taps from that and one other register; and then one keystream bit is
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produced using a linear output function. To initialize the cipher, the n = 80 key bits
and m = 80 IV bits are written into two of the shift registers, with the remaining
bits being set to a fixed pattern. The cipher state is then updated R = 18 × 64 =
1152 times without producing output in order to provide a good mixture of the key
and IV bits in the initial state. We consider the Boolean function F (V,K) which
computes the first keystream bit after r rounds of initialization. In [109], Trivium
was analyzed with chosen IV statistical tests and non-randomness was detected for
r = 10× 64, 10.5× 64, 11× 64, 11.5× 64 rounds with l = 13, 18, 24 and 33 IV bits,
respectively. In [231], the key recovery cryptanalysis of Trivium was investigated with
respect to scenario 2 (see section 3.4) for r = 9 × 64 rounds. Here we provide more
examples for key recovery cryptanalysis with respect to scenario 3 for r = 10× 64 and
r = 10.5× 64. In the following two examples, the sets of weak IV variables have been
found by a random search. We first concentrate on equivalence classes of the key.
Example 3. For r = 10 × 64 rounds, the set of l = 10 weak IV variables with the bit
positions {34, 36, 39, 45, 63, 65, 69, 73, 76, 78} for U , and the coefficient with index
α = 1023 (corresponding to the monomial of maximum degree), we could experimentally
verify that the derived function Γα(W,K) only depends on t = 10 key bits with bit
positions {15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 35, 64, 65, 66}. By assigning all 210 different
possible values to these 10 key bits and putting those Ks’s which gives the same function
Γα(W,K) (by trying enough samples of W ), we could determine the equivalence classes
for Ks with respect to Γα. Our experiment shows the existence of 65 equivalence classes:
one with 512 members for which k15k16 + k17 + k19 = 0 and 64 other classes with 8
members for which k15k16 + k17 + k19 = 1 and the vector (k18, k22, k35, k64, k65, k66) has
a fixed value. This shows that Γα provides 12 × 1 + 12 × 7 = 4 bits of information about
the key on average.
Example 4. For r = 10 × 64 rounds, the set of l = 11 weak IV variables with the bit
positions {1, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 22, 24, 27, 29} for U , and the coefficient with index
α = 2047 (corresponding to the monomial of maximum degree), the derived function
Γα(W,K) depends on all 80 key bits. A more careful look at the neutrality measure of
the key bits reveals that max(γi) ≈ 0.35 and only 7 key bits have a neutrality measure
larger than γ = 0.18, which is not enough to get a useful approximation A(W,Ks) for an
efficient cryptanalytic algorithm. However, we observed that Γα(W,K) is independent
of the key for W = 0, and more generally the number of significant bits depends on
wt(W ).
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It is difficult to find a good choice of a set of weak IV variables for larger values of
r, using a random search. The next example shows how we can go a bit further with
some insight on the initialization procedure of the cipher.
Example 5. Now we consider r = 10.5 × 64 = 10 × 64 + 32 = 672 rounds. The con-
struction of the initialization function of Trivium suggests that shifting the bit positions
of U in Example 4 may be a good choice for a set of weak IV variables. Hence, we
choose U with the l = 11 bit positions {33, 37, 39, 41, 44, 46, 48, 54, 56, 59, 61}, and
α = 2047 (corresponding to the monomial of maximum degree). In this case, Γα(W,K)
for W = 0 is independent of 32 key bits, and p = Pr{Γα(0,K) = 1} ≈ 0.42. This is
already a cryptanalysis which is 1/0.42 ≈ 1.95 times faster than exhaustive search.
The following example shows how we can connect a bridge between scenarios 2 and
3 and come up with a cryptanalytic algorithm which is much faster than exhaustive
search.
Example 6. Consider the same setup as in Example 5. If we restrict ourselves to W ’s
with wt(W ) = 5 and compute the value of γi conditioned over this subset of W ’s, then
maxi(γi) ≈ 0.68. Assigning all key bits with γi ≤ γ = 0.25 as significant, we obtain
a significant key part Ks with the t = 29 bit positions {1, 3, 10, 14, 20, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 39, 41, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 59, 61, 63, 68, 74}.
Our analysis of the approximation function A(W,Ks) shows that for about 44% of the
keys we have ε0 > ε?0 = 0.2 when the subkey is correctly guessed. If the subkey is not
correctly guessed, we observe ε1 < ε?1 = 0.15. Then, according to equation (3.4) the
correct subkey of 29 bits can be detected using at most N ≈ 215 samples, with time
complexity N2l+t ≈ 255. Note that N must be smaller than the total number of W ’s
with wt(W ) = 5, i.e., N <
(
69
5
)
. This condition is satisfied here.
3.9 Application to Grain-128
The stream cipher Grain-128 [126] is one of the eSTREAM phase 3 candidates. It
consists of an LFSR, an NFSR and a nonlinear output function. Grain-128 has n = 128
key bits, m = 96 IV bits and the full initialization function has R = 256 rounds. We
again consider the Boolean function F (V,K) which computes the first keystream bit of
Grain-128 after r rounds of initialization. In [109], Grain-128 was analyzed with chosen
IV statistical tests. With l = 22 variable IV bits, they observed a non-randomness of
the first keystream bit after r = 192 rounds. They also observed a non-randomness in
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the initial state bits after the full number of rounds. In [191], a non-randomness up to
313 rounds was reported (without justification). In this section we provide key recovery
cryptanalysis for up to r = 180 rounds with slightly reduced complexity compared with
exhaustive search. In the following example, the set of weak IV variables for scenario
2 have been found again by a random search.
Example 7. Take the set of l = 7 weak IV variables with the bit positions {2, 6, 8,
55, 58, 78, 90} for U . For the coefficient with index α = 127 (corresponding to the
monomial of maximum degree), a significant imbalance for up to r = 180 rounds can
be detected: the monomial of degree 7 appears only with a probability of p < 0.2 for
80% of the keys. Note that in [109], the cryptanalytic algorithm with l = 7 could be
successfully applied only up to r = 160 rounds.
In the following examples, our goal is to show that there exists a cryptanalytic algorithm
for up to r = 180 rounds on Grain-128 which is slightly faster than exhaustive key
search.
Example 8. Consider again the l = 7 IV bits U with bit positions {2, 6, 8, 55, 58, 78,
90}. For r = 150 rounds we choose the coefficient with index α = 117 (corresponding to
a monomial of non-maximum degree) and include key bits with neutrality measure less
than γ = 0.98 in the list of the significant key bits. This gives a subkey Ks of t = 99 bits.
Our simulations show that ε0 > ε?0 = 0.95 for about 95% of the keys, hence pmis = 0.05.
On the other hand, for 128 wrong guesses of the subkey with N = 200 samples, we
never observed that ε1 > 0.95, hence we estimate pfa < 2−7. This gives a cryptanalytic
algorithm with time complexity N2t+l + 2npfa ≈ 2121 which is an improvement of a
factor of (at least) 1/pfa = 27 compared to exhaustive search.
Example 9. With the same choice for U as in Examples 7 and 8, we take α = 127
(corresponding to the monomial of maximum degree) for r = 180 rounds. We identified
t = 110 significant key bits for Ks. Our simulations show that ε0 > ε?0 = 0.8 in
about 30% of the runs when the subkey is correctly guessed. For 128 wrong guesses of
the subkey with N = 128 samples, we never observed that ε1 > 0.8. Here we have a
cryptanalytic algorithm with time complexity N2t+l+2npfa ≈ 2124, i.e., an improvement
of a factor of 24.
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3.10 Connection with previous works
In the literature there are a fair number of articles discussing the security of stream
ciphers with regards to the initialization procedure [90, 115, 63, 122, 111, 136, 108, 123,
9, 164, 163, 242, 77, 214, 29, 109, 231]. The technique of this chapter is in the line of
that of [231, 109, 191, 214, 111], in the sense that all of them consider the algebraic
description of the initialization procedure. The method is also closely related to the
differential [48], higher-order differential [155], square [93], saturation [165] and inte-
gral [158] attacks, also collectively referred to as multiset attack [56], see section 1.5.5.
The resemblance comes from the fact that in all of these methods, a specific function
is summed over a certain set (or more generally multiset) of inputs, see equation (3.1).
However, here we observed a behavior which is less frequent in other methods. In some
of the examples in this chapter, the values for W were often chosen adaptively. By
adaptively we mean that a stronger deviation from randomness is observed for some
restricted choices for W (e.g., low weight W ’s) or even a particular value for W (e.g., W
= 0). Whereas in most applications of differential-related cryptanalysis, specific input
values are of no favor.
3.11 Follow-ups of our work
Following our work, Dinur and Shamir published the cube attack [100] which is essen-
tially the same as Vielhaber’s AIDA attack [231] that we discussed under scenario 2
in section 3.4. Our method is mainly statistical whereas AIDA/cube attack is totally
algebraic. Dinur and Shamir improved the previous results due to the following con-
tributions. They remarked that for a random Boolean function F (V,K) with m-bit
public variable V and n-bit secret key K whose degree is limited to d, any subset of IV
variables of size d− 1 is weak. More precisely, if U is any subvector of size d− 1 of the
public variables, the derived function Γ(W,K) = Γ2d−1−1(W,K) is an affine function
where W = V \ U . In this case, the function Γ corresponds to the coefficient of the
highest degree monomial, i.e., the coefficient of
∏d−1
i=1 ui when F is described in terms
of variables in U . As it was later pointed out by Bernstein [37], this is a trivial corollary
of Lai’s work [159] published in 1994, which can be explained as follows. The function
Γ is a derivative of order d−1 of the original function F . Since, each derivative reduces
the degree at least by one, Γ trivially has degree at most one, i.e., an affine function.
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Interestingly, based on this simple observation, it can be easily argued that AIDA/cube
attack has a complexity of n2d−1 + n2 under the above assumption for F [100]. Since
the degree evolves very slowly in Trivium, this cute observation motivated Dinur and
Shamir to look for sets of weak IV variables of larger size. In our examples in this
chapter we found the sets of weak IV variables mainly using random search. Most re-
markably, Dinur and Shamir developed a random-walk-based heuristic search for finding
sets of weak public variables (which they call it “appropriate maxterms”). This method
helped them to significantly improve the previous results by finding a lot of appropriate
maxterms, after few weeks of preprocessing stage. In particular, for Trivium with 672
initialization rounds (for which we require a time complexity of order 255 with a set
of 11 weak IV variables, see Example 6), they found 63 appropriate maxterms of size
12, yielding an amazingly low total complexity of around 219. For Trivium with 767
initialization rounds, they found 35 appropriate maxterms of size 28-31 which gives rise
to a cryptanalytic algorithm in time 245.
Later, Aumasson et al. introduced the cube testers [14] which led to demonstrate
nonrandom properties for Trivium up to 885 initialization rounds. In [16], cube testers
were implemented using an efficient FPGA hardware to find a set of weak IV variables
of size 40 using an evolutionary-based search algorithm to provide a distinguisher for
Grain-128 with 237 initialization rounds in time 240. By extrapolation, it is conjectured
in [16] that a successful distinguisher in time 283 can be constructed for the full Grain-
128, i.e., with 256 initialization rounds.
Finding a set of weak public variables is essential for the success of this kind of crypt-
analytic algorithms. The random-walk and evolutionary search algorithms turn out to
be very good solutions for this crucial problem. In chapter 4, published before [100]
and [16] in [149], we use a more systematic method to find a set of weak public vari-
ables, rather than random search, to cryptanalyze a self-synchronizing stream cipher
based on the ideas of this chapter.
3.12 Summary
The framework for chosen IV statistical distinguishers for stream ciphers has been
exploited to provide new methods for key recovery algorithms. This is based on a
polynomial description of output bits as a function of the key and the IV. A deviation
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of the algebraic normal form (ANF) from random indicates that not every bit of the
key or the IV has full influence on the value of certain coefficients in the ANF. It
has been demonstrated how this can be exploited to derive information on the key
faster than exhaustive key search through approximation of the polynomial description
and using the concept of probabilistic neutral key bits. This answers positively the
question whether statistical distinguishers based on polynomial descriptions of the IV
initialization of a stream cipher can be successfully exploited for key recovery. As
a proof, two applications of our methods through extensive experiments have been
given: a reduced complexity key recovery for Trivium with IV initialization reduced
to 672 of its 1152 iterations, and a reduced complexity key recovery for Grain-128
with IV initialization reduced to 180 of its 256 iterations. Our key recovery results on
Trivum has been improved in [100]. Newer cryptanalyses of Grain-128 [16, 69] discuss
distinguishers based on cube testers [14] and related-key cryptanalysis based on sliding
properties [58] of the initialization procedure of the cipher. Part of our results, still
remains the best cryptanalytic results on Grain-128 as of April 2010.
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4Chosen Ciphertext Cryptanalysis
for Self-synchronizing Stream
Ciphers
In cryptology we commonly face the problem of finding a secret key from the output
of an interactable keyed function. The interactable function depends on a secret and
a public variable. The public variable is a controllable input, making the function
interactable in the following sense. An oracle randomly chooses a key and keeps it
unknown to an adversary. He then provides the adversary with the output value of the
function (computed under the fixed unknown key) for any chosen value for the public
variable of adversary’s choice. The goal of the adversary is to recover the secret key as
efficiently as possible. In chapter 3, we studied this problem for synchronous stream
ciphers. In that case, the public variable were the initial value (IV) and the interactable
function were simply the function which maps the key and IV into, for example, the
first keystream bit. In this chapter, we focus on self-synchronizing stream ciphers.
First we show how to model these primitives in the above-mentioned general problem
by relating appropriate interactable functions to the underlying ciphers as it is less
trivial than the case of synchronous stream ciphers. Then we apply the framework of
chapter 3 for dealing with this kind of problems to the proposed T-function based self-
synchronizing stream cipher by Klimov and Shamir [152] at FSE 2005. Our results,
originally presented in [149] at INDOCRYPT 2008, show how to deduce some non-
trivial information about the key for this cipher.
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4.1 Introduction
The area of stream cipher design and analysis has made a lot of progress recently, mostly
spurred by the eSTREAM [106] project. Thanks to this project, it is now a common
belief that designing elegant strong synchronous stream ciphers is possible. In contrary,
there is no such belief about self-synchronizing stream ciphers (SSSCs). There were
only two SSSCs among the initial 34 eSTREAM candidates, both of which revealed
serious weaknesses. Apparently, SSSCs have been (and maybe still are) widely used
in industrial, diplomatic and military communications [88], nevertheless, their future
deployment is unclear [18]. However, from a theoretical point of view, it has remained
a very challenging issue for almost two decades to come up with suitable designs for
SSSCs. There are very few articles in the literature studying SSSCs. Dedicated con-
structions for SSSCs were first introduced by Maurer [170] in 1991, see [200] for an older
work. The remaining articles are devoted to concrete proposals and their cryptanaly-
ses. In 1992, Daemen et al. reconsidered the design of dedicated SSSCs from a practical
point of view [89] and proposed KNOT as an efficient concrete SSSC. KNOT was later
broken by Joux and Muller in 2003 [137]. There are several tweaked versions of KNOT.
In his Ph.D. thesis, Daemen detected a statistical imbalance in the output of KNOT
and suggested the improved cipher ΥΓ. In 2005, Daemen and Kitsos proposed the SSSC
Mosquito [91] as a candidate to the eSTREAM call for primitives. Soon after in 2006,
Joux and Muller [139] proposed successful cryptanalytic algorithms for Mosquito as well
as ΥΓ. As a response, Mosquito was tweaked and Moustique [92] was proposed, which
was among the eSTREAM phase-3 candidates. However, it was excluded from the final
protfolio [19, 20] due to the successful cryptanalysis of [144]. SSS [213], designed by
Rose et al., was the other eSTREAM SSSC candidate which remained a phase 1 can-
didate due to a devastating cryptanalysis by Daemen et al. [94]. HBB (Hiji-bij-bij) is
another SSSC designed by Sarkar [215] in 2003 which was defeated by Mitra [176], and
Joux and Muller [138]. In 2004, a dedicated SSSC by Arnault and Berger [11] based on
Feedback with Carry Shift Registers (FCSR) was broken by Zhang et al. [244] as well.
To the best of our knowledge, the Klimov-Shamir T-function based SSSC, proposed in
2005 [152], is the only remaining design which has not been subject to cryptanalysis
so far. We would like to mention that in addition to the above-mentioned dedicated
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designs, a block cipher in a Cipher FeedBack (CFB) mode [112] operates as a SSSC;
see also OCFB [5] and SCFB [141], and the related articles [199, 131, 117] as well.
In this work we first show how to model a SSSC by a family of interactable keyed
functions F (C,Ke). The input parameter C, called the public variable, can be controlled
by the adversary while the input Ke is an unknown parameter to her called the extended
key. The public variable corresponds to the ciphertext whereas the extended key is a
combination of the actual key used in the cipher and the unknown internal state of the
cipher. The goal of the adversary would be to recover Ke or to get some information
about it. The problem of finding the unknown Ke, when access is given to the output
of an interactable function F (C,Ke) for every C of the adversary’s choice, is a very
common problem encountered in cryptography. In general, when the keyed function F
looks like a random function, the best way to solve the problem is to exhaust the key
space. However, there might be more efficient methods if F is far from being a random
function. In chapter 3, we studied how to recover the key faster than by exhaustive
search in case F does not properly mix its input bits. The idea was to first identify
a subset of variable bits from C referred to as a set of weak public variables and then
to consider the coefficient of a monomial involving this set of weak public variables in
the algebraic normal form of F . If this coefficient does not depend on all the unknown
bits of Ke, or it weakly depends on some of them, it can be exploited for efficient
cryptanalysis. Having modeled the SSSCs as the above-mentioned general problem, we
consider the T-function based SSSC proposed by Klimov and Shamir [152] and use the
framework from chapter 3 to deduce some information about the key bits through some
striking relations. Finding sets of weak public variables was raised as a crucial open
question in chapter 3 which was done mostly by random search there. In this chapter
we take a more systematic approach to find sets of weak public variables.
4.2 Polynomial approach for key recovery on an inter-
actable keyed function
In this chapter, we use the framework from chapter 3. For the notations please refer to
section 3.2. In chapter 3, the secret variable (the key) and public variable (the initial
value) were denoted by K and V , respectively. In this chapter, the secret variable (the
extended key) and public variable (the ciphertext) are respectively denoted by Ke and
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C. Moreover, we use the terminology a set of weak ciphertext variables instead of a
set of weak IV variables or a set of weak public variables. Therefore, the interactable
Boolean function is denoted by F : Bm × Bn → B which maps the m-bit ciphertext
C and the n-bit extended key Ke into the output bit z = F (C,Ke). In addition, for
a subvector U ∈ Bl of l weak ciphertext variables, a derived function is denoted by
ΓU (W,Ke) where W = C \ U ∈ Bm−l.
Our cryptanalytic algorithm in this chapter is based on scenario 3 of section 3.4.
However, there are two differences here. First, in this chapter, we only consider the
derived functions corresponding to the maximum degree monomial. In chapter 3, we
also took advantage of other monomial coefficients. Nevertheless, most of our examples
were based on the maximum degree monomial coefficient. Other works [109, 231, 100]
also suggest that this monomial is usually more suitable. More precisely, we find a
subvector U of l weak ciphertext variables and consider the Boolean function ΓU :
Bm−l × Bn → B where
ΓU (W,Ke) =
⊕
U∈Bl
F ((U ;W ),Ke) . (4.1)
Inspired by the terminology of [100], we refer to ΓU as the superpoly (corresponding to
U). The second difference is that we only take advantage of neutral bits. In other words,
we do not use approximations of the superpoly by identifying probabilistic neutral bits.
Hence, we directly analyze the dependency of the superpoly on its arguments. In this
chapter we will see a lot of examples for which the superpoly ΓU does not depend on
some of its total m − l + n input bits. That is, some of the input bits are neutral.
This is a special case of the third scenario in section 3.4 where probabilistic neutral
bits were used instead. Suppose that the superpoly effectively depends on tKe ≤ n
extended key bits and tW ≤ m − l ciphertext bits. Assuming the involved tKe + tW
bits are mixed reasonably well and provided that log2 tKe  tW (see section 3.3), the
involved tKe secret bits can be recovered in time O(2
l+tKe ) by sending O(tKe2
l) queries
to the F oracle. Recall that each query to ΓU oracle costs 2l queries to F according to
equation (4.1). However, if the superpoly extremely deviates from being treated as a
random function, as already argued in section 3.3 (see Lemma 1), it may even happen
that the tKe secret bits cannot be determined uniquely. In this case one has to look
at the corresponding equivalence classes to see how much information one can achieve
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about the involved tKe secret bits on average. In sections 4.5 and 4.6 we will provide
some examples by considering Klimov-Shamir self-synchronizing stream cipher.
4.3 Self-synchronizing stream ciphers
A self-synchronizing stream cipher (SSSC) is built on an output filter O : K× S → M
and a self-synchronizing state update function (see Definition 5) U : M ×K × S → S,
where S, K andM are the cipher state space, key space and plaintext space. We suppose
that the ciphertext space is the same as that of the plaintext. Let K ∈ K be the secret
key, and {Si}∞i=0, {pi}∞i=0 and {ci}∞i=0 respectively denote the sequences of cipher state,
plaintext and ciphertext. We assume that there is no initial value (IV) involved and the
initial state is computed through the initialization procedure as S0 = I(K) from the
secret key K. The ciphertext (in an additive stream cipher) is then computed according
to the following relations:
ci = pi ⊕ O(K,Si), i ≥ 0 , (4.2)
Si+1 = U(ci,K, Si), i ≥ 0 . (4.3)
Definition 5. [152] (SSF) Let {ci}∞i=0 and {cˆi}∞i=0 be two input sequences, let S0 and
Sˆ0 be two initial states, and let K be a common key. Assume that the function U is
used to update the state based on the current input and the key: Si+1 = U(ci,K, Si)
and Sˆi+1 = U(cˆi,K, Sˆi). The function U is called a self-synchronizing function (SSF) if
there exist a positive integer r such that the equality of any r consecutive inputs implies
the equality of the next state, i.e.,
ci = cˆi, . . . , ci+r−1 = cˆi+r−1 ⇒ Si+r = Sˆi+r. (4.4)
Definition 6. The “resynchronization memory” of a function U, assuming it is a SSF,
is the least positive value of r such that equation (4.4) holds.
4.3.1 Cryptanalytic model
In this chapter, we consider key recovery algorithms on SSSCs in a chosen ciphertext
scenario. Our goal as a cryptanalyst is to efficiently recover the unknown keyK by send-
ing to the decryption oracle chosen ciphertexts of our choice. More precisely, we consider
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the family of functions {Hi : Mi × K × S → M|i = 1, 2, . . . , r}, where r is the resyn-
chronization memory of the cipher and Hi(c1, . . . , ci,K, S) = O(K,Gi(c1, . . . , ci,K, S)),
where Gi : Mi × K × S → S is recursively defined as Gi+1(c1, . . . , ci, ci+1,K, S) =
U(ci+1,K,Gi(c1, . . . , ci,K, S)) with initial condition G1 = U.
Note that, due to the self-synchronizing property of the cipher, Hr(c1, . . . , cr,K, S)
is actually independent of the last argument S; however, all other r−1 functions depend
on their last input. The internal state of the cipher is unknown at each step of operation
of the cipher but because of the self-synchronizing property of the cipher it only depends
on the last r ciphertext inputs and the key. We take advantage of this property and
force the cipher to get stuck in a fixed but unknown state S? by sending the decryption
oracle ciphertexts with some fixed prefix (c?−r+1, . . . , c?0) of our choice. Having forced
the cipher to fall in the unknown fixed state S?, we can evaluate any of the functions
Hi, i = 1, 2, . . . , r, at any point (c1, . . . , ci,K,S?) for any input (c1, . . . , ci) of our choice
by dealing with the decryption oracle. To be clearer let z = Hi(c1, . . . , ci,K,S?). In
order to compute z for an arbitrary (c1, . . . , ci), we choose an arbitrary c?i+1 ∈ M
and ask the decryption oracle for (p−r+1, . . . , p−1, p0, . . . , pi+1), that is, the decrypted
plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext (c?−r+1, . . . , c?0, c1, . . . , ci, c?i+1). We then set
z = pi+1 ⊕ c?i+1.
To make notations simpler, we merge the unknown values K and S? in one unknown
variable Ke = (K,S?) ∈ K×S, called extended key. We then use the simplified notation
Fi(C,Ke) = Hi(c1, . . . , ci,K,S?) : Mi × (K× S)→M where C = (c1, . . . , ci).
4.4 Description of the Klimov-Shamir T-function based
self-synchronizing stream cipher
Shamir and Klimov [152] used the so-called multiword T-functions for a general method-
ology to construct a variety of cryptographic primitives. No fully specified schemes were
given, but in the case of SSSCs, a concrete example construction was outlined. This
section recalls its design. Let ≪, +, ×, ⊕ and ∨ respectively denote left rotation,
addition modulo 264, multiplication modulo 264, bit-wise XOR and bit-wise OR op-
erations on 64-bit integers. The proposed design works with 64-bit words and has a
3-word internal state S = (s0, s1, s2)T . A 5-word key K = (k0, k1, k2, k3, k4) is used to
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define the output filter and the state update function as follows:
O(K,S) =
(
(s0 ⊕ s2 ⊕ k3)≪ 32
)× (((s1 ⊕ k4)≪ 32) ∨ 1), (4.5)
and
U
(
c, K, S
)
=

(
((s′1 ⊕ s′2) ∨ 1)⊕ k0
)2(
((s′2 ⊕ s′0) ∨ 1)⊕ k1
)2(
((s′0 ⊕ s′1) ∨ 1)⊕ k2
)2
 , (4.6)
where
s′0 = s0 + c ,
s′1 = s1 − (c≪ 21) ,
s′2 = s2 ⊕ (c≪ 43).
(4.7)
4.4.1 Reduced word size variants
We also consider generalized versions of this cipher which use ω-bit words (ω even and
typically ω = 8, 16, 32 or 64). For ω-bit version, the number of rotations in the output
filter, equation (4.5), is ω2 and those of the state update function, equation (4.7), are
bω3 e and b2ω3 e, bxe being the closest integer to x.
It can be shown [152] that the update function U is actually a SSF whose resyn-
chronization memory is limited to ω steps and hence the resulting stream cipher is
self-synchronizing indeed. Our analysis of the cipher for ω = 8, 16, 32 and 64 shows
that it resynchronizes after r = ω − 1 steps (using ω(ω − 1) input bits). It is an open
question if this holds in general.
Remark 5. In [152] the notation (k0, k1, k2, kO, k′O) is used for the key instead of the
more standard notation (k0, k1, k2, k3, k4). The authors possibly meant to use a 3-word
key (k0, k1, k2) by deriving the other two key words (kO and k′O in their notations corre-
sponding to k3 and k4 in ours) from first three key words. However, they do not specify
how this must be done if they meant so. Also they did not introduce an initialization
procedure for their cipher. In any case, we cryptanalyze a more general situation where
the cipher uses a 5-word secret key K = (k0, k1, k2, k3, k4) in chosen-ciphertext crypt-
analytic scenario. Moreover, for the 64-bit version, the authors mentioned “the best
attack we are aware of this particular example [64-bit version] requires O(296) time”,
without mentioning the attack.
67
4. CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT CRYPTANALYSIS FOR
SELF-SYNCHRONIZING STREAM CIPHERS
4.5 Analysis of the Klimov-Shamir T-function based self-
synchronizing stream cipher
Let ω (ω = 8, 16, 32 or 64) denote the word size and r = ω−1 be the resynchronization
memory of the ω-bit version of the Klimov-Shamir self-synchronizing stream cipher.
Let B = {0, 1} and Bω denote the binary field and the set of ω-bit words respectively.
Following the general model of analysis of SSSCs in section 4.3.1, we focus on the
family of functions Fi(C,Ke) : Biω × B8ω → Bω, i = 1, 2, . . . , r where C = (c1, . . . , ci)
and Ke = (K,S?) = (k0, k1, k2, k3, k4, s?0, s
?
1, s
?
2). We also look at a word b as an ω-bit
vector b = (b0, . . . , bω−1), b0 being its LSB and bω−1 its MSB. Therefore, any vector
A = (a0, a1, . . . , at−1) ∈ Btω could be also treated as a vector in Bt×ω where the (iω+j)th
bit of A is ai,j , the jth LSB of the word ai, for i = 0, 1, . . . , t− 1 and j = 0, 1, . . . , ω− 1
(we start numbering the bits of vectors from zero).
Now, for any i = 1, . . . , r and j = 0, . . . , ω−1 we consider the family of interactable
Boolean functions Fi,j : Biω × B8ω → B which maps the iω-bit ciphertext C and
the 8ω-bit extended key Ke into the jth LSB of the word Fi(C,Ke). Any of these
interactable keyed functions can be put into the framework from [113] explained in
section 4.2. The next step is to identify a set of l weak ciphertext variables and make
the partitioning C = (U ;W ) with l-bit subvector U and (iω − l)-bit subvector W to
derive the (hopefully weaker) functions ΓUi,j : Biω−l × B8ω → B. Recall that ΓUi,j is
the superpoly in Fi,j corresponding to U , see equation (4.1). Whenever there is no
ambiguity we drop the superscript or the subscripts. We may also use ΓUi,j [ω] in some
cases to emphasize the word size. We are now ready to give our simulation results.
Note 1. Instead of presenting the variables in the vector U we give the bit numbers
as a set. For example, for ω = 16, the set {0, 18, 31, 32} stands for the subvector
U = (c1,0, c2,2, c2,15, c3,0).
Example 10. For all possible common word sizes (ω = 8, 16, 32 or 64), we have been
able to find some i, j and U such that Γ is independent of W and only depends on three
key bits k0,0, k1,0 and k2,0. Table 4.1 shows some of these quite striking relations. We
also found relations Γ{3}1,0 [8] = 1 + k2,0 and Γ
{6,7,8,9,10}
1,0 [16] = 1 + k0,0 involving only one
key bit. In particular, for ω = 64, the three relations in Table 4.1 give 1.75 bits of
information about (k0,0, k1,0, k2,0).
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ω i j U the value of ΓUi,j [ω]
8 2 0 {2} 1 + k0,0k1,0 + k0,0k2,0 + k1,0k2,0
16 3 0 {5} 1 + k0,0k1,0 + k2,0 + k0,0k1,0k2,0
16 3 0 {10} 1 + k0,0 + k1,0k2,0 + k0,0k1,0k2,0
32 5 0 {11} 1 + k0,0k1,0 + k2,0 + k0,0k1,0k2,0
32 16 0 {96, 97, 98} 1 + k0,0 + k2,0 + k0,0k2,0
64 11 0 {21} 1 + k0,0k1,0 + k2,0 + k0,0k1,0k2,0
64 11 0 {42} 1 + k0,0 + k1,0k2,0 + k0,0k1,0k2,0
64 12 0 {20} 1 + k0,0k1,0 + k0,0k2,0 + k1,0k2,0
Table 4.1: Simple relations on three key bits for the Klimov-Shamir cipher.
The table shows some striking relations, which depend on three key bits (k0,0, k1,0, k2,0),
for the Klimov-Shamir self-synchronizing stream cipher.
A more detailed analysis of the functions ΓUi,j [ω](W,Ke) for different values of i, j and
U reveals that many of these functions depend on only few bits of their (iω− l)-bit and
8ω-bit arguments. Let tW and tKe respectively denote the number of bits of W and Ke
which Γ effectively depends on. In addition, let tK out of tKe bits come from K and
the remaining tS? = tKe − tK bits from S? (remember Ke = (K,S?)). Table 4.2 shows
these values for some of these functions.
Having in mind what we mentioned in section 4.2 and being too optimistic, we give
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If a function ΓUi,j is random-looking enough, recovering the tKe un-
known bits of the extended key takes expected time 2× i× 2l+tKe .
The unity of time is processing one ciphertext word of the underlined SSSC. The factors
2, 2l and i come from the following facts. On average two query evaluations are required
to reject a wrong guess for the involved tKe unknown extended key bits. Computing Γ
from Fi needs 2l evaluations of Fi (remember ΓUi,j(W,Ke) =
⊕
U∈Bl Fi,j((U ;W ),Ke)).
Finally, computing Fi needs i iterations of the cipher.
Even if the ideal condition of Proposition 1 is not satisfied, the only thing which is
not guaranteed is that the tKe involved unknown bits are uniquely determined. Yet some
information about them can be achieved. Refer to the sections 4.2 and 3.2 regarding
the equivalence classes.
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ω i j U tKe tW tK tS? comment
8 1 0 ∅ 20 8 9 11
16 1 0 ∅ 40 16 17 23
32 1 0 ∅ 80 32 33 47
64 1 0 ∅ 160 64 65 95
8 1 0 {1} 9 5 3 6
16 1 0 {u} 18 11 6 12 8 ≤ u ≤ 10
32 1 0 {u} 42 23 14 28 16 ≤ u ≤ 20
64 1 0 {u} 90 51 30 60 32 ≤ u ≤ 42
8 3 0 {8} 4 6 4 0
8 3 0 {18} 5 7 5 0 see Example 11
16 7 0 {16} 17 58 17 0
16 7 0 {34} 16 52 16 0 see Example 14
16 7 0 {33, 34} 12 33 12 0 see Example 12
16 7 0 {38, 39} 12 30 12 0 see Example 13
32 15 0 {32} 41 293 41 0
32 15 0 {66} 40 279 40 0
32 15 0 {76, 77} 36 231 36 0
64 31 0 {64} 89 1274 89 0
64 31 0 {130} 88 1243 88 0
64 31 0 {129, 130} 84 1158 84 0 see Proposition 2
64 31 0 {150, 151} 84 1155 84 0 see Proposition 2
Table 4.2: Overview of the dependency of the superpolys in their input argu-
ments for the Klimov-Shamir self-synchronizing stream cipher. The table shows
the effective number of bits of each argument which the superpoly ΓUi,j [ω](W,Ke) depends
on. The superpoly ΓUi,j [ω] effectively depends on tW bits of W and tKe bits of Ke. More-
over, tK bits out of the tKe extended key bits are from the original secret key whereas the
remaining tS? = tKe − tK bits are due to the unknown internal state. Note that the func-
tions having the same number of effective bits do not necessarily have the same involved
variables.
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Example 11. Take the superpoly Γ{18}3,0 [8](W,Ke) from Table 4.2. This particular func-
tion depends on tKe = 5 bits (k0,0, k0,1, k1,0, k2,0, k2,1) of the key and on tW = 7 bits
(c1,4, c1,5, c1,6, c2,0, c2,1, c2,5, c2,6) of the ciphertext. The ANF of this function is:
Γ{18}3,0 [8] = 1 + k0,0k0,1 + k0,0k0,1k2,0 + k2,0k2,1 + k0,0c1,4+
k0,0k2,0c1,4 + k0,0k1,0c1,5 + k0,0k1,0k2,0c1,5+
k0,0c1,6 + k0,0k2,0c1,6 + k2,0c2,0 + k0,0k2,0c2,0+
k2,0c2,1 + c2,0c2,1 + k0,0c2,0c2,1 + k2,0c2,0c2,1+
k0,0k2,0c2,0c2,1 + k1,0k2,0c2,5 + k2,0c2,6.
(4.8)
This equation can be seen as a system of 2tW = 128 equations versus tKe = 5 unknowns.
Our analysis of this function shows that only 48 of the equations are independent which
on average can give 3.5 bits of information about the five unknown bits (4 bits of infor-
mation for 75% of the keys and 2 bits for the remaining 25% of the keys).
Example 12. Take the superpoly Γ{33,34}7,0 [16](W,Ke) from Table 4.2. This particular
function depends on tKe = 12 key bits and on tW = 33 ciphertext bits. Our analysis of
this function shows that on average about 2.41 bits of information on the 12 key bits
can be achieved (10 bits of information for 12.5% of the keys, 3 bits for 25% of the keys
and 0.67 bits about the remaining 62.5% of the keys).
Example 13. Take the superpoly Γ{38,39}7,0 [16](W,Ke) from Table 4.2. This particular
function depends on tKe = 12 key bits and on tW = 30 ciphertext bits. Our analysis of
this function shows that on average about 1.94 bits of information on the 12 key bits
can be achieved (10 bits of information for 12.5% of the keys, 3 bits for another 12.5%
of the keys and 0.42 bits for the remaining 75% of the keys).
Example 14. Take the superpoly Γ{34}7,0 [16](W,Ke) from Table 4.2. This particular
function depends on tKe = 16 key bits and on tW = 52 ciphertext bits. Our analysis of
this function shows that on average about 5.625 bits of information on the 16 key bits
can be achieved (13 bits of information for 25% of the keys, 11 bits for 12.5% of the
keys, 4 bits for another 12.5% of the keys, and 1 bit for the remaining 50% of the keys).
For larger values of i we expect Γ to fit better the ideal situation of Proposition 1.
Therefore, we give the following claim about the security of the 64-bit version of Klimov-
Shamir’s proposal.
Proposition 2. We expect each of the functions Γ{129,130}31,0 [64] and Γ
{150,151}
31,0 [64] to
reveal a large amount of information about the corresponding tKe = 84 involved key bits
for a non-negligible fraction of the keys. The required computational time is 2 × 31 ×
22+84 ≈ 292.
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In chapter 3, the sets of weak IV variables were mainly found by random search. How
to find a set of weak public variables was raised as an open question in chapter 3. In the
next section we present a systematic procedure to find a set of weak ciphertext variables,
with the consequence of improving Proposition 2. More sophisticated algorithms for
finding a set of weak public variables can be found in [100, 16].
4.6 Towards a systematic approach to find weak cipher-
text variables
The idea is to start with a set (vector) U and extend it gradually. At each step, we
examine all the ciphertext bits which ΓU depends on. The goal is to determine an
extended U for the next step that results in a Γ which depends on the least number
of key bits. To this end, we choose a ciphertext bit (to be added to the current
set U) which has this property. Table 4.3 shows our simulation results by starting
from function Γ{41}1,0 [64] from Table 4.2 which effectively depends on tKe = 90 extended
key bits and tW = 51 ciphertext bits. Similar to Proposition 2, one expects each of
the functions ΓU1,0[64] in Table 4.3 to reveal a large amount of information about the
corresponding tKe involved extended key bits (including tK effective key bits) for a non-
negligible fraction of the keys; the time complexity is 2× 1× 2l+tKe , as indicated in the
last column. In particular, by starting from the function in the bottom of Table 4.3,
(the promised large amount of information about) the involved tK = 12 key bits and
tS? = 33 internal state bits can be gained in time 265 (for a non-negligible fraction of
the keys). Notice, that once we have the correct value for the unknown extended key
for some function in Table 4.3, those of the previous function can be recovered by little
effort. Therefore, we present the following proposition.
Proposition 3. We expect that by starting from Γ{1−9,32−41}1,0 [64] and going backwards
to Γ{41}1,0 [64] as indicated in Table 4.3, a large amount of information about the involved
tKe = 90 unknown bits (including tK = 30 effective key bits) is revealed for a non-
negligible fraction of the keys in time 265 .
Remark 6. By combining the results of different superpolys Γ, one can get better
results. Finding an optimal combination demands patience and detailed examination
of different Γ’s. We make this statement clearer by an example as follows. Detailed
analysis of Γ{129,130}31,0 [64] and Γ
{150,151}
31,0 [64] shows that the key bits which they depend
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on are {0− 27, 64− 90, 128− 156} and {0− 28, 64− 90, 128− 155}, respectively. These
two functions have respectively 27 and 28 bits in common with the 30 key bits {0 −
19, 21 − 30} involved in Γ{41}1,0 [64]. They also include the key bits {0, 32, 64} for which
1.75 information can be easily gained according to Example 10. Taking it altogether, it
can be said that a large amount of information about the 88 key bits {0 − 30, 32, 64 −
90, 128− 156} can be achieved in time 265 with a non-negligible probability.
4.7 Summary
In this work we proposed a new analysis method for self-synchronizing stream ciphers.
We then applied it to the Klimov-Shamir’s example of a construction of a T-function
based self-synchronizing stream cipher. We did not fully break this proposal, but the
strong key leakage demonstrated by our results makes us believe a total break is not
out of reach. In future design of self-synchronizing stream ciphers, one has to take into
account and counter potential key leakage.
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5Linearization Framework for
Finding hash Collisions
In the previous three chapters, we cryptanalyzed stream ciphers which are among keyed
cryptographic primitives. In this chapter, however, we study hash functions which are
often unkeyed. There is no secret key to be recovered in this case. Instead, a major goal
in hash function cryptanalysis is to find a hash collision. In this chapter, an improved
differential cryptanalysis framework for finding collisions in hash functions is provided.
Its principle is based on linearization of hash functions in order to find low weight
differential characteristics as initiated by Chabaud and Joux [75]. This is, however,
formalized and refined in several ways: for the problem of finding conforming message
pairs whose differential trail follows a linear trail, a condition function is introduced
so that finding collisions is equivalent to finding preimages of the zero vector under
the condition function. Then, the dependency table concept shows how much influence
every input bit of the condition function has on each output bit. Careful analysis of
the dependency table reveals degrees of freedom that can be exploited in accelerated
preimage reconstruction under the condition function. It turns out that the degrees
of freedom are highly related to the neutrality and probabilistic neutrality concepts,
exploited to accelerate key recovery cryptanalysis on keyed primitives in the previous
chapters. These concepts are applied to an in-depth collision analysis of reduced-round
variants of two SHA-3 candidates CubeHash and MD6. This chapter is mainly due to
the contributions of [65], published at ASIACRYPT 2009. We also include the result
of [148], published at AFRICACRYPT 2010, yet largely based on [65].
75
5. LINEARIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR FINDING HASH
COLLISIONS
5.1 Introduction
Hash functions are important cryptographic primitives that find applications in many
areas including digital signatures, commitment schemes and authentication codes. To
this end, hash functions are expected to possess several security properties, one of which
is collision resistance. Informally, a hash function is collision resistant if it is practically
infeasible to find two distinct messages that produce the same output.
The goal of this work is to revisit collision-finding methods using linearization of the
hash function. This method was initiated by Chabaud and Joux on SHA–0 [75] and
was later extended and applied to SHA–1 by Rijmen and Oswald [203]. In particular,
in [203] it was observed that the codewords of a linear code, which are defined through
a linearized version of the hash function, can be used to identify high probability
differential paths. This method was later extended by Pramstaller et al. [195] with
the general conclusion that finding high probability differential paths is related to low
weight codewords of the attributed linear code. In this chapter we further investigate
this issue.
The first contribution of our work is to present a more concrete and tangible relation
between the linearization and differential paths. In the case that modular addition is
the only involved nonlinear operation, our results can be stated as follows. Given the
parity check matrix H of a linear code, and two matrices A and B, find a codeword
∆ such that A∆ ∨ B∆ is of low weight. This is clearly different from the problem of
finding a low weight codeword ∆.
We then consider the problem of finding a conforming message pair for a given
differential trail for a certain linear approximation of the hash function. The recent
collision finding algorithms on hash functions [44, 45, 236, 238, 239, 237, 73, 179, 70, 168,
134] have investigated extensive methods to identify degrees of freedom to be used to
efficiently find conforming message pairs by means of satisfying some conditions. These
methods are referred to as message modification techniques which apparently have been
used by Xiaoyun Wang as early as 1997 [233, 234]. However, they were brought to the
attention of the international cryptographic community only in 2004 [235]; see also [236,
238, 239, 237]. Message modification techniques use concepts such as neutral bits [44],
semi-neutral bits [167, 226] and tunnels [151]. When it comes to implementation,
backtracking algorithms [38, 73] are used to find a conforming message.
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Our second contribution in this chapter is to present a unified framework to exploit
degrees of freedom and evaluate the complexity of the corresponding backtracking al-
gorithm. Our framework, similar to the work by De Cannie`re and Rechberger [73],
has the flexibility to be applied to a large number of differential paths to identify the
best one. In particular, we show that the problem of finding conforming pairs can be
reformulated as finding preimages of zero under a function which we call the Condition
function. We then define the concept of dependency table which shows how much in-
fluence every input bit of the condition function has on each output bit. By carefully
analyzing the dependency table, we are able to profit not only from neutral bits [44]
but also from probabilistic neutral bits [15] in a backtracking search algorithm, similar
to [73, 38, 194, 118]. This contributes to a better understanding of freedom degrees
uses.
We consider hash functions working with n-bit words. In particular, we focus on
those using modular addition of n-bit words as the only nonlinear operation. The in-
corporated linear operations are XOR, shift and rotation of n-bit words in practice. We
present our framework in detail for these constructions by approximating modular addi-
tion with XOR. We demonstrate its validity by applying it on reduced-round variants of
CubeHash [34] (one of the 14 second round NIST SHA-3 [181] competitors) which uses
modular addition, XOR and rotation. CubeHash instances are parametrized by two
parameters r and b and are denoted by CubeHash-r/b which process b message bytes per
iteration; each iteration is composed of r rounds. Although we cannot break the original
submission CubeHash-8/1 nor the current tweaked official proposal CubeHash-16/32, we
provide real collisions for the much weaker variants CubeHash-3/64, CubeHash-4/48 and
CubeHash-5/96. Interestingly, we show that neither the more secure variants CubeHash-
6/16, CubeHash-7/64 and CubeHash-8/96 do provide the desired collision security by
providing theoretical attacks with complexities 2219.9, 2203.0 and 280.0 respectively; nor
that CubeHash-6/4 with 512-bit digests is second-preimage resistant, as with probabil-
ity 2−478 a second preimage can be produced by only one hash evaluation. Our theory
can be easily generalized to arbitrary nonlinear operations. We discuss this issue and
as an application we provide collision cryptanalyses on 16 rounds of MD6 [206]. MD6
was a first round SHA-3 candidate whose original number of rounds varies from 80 to
168 when the digest size ranges from 160 to 512 bits.
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5.2 Linear differential cryptanalysis of hash functions
5.2.1 Attributing compression functions to hash functions
Hash functions transform a variable-length input to a fixed-size output, called message
digest. In practice, hash functions are mostly built from a fixed input size compres-
sion function, e.g., the Davies-Meyer [174] block cipher based construction; see 1.4.2.
One then applies a domain extension method, such as the renowned Merkle-Damg˚ard
construction, to the compression function in order to construct a hash function that
accepts messages of arbitrary length. To any hash function, no matter how it has
been designed, we can always attribute fixed input size compression functions, such
that a collision for a derived compression function results in a direct collision for the
hash function itself. This way, firstly we are working with fixed input size compression
functions rather than varying input size ones, secondly we can attribute compression
functions to those hash functions which are not explicitly based on a fixed input size
compression function, and thirdly we can derive different compression functions from a
hash function. For example, multi-block collision cryptanalysis [238] benefits from the
third point. Our task is to find two messages for an attributed compression function
such that their digests are preferably equal (a collision) or differ in only a few bits (a
near-collision). Collisions for a compression function are directly translated into colli-
sions for the hash function provided that the initial value condition of the hash function
is satisfied. The relevance of near collisions, however, depends on the hash function
structure and the way the compression function has been defined. In most of the cases
the near collisions of the compression function provide near collisions for the underly-
ing hash function as well. But in some other cases, such as sponge constructions [39]
with a strong filtering at the end or a Merkle-Damg˚ard construction with a strong final
transformation [166], they are of little interest.
5.2.2 Linearization of compression functions
Let’s consider a compression function H = Compress(M,V ) which works with n-bit
words and maps an m-bit message M and a v-bit initial value V into an h-bit out-
put H. Our aim is to find a collision for such compression functions with a randomly
given initial value V . In this section we consider modular-addition-based Compress
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functions, that is, they use only modulo 2n additions in addition to linear transfor-
mations. This includes the family of AXR (Addition-XOR-Rotation) hash functions
which are based on these three operations. In section 5.5 we generalize our frame-
work to other family of compression functions. For these Compress functions, we are
looking for two messages with a difference ∆ that result in a collision. In particular,
we are interested in a ∆ for which two randomly chosen messages with this difference
lead to a collision with a high probability for a randomly chosen initial value. For
modular-addition-based Compress functions, we consider a linearized version for which
all modular additions are replaced by XOR. This is a common linear approximation
of modular addition. Other possible linear approximations of modular addition, which
are less addressed in literature, can be considered according to our generalization of
section 5.5. As modular addition was the only nonlinear operation, we now have a
linear function which we call Compresslin. Since Compresslin(M,V )⊕ Compresslin(M ⊕
∆, V ) = Compresslin(∆, 0) is independent of the value of V , we adopt the notation
Compresslin(M) = Compresslin(M, 0) instead. Let ∆ be an element of the kernel of
the linearized compression function, i.e., Compresslin(∆) = 0. We are interested in the
probability Pr{Compress(M,V ) ⊕ Compress(M ⊕∆, V ) = 0} for a random M and V .
In the following we present an algorithm which computes this probability, called the
raw (or bulk) probability.
5.2.3 Computing the raw probability
We consider a general n-bit vector x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) as an n-bit integer denoted by
the same variable, i.e., x =
∑n−1
i=0 xi2
i. The Hamming weight of a binary vector or
an integer x, wt(x), is the number of its nonzero elements, i.e., wt(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 xi. We
use + for modular addition of words and ⊕,∨ and ∧ for bit-wise XOR, OR and AND
logical operations between words as well as vectors. We use the following lemma which
is a special case of the problem of computing Pr{((A⊕ α) + (B ⊕ β))⊕ (A+B) = γ}
where α, β and γ are constants and A and B are independent and uniform random
variables, all of them being n-bit words. Lipmaa and Moriai have presented an efficient
algorithm for computing this probability [162]. We are interested in the case γ = α⊕β
for which the desired probability has a simple closed form.
Lemma 2. Pr{((A⊕ α) + (B ⊕ β))⊕ (A+B) = α⊕ β} = 2−wt((α∨β)∧(2n−1−1)).
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Lemma 2 gives us the probability that modular addition behaves like the XOR
operation. As Compresslin approximates Compress by replacing modular addition with
XOR, we can then devise a simple algorithm to compute (estimate) the raw probability
Pr{Compress(M,V ) ⊕ Compress(M ⊕ ∆, V ) = Compresslin(∆)}. Let’s first introduce
some notation.
Notation. Let nadd denote the number of modular additions which Compress uses in
total. In the course of evaluation of Compress(M,V ), let the two addends of the ith
modular addition (1 ≤ i ≤ nadd) be denoted by Ai(M,V ) and Bi(M,V ), for which the
ordering is not important. The value Ci(M,V ) =
(
Ai(M,V )+Bi(M,V )
)⊕Ai(M,V )⊕
Bi(M,V ) is then called the carry word of the ith modular addition. Similarly, in the
course of evaluation of Compresslin(∆), denote the two inputs of the ith linearized mod-
ular addition by αi(∆) and βi(∆) in which the ordering is the same as that for Ai and
Bi. We define five more functions A(M,V ), B(M,V ), C(M,V ), α(∆) and β(∆) with
(n − 1)nadd-bit outputs. These functions are respectively defined as the concatena-
tion of the first (n− 1) bits of the words Ai(M,V ), Bi(M,V ), Ci(M,V ), αi(M,V ) and
βi(M,V ), 1 ≤ i ≤ nadd . For example, A(M,V ) and α(∆) are respectively the con-
catenation of the nadd words
(
A1(M,V ), . . . , Anadd(M,V )
)
and
(
α1(∆), . . . , αnadd(∆)
)
where the MSBs of the words are excluded. To be more precise, we have A(M,V ) =(
A1(M,V ) mod 2n−1, . . . , Anadd(M,V ) mod 2n−1
)
. Similar relations can be written
for the other four functions.
Table 5.1 is a reference for all the main symbols used in sections 5.2, 5.3.1 and 5.5.
Using this notation, the raw probability can be simply estimated as follows.
Lemma 3. Let Compress be a modular-addition-based compression function. Then for
any message difference ∆ and for random values M and V , p∆ = 2
−wt
(
α(∆)∨β(∆)
)
is
a lower bound for Pr{Compress(M,V )⊕ Compress(M ⊕∆, V ) = Compresslin(∆)}.
Proof. We start with the following definition.
Definition 7. We say that a message M (for a given V ) conforms to (or follows) the
trail of ∆ iff 1(
(Ai ⊕ αi) + (Bi ⊕ βi))⊕ (Ai +Bi) = αi ⊕ βi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ nadd, (5.1)
where Ai, Bi, αi and βi are shortened forms for Ai(M,V ), Bi(M,V ), αi(∆) and βi(∆),
respectively.
1if and only if
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symbol description
H = Compress(M,V ) a modular-addition-based or binary-FSM-based
compression function from {0, 1}m × {0, 1}v to
{0, 1}h
Compresslin(∆, 0) or Compresslin(∆) the linearized version of Compress
Condition∆(M,V ) or Condition(M,V ) condition function associated with a differential trail
∆ for a compression function Compress and its lin-
earized version Compresslin
Y the output of the condition function, Y =
Condition∆(M,V )
Yj the jth condition bit
y the total number of condition bits, i.e., length of Y
nadd the total number of modular additions of a modular-
addition-based Compress function
nnl the total number of NUBFs of a binary-FSM-based
Compress function
(Ai, Bi) or
`
Ai(M,V ), Bi(M,V )
´
the two addend words of the ith modular addition
in a modular-addition-based Compress function
Ci or Ci(M,V ) the carry word of the ith modular addition in a
modular-addition-based Compress function
(αi, βi) or
`
αi(∆), βi(∆)
´
the two input words of the ith linearized modular
addition (i.e., XOR) in a modular-addition-based
linearized compression function Compresslin
A(M,V ) the concatenation of all nadd addend words
A1, . . . , Anadd excluding their MSBs
B(M,V ) the concatenation of all nadd addend words
B1, . . . , Bnadd excluding their MSBs
C(M,V ) the concatenation of all nadd carry words
C1, . . . , Cnadd excluding their MSBs
α(∆) the concatenation of all nadd words α
1, . . . , αnadd
excluding their MSBs
β(∆) the concatenation of all nadd words β
1, . . . , βnadd
excluding their MSBs
αk,βk,Ak,Bk,Ck the kth bit of the vectors α,β,A,B,C
gk the kth NUBF of a binary-FSM-based Compress func-
tion
gklin the linear approximation of g
k as the one in
Compresslin for a binary-FSM-based Compress function
xk the input vector of the kth NUBF of a binary-FSM-
based compression function (i.e., gk) which com-
putes Compress(M,V )
δk the input vector of the kth linearized NUBF of a
linearized binary-FSM-based compression function
(i.e., gklin) which computes Compresslin(∆)
Λ(M,V ) the output of all the nnl NUBFs of a binary-FSM-
based Compress function
Φ(∆) the output of all the nnl linearized NUBFs of a
linearized binary-FSM-based compression function
Compresslin
Λ∆(M,V ) see section 5.5
Γ(∆) see section 5.5
Λk(M,V ) the kth bit of the vector Λ(M,V ) which equals
gk(xk)
Φk(∆) the kth bit of the vector Φ(∆) which equals g
k
lin(δ
k)
Λ∆k (M,V ) the kth bit of the vector Λ
∆(M,V ) which equals
gk(xk ⊕ δk)
Γk(∆) the kth bit of the vector Γ(∆); Γk(∆) = 1 iff δ
k 6= 0
Table 5.1: Main symbols used in this chapter. This table includes the main symbols
used in sections 5.2, 5.3.1 and 5.5 along with their description.
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It is not difficult to prove that under some reasonable independence assumptions p∆,
which we call conforming probability, is the probability that a random message M
follows the trail of ∆. This is a direct corollary of Lemma 2 and Definition 7. The
exact proof can be done by induction on nadd, the number of modular additions in
the compression function. Due to other possible non-conforming pairs that start from
message difference ∆ and lead to output difference Compresslin(∆), p∆ is a lower bound
for the desired probability in the lemma.
If Compresslin(∆) is of low Hamming weight, a conforming message pair leads to a near
collision in the output. The interesting ∆’s for collision search are those which belong
to the kernel of Compresslin, i.e., those that satisfy Compresslin(∆) = 0. From now
on, we assume that ∆ 6= 0 is in the kernel of Compresslin, hence looking for collisions.
According to Lemma 3, one needs to try around 1/p∆ random message pairs in order
to find a collision which conforms to the trail of ∆. However, in a random search it
is better not to restrict oneself to the conforming messages as a collision at the end
is all we want. Since p∆ is a lower bound for the probability of getting a collision for
a message pair with difference ∆, we might get a collision sooner. In section 5.3 we
explain a method which might find a conforming message by avoiding random search.
5.2.4 Link with coding theory
We would like to conclude this section with a note on the relation between the following
two problems:
I) finding low-weight codewords of a linear code,
II) finding a high probability linear differential path.
Since the functions Compresslin(∆), α(∆) and β(∆) are linear, we consider ∆ as a
column vector and attribute three matrices H, A and B to these three transformations,
respectively. In other words we have Compresslin(∆) = H∆, α(∆) = A∆ and β(∆) =
B∆. We then call H the parity check matrix of the compression function.
Based on an initial work by Chabaud and Joux [75], the link between these two
problems has been discussed by Rijmen and Oswald in [203] and by Pramstaller et
al. in [195] with the general conclusion that finding highly probable differential paths
is related to low weight codewords of the attributed linear code. In fact the relation
82
5.3 Finding a conforming message pair efficiently
between these two problems is more delicate. For problem (I), we are provided with
the parity check matrix H of a linear code for which a codeword ∆ satisfies the relation
H∆ = 0. Then, we are supposed to find a low-weight nonzero codeword ∆. This
problem is known to be NP-hard but there are some non-optimal heuristic approaches
for it, see [74] for example. For problem (II), however, we are given three matrices
H, A and B and need to find a nonzero ∆ such that H∆ = 0 and A∆ ∨ B∆ is of
low-weight, see Lemma 3. Nevertheless, low-weight codewords ∆’s of the parity check
matrix H might be good candidates for providing low-weight A∆∨B∆, i.e., differential
paths with high probability p∆. In particular, this approach is promising if these three
matrices are sparse.
5.3 Finding a conforming message pair efficiently
The methods that are used to accelerate the finding of a message which satisfies some
requirements are referred to as freedom degrees use in the literature. This includes
message modifications [238], neutral bits [44], semi-neutral bits [167, 226], tunnels [151],
submarine modifications [179] and boomerang attacks [140, 168]. In this section we
show that the problem of finding conforming message pairs can be reformulated as
finding preimages of zero under a function which we call the condition function. One
can carefully analyze the condition function to see how freedom degrees might be used
in efficient preimage reconstruction. Our method is based on measuring the amount of
influence which every input bit has on each output bit of the condition function. We
introduce the dependency tables to distinguish the influential bits, from those which
have no influence or are less influential. In other words, in case the condition function
does not mix its input bits well, we profit not only from neutral bits [44] but also
from probabilistic neutral bits [15]. This is achieved by devising a backtracking search
algorithm, similar to [73, 38, 194, 118], based on the dependency table.
5.3.1 Condition function
Let’s assume that we have a differential path for the message difference ∆ which holds
with probability p∆ = 2−y. According to Lemma 3 we have y = wt
(
α(∆) ∨ β(∆)). In
this section we show that, given an initial value V , the problem of finding a conforming
message pair such that Compress(M,V )⊕ Compress(M ⊕∆, V ) = 0 can be translated
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into finding a message M such that Condition∆(M,V ) = 0. Here Y = Condition∆(M,V )
is a function which maps m-bit message M and v-bit initial value V into y-bit output
Y . In other words, the problem is reduced to finding a preimage of zero under the
Condition∆ function. As we will see it is quite probable that not every output bit of the
Condition function depends on all the message input bits. By taking a good strategy,
this property enables us to find the preimages under this function more efficiently than
random search. But of course, we are only interested in preimages of zero. In order to
explain how we derive the function Condition from Compress, we first present a quite
easy-to-prove lemma. We recall that the carry word of two words A and B is defined
as C = (A+B)⊕A⊕B.
Lemma 4. Let A and B be two n-bit words and C represent their carry word. Let
δ = 2i for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 2. Then,(
(A⊕ δ) + (B ⊕ δ)) = (A+B)⇔ Ai ⊕Bi ⊕ 1 = 0 , (5.2)
(
A+ (B ⊕ δ)) = (A+B)⊕ δ ⇔ Ai ⊕ Ci = 0 , (5.3)
and similarly (
(A⊕ δ) +B) = (A+B)⊕ δ ⇔ Bi ⊕ Ci = 0 . (5.4)
For a given difference ∆, a message M and an initial value V , let Ak, Bk, Ck, αk
and βk, 0 ≤ k < (n−1)nadd, respectively denote the kth bit of the output vectors of the
functions A(M,V ), B(M,V ), C(M,V ), α(∆) and β(∆), as defined in section 5.2.3.
Let {i0, . . . , iy−1}, 0 ≤ i0 < i1 < · · · < iy−1 < (n− 1)nadd be the positions of 1’s in the
vector α(∆) ∨ β(∆). We define the function Y = Condition∆(M,V ) as:
Yj =

Aij ⊕Bij ⊕ 1 if (αij ,βij ) = (1, 1),
Aij ⊕Cij if (αij ,βij ) = (0, 1),
Bij ⊕Cij if (αij ,βij ) = (1, 0),
(5.5)
for j = 0, 1, . . . , y − 1. We sill later see that this equation can be equivalently written
as equation (5.8).
Proposition 4. For a given V and ∆, a message M conforms to the trail of ∆ iff
Condition∆(M,V ) = 0.
Proof. The proof is straightforward from Definition 7, Lemma 4 and the definition of
the Condition function in equation (5.5).
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5.3.2 Dependency table for freedom degrees use
For simplicity and generality, let’s adopt the notation F (M,V ) = Condition∆(M,V ) in
this section. Assume that we are given a general function Y = F (M,V ) which maps
m message bits and v initial value bits into y output bits. Our goal is to reconstruct
preimages of a particular output (e.g., the zero vector) efficiently. More precisely, we
want to find V and M such that F (M,V ) = 0. If F mixes its input bits very well, one
needs to try about 2y random inputs in order to find one mapping to zero. However, in
some special cases due to neutrality [44] or semi-neutrality [151, 167, 226] of some input
bits, not every input bit of F affects every output bit. Consider an ideal situation where
message bits and output bits can be divided into ` and `+1 disjoint subsets respectively
as
⋃`
i=1Mi and
⋃`
i=0 Yi such that the output bits Yj (0 ≤ j ≤ `) only depend on the
input bits
⋃j
i=1Mi and the initial value V . In other words, once we know the initial
value V , we can determine the output part Y0. If we know the initial value V and the
input portion M1, the output part Y1 is then known and so on. Refer to Tables A.1
and A.2 to see the partitioning of condition functions related to CubeHash and MD6.
This property of F suggests Algorithm 3 for finding a preimage of zero. Algorithm 3 is
a backtracking search algorithm in essence, similar to [73, 38, 194, 118], and in practice
is implemented recursively with a tree-based search to avoid memory requirements.
The values q0, q1, . . . , q` are the parameters of the algorithm to be determined later. To
discuss the complexity of the algorithm, let |Mi| and |Yi| denote the cardinality of Mi
and Yi respectively, where |Y0| ≥ 0 and |Yi| ≥ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ `. We consider an ideal
behavior of F for which each output part depends in a complex way on all the variables
that it depends on. Thus, the output segment changes independently and uniformly at
random if we change any part of the relevant input bits.
To analyze the algorithm, we need to compute the optimal values for q0, . . . , q`. The
time complexity of the algorithm is
∑`
i=0 2
qi as at each step 2qi values are examined.
The algorithm is successful if we have at least one candidate left at the end, i.e.,
q′`+1 ≥ 0. We have q′i+1 ≈ qi− |Yi|, coming from the fact that at the ith step 2qi values
are examined each of which makes the portion Yi of the output null with probability
2−|Yi|. Note that we have the restrictions qi − q′i ≤ |Mi| and 0 ≤ q′i since we have |Mi|
bits of freedom degree at the ith step and we require at least one surviving candidate
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Algorithm 3 : Preimage finding
Inputs: Function F with the corresponding message partitions M1, . . . ,M` and output
partitions Y0, . . . ,Y`, and the (optimised) parameters q0, q1, . . . , q` for the algorithm.
Output: some preimage of zero under F .
0: Choose 2q0 initial values at random and keep those 2q
′
1 candidates which make Y0
part null.
1: For each candidate, choose 2q1−q′1 values for M1 and keep those 2q
′
2 ones making
Y1 null.
2: For each candidate, choose 2q2−q′2 values for M2 and keep those 2q
′
3 ones making
Y2 null.
...
i: For each candidate, choose 2qi−q′i values for Mi and keep those 2q
′
i+1 ones making
Yi null.
...
`: For each candidate, choose 2q`−q′` values for M` and keep those 2q
′
`+1 final candi-
dates making Y` null.
after each step. Hence, the optimal values for qi’s can be recursively computed as
qi−1 = |Yi−1|+ max(0, qi − |Mi|) for i = `, `− 1, . . . , 1 with q` = |Y`|.
How can we determine the partitions Mi and Yi for a given function F? Based
on the idea of probabilistic neutrality and neutrality measure introduced in chapter 2,
we propose the following heuristic method for determining the message and output
partitions in practice. We first construct a y×m binary valued table T called dependency
table. The entry Tj,i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ y − 1, is set to one iff the jth output
bit is highly affected by the ith message bit. To this end, we empirically measure
the probability that changing the ith message bit changes the jth output bit. The
probability is computed over random initial values and messages. We then set Tj,i to
one iff this probability is greater than a threshold 0 ≤ th < 0.5, e.g., th ≈ 0.3. We then
call Algorithm 4.
In practice, once we make a partitioning for a given function using the above method,
there are two issues which may cause the ideal behavior assumption to be violated:
1. The message segments M1, . . . ,Mi do not have full influence on Yi,
2. The message segments Mi+1, . . . ,M` have influence on Y0, . . . ,Yi.
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Algorithm 4 : Message and output partitioning
Input: Dependency table T .
Outputs: `, message partitions M1, . . . ,M`, and output partitions
Y0, . . . ,Y`.
1: Put all the output bits j in Y0 for which the row j of T is all-zero.
2: Delete all the all-zero rows from T .
3: ` := 0;
4: while T is not empty do
5: ` := `+ 1;
6: repeat
7: Determine the column i in T which has the highest number of 1’s and delete
it from T .
8: Put the message bit which corresponds to the deleted column i into the set
M`.
9: until There is at least one all-zero row in T OR T becomes empty
10: If T is empty set Y` to those output bits which are not in
⋃`−1
i=0 Yi and stop.
11: Put all the output bits j in Y` for which the corresponding row of T is all-zero.
12: Delete all the all-zero rows from T .
13: end while
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With regard to the first issue, we ideally would like that all the message segments
M1,M2, . . . ,Mi as well as the initial value V have full influence on the output part
Yi. In practice the effect of the last few message segments Mi−di , . . . ,Mi (for some
small integer di) is more important, though. Theoretical analysis of deviation from
this requirement may not be easy. However, with some tweaks on the tree-based (back-
tracking) search algorithm, we may overcome this effect in practice. For example, if the
message segment Mi−1 does not have a great influence on the output segment Yi, we
may decide to backtrack two steps at depth i, instead of one (the default value). The
reason is as follows. Imagine that you are at depth i of the tree and you are trying to
adjust the ith message segment Mi, to make the output segment Yi null. If, after trying
about 2min(|Mi|,|Yi|) choices for the ith message block, you do not find an appropriate
one, you will go one step backward and choose another choice for the (i−1)-st message
segment Mi−1; you will then go one step forward once you have successfully adjusted
the (i− 1)-st message segment. If Mi−1 has no effect on Yi, this would be useless and
increase our search cost at this node. Hence it would be appropriate if we backtrack
two steps at this depth. In general, we may tweak our tree-based search by setting the
number of steps which we want to backtrack at each depth.
In contrast, the theoretical analysis of the second issue is easy. Ideally, we would
like that the message segments Mi, . . . ,M` have no influence on the output segments
Y0, . . . ,Yi−1. The smaller the threshold value th is chosen, the less the influence would
be. Let 2−pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ `, denote the probability that changing the message segment
Mi does not change any bit from the output segments Y0, . . . ,Yi−1. The probability is
computed over random initial values and messages, and a random non-zero difference
in the message segment Mi. Algorithm 3 must be reanalyzed in order to recompute the
optimal values for q0, . . . , q`. Algorithm 3 also needs to be slightly changed by reassuring
that at step i, all the output segments Y0, . . . ,Yi−1 remain null. The time complexity of
the algorithm is still
∑`
i=0 2
qi and it is successful if at least one surviving candidate is
left at the end, i.e., q`+1 ≥ 0. However, here we set q′i+1 ≈ qi−|Yi|−pi. This comes from
the fact that at the ith step 2qi values are examined each of which makes the portion Yi
of the output null with probability 2−|Yi| and keeping the previously set output segments
Y0, . . . ,Yi−1 null with probability 2−pi (we assume these two events are independent).
Here, our restrictions are again 0 ≤ q′i and qi − q′i ≤ |Mi|. Hence, the optimal values
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for qi’s can be recursively computed as qi−1 = pi−1 + |Yi−1| + max(0, qi − |Mi|) for
i = `, `− 1, . . . , 1 with q` = |Y`|.
Remark 7. When working with functions with a huge number of input bits, it might be
appropriate to consider the m-bit message M as a string of u-bit units instead of bits.
For example, one can take u = 8 and work with bytes. We then use the notation M =
(M [0], . . . ,M [m/u − 1]) (assuming u divides m) where M [i] = (Miu, . . . ,Miu+u−1).
In this case the dependency table must be constructed according to the probability that
changing every message unit changes each output bit.
5.4 Application to CubeHash
CubeHash [34] is Bernstein’s proposal for the NIST SHA-3 competition [181]. Cube-
Hash variants, denoted by CubeHash-r/b, are parametrized by r and b which at each
iteration process b bytes in r rounds. Although CubeHash-8/1 was the original official
submission, later the designer proposed the tweak CubeHash-16/32 which is almost 16
times faster than the initial proposal [36]. Nevertheless, the author has encouraged
cryptanalysis of CubeHash-r/b variants for smaller r’s and bigger b’s.
5.4.1 CubeHash description
CubeHash works with 32-bit words (n = 32) and uses three simple operations: XOR,
rotation and modular addition. It has an internal state S = (S0, S1, . . . , S31) of 32
words and its variants, denoted by CubeHash-r/b, are identified by two parameters
r ∈ {1, 2, . . . } and b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 128}. The internal state S is set to a specified value
which depends on the digest length (limited to 512 bits) and parameters r and b. The
message to be hashed is appropriately padded and divided into b-byte message blocks.
At each iteration one message block is processed as follows. The 32-word internal state
S is considered as a 128-byte value and the message block is XORed into the first b
bytes of the internal state.1Then, the following fixed permutation is applied r times to
the internal state to prepare it for the next iteration.
1 The first message byte into the least significant byte of S0, the second one into the second least
significant byte of S0, the third one into the third least significant byte of S0, the fourth one into the
most significant byte of S0, the fifth one into the least significant byte of S1, and so forth until all b
message bytes have been exhausted.
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1. Add Si into Si⊕16, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15.
2. Rotate Si to the left by seven bits, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15.
3. Swap Si and Si⊕8, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 7.
4. XOR Si⊕16 into Si, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15.
5. Swap Si and Si⊕2, for i ∈ {16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29}.
6. Add Si into Si⊕16, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15.
7. Rotate Si to the left by eleven bits, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15.
8. Swap Si and Si⊕4, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11}.
9. XOR Si⊕16 into Si, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15.
10. Swap Si and Si⊕1, for i ∈ {16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30}.
Having processed all message blocks, a fixed transformation is applied to the final
internal state to extract the hash value as follows. First, the last state word S31 is
ORed with integer 1 and then the above permutation is applied 10 × r times to the
resulting internal state. Finally, the internal state is truncated to produce the message
digest of desired hash length. Refer to [34] for the full specification.
Remark 8. For CubeHash-r/b there is a generic collision cryptanalysis with complexity
of about 2512−4b. For b > 64 this is faster than the generic birthday attack on hash
functions with digest length of 512 bits. Specifically, for b = 96 the generic attack has
a complexity of about 2128.
5.4.2 Defining the compression function
To be in the line of our general method, we need to deal with fixed-size input com-
pression functions. To this end, we consider t (t ≥ 1) consecutive iterations of Cube-
Hash. We define the function H = Compress(M,V ) with an 8bt-bit message M =
M0|| . . . ||M t−1, a 1024-bit initial value V and a (1024− 8b)-bit output H. The initial
value V is used to initialize the 32-word internal state of CubeHash. Each M i is a
b-byte message block. We start from the initialized internal state and update it in t
iterations. That is, in t iterations the t message blocks M0, . . . ,M t−1 are sequentially
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processed in order to transform the internal state into a final value. The output H is
then the last 128− b bytes of the final internal state value which is ready to absorb the
(t+1)-st message block (the 32-word internal state is interpreted as a 128-byte vector).
Our goal is to find collisions for this Compress function. In the next section we
explain how collisions can be constructed for CubeHash itself.
5.4.3 Collision construction
We are planning to construct collision pairs (M ′,M ′′) for CubeHash-r/b which are of
the form M ′ = Mpre||M ||M t||M suf and M ′′ = Mpre||M ⊕ ∆||M t ⊕ ∆t||M suf . Here,
Mpre is the common prefix of the colliding pairs whose length in bytes is a multiple of
b, M t is one message block of b bytes and M suf is the common suffix of the colliding
pairs whose length is arbitrary. The message prefix Mpre is chosen for randomizing the
initial value V . More precisely, V is the content of the internal state after processing
the message prefix Mpre. For this value of V , (M,M ⊕ ∆) is a collision pair for the
compression function, i.e., Compress(M,V ) = Compress(M ⊕∆, V ). Remember that a
collision for the Compress indicates collision over the last 128− b bytes of the internal
state. The message blocks M t and M t ⊕∆t are used to get rid of the difference in the
first b bytes of the internal state. The difference ∆t is called the erasing block difference
and is computed as follows. When we evaluate the Compress with inputs (M,V ) and
(M ⊕∆, V ), ∆t is the difference in the first b bytes of the final internal state values.
Once we find message prefix Mpre, message M and difference ∆, any message pairs
(M ′,M ′′) of the above-mentioned form is a collision for CubeHash for any message
block M t and any message suffix M suf . We find the difference ∆ using the linearization
method of section 5.2, to be applied to CubeHash in the next section. Then, Mpre and
M are found by finding a preimage of zero under the Condition function as explained
in section 5.3. Algorithm 6 in appendix A.7 shows how CubeHash Condition function
can be implemented in practice for a given differential path.
5.4.4 Constructing linear differentials
We linearize the compression function of CubeHash to find message differences that
can be used for efficient collision search. In particular, we are interested in finding
differences which result in a low theoretical collision complexity when used with the
dependency table and backtracking algorithm. As a first approach one can search for
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differences with a high raw probability. Another motivation is that, as we will see at
the end of this section, a differential path with higher raw probability also corresponds
to a better second preimage cryptanalysis. Table 5.2 indicates the − log2 probability
(i.e., number of bit conditions) of the differential paths with the highest raw probability
which we found for b ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 16, 32, 48, 64, 96} and r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. We
did not consider the dash entries “–” since the large probability of their differential
paths makes them less interesting. The corresponding differential paths can be found in
appendix A.1. We would like to emphasize that since we are using linear differentials,
the erasing block difference ∆t only depends on the difference ∆, see section 5.4.3.
Appendix A.1 also includes the erasing block for convenience.
The differential paths have been found as follows. As explained in section 5.2, the
linear transformation Compresslin can be identified with a matrixH. A linear differential
path is a member of the kernel of this matrix, i.e., those ∆’s such that H∆ = 0. For
CubeHash-r/b with t iterations, ∆ = ∆0|| . . . ||∆t−1 and H has size (1024 − 8b) × 8bt,
see section 5.4.2. Let τ be the dimension of the kernel of H. The matrix H does
not have full rank for many parameters r/b and t. Therefore, one can find differences
with a high raw probability in the set of linear combinations of at most λ kernel basis
vectors, where λ ≥ 1 is chosen such that the set can be searched exhaustively. The
results heavily depend on the choice of the kernel vectors, see [148]. The kernel of
H contains 2τ different elements. The above method finds the best difference out of a
subset of
∑λ
i=1
(
τ
i
)
elements. We may find better results by increasing λ or by repeating
the search for another choice of the basis. Using ideas from [74, 195] we propose an
alternative search algorithm, that works well for many variants of CubeHash and does
not decisively depend on the choice of the kernel basis.
Let ∆0, . . . ,∆τ−1 be a kernel basis of Compresslin and denote G the matrix whose
τ rows consist of the binary vectors ∆i‖α(∆i)‖β(∆i) for i = 0, . . . , τ − 1; refer to
section 5.2.3 for the notation. Elementary row operations on G preserve this structure.
That is, the rows always have the form ∆‖α(∆)‖β(∆) where ∆ lies in the kernel of
Compresslin and its raw probability is given by the Hamming weight of α(∆) ∨ β(∆).
For convenience, we call this the raw probability of the row.
Our proposed algorithm works as follows. Determine imax, the index of the row
with the highest raw probability. Then repeat the following steps a number of N times:
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1. Randomly choose a column index j and let i be the smallest row index such that
Gi,j = 1 (choose a new j if no such i exists).
2. For all row indices k = i+ 1, . . . , τ − 1 such that Gk,j = 1:
• add row i to row k,
• set imax = k if row k has higher raw probability than row imax.
3. Move row i to the bottom of G, shifting up rows i+ 1, . . . , τ − 1 by one.
Remark 9. Table 5.2 shows the best differential paths with regards to the raw probability
found after 200 trials of the above randomized algorithm with N = 600 repetitions. A
more specific choice of the column index j in the first step does not lead to better
results. In particular, we tried to prioritize choosing columns towards the end, or for
every chosen column in α(∆) to also eliminate the corresponding column in β(∆).
r \ b 1 2 3 4 8 12 16 32 48 64 96
1 1225 221 46 32 32 – – – – – –
2 1225 221 46 32 32 – – – – – –
3 4238 1881 798 478 478 400 400 400 364? 65 –
4 2614 964 195 189 189 156 156 156 130? 130? 38
5 10221 4579 2433 1517 1517 1244? 1244? 1244? 1244? 205 127?
6 4238 1881 798 478 478 394 394 394 309 309 90
7 13365 5820 3028 2124 2124 1748 1748 1748 1748 447? 251?
8 2614 2614 1022 1009 1009 830 830 830 637? 637? 151
Table 5.2: Differential paths for CubeHash with the highest probability. The
table includes the values of y (i.e., the − log2 probability or the number of condition bits)
for the differential path with the highest raw probability which we found. Any entry
which is less than 512 indicates a theoretical second preimage cryptanalysis for 512-bit
digest values. For b ≤ 64, any entry which is less than 256 (already even without message
modification) indicates a theoretical collision cryptanalysis for 512-bit digest values. For
CubeHash-r/96, any entry which is less than 128 (already even without message modifi-
cation) indicates a theoretical collision cryptanalysis for digest values of size bigger than
256 bits, see Remark 8. Some of the corresponding differential paths can be found in ap-
pendix A.1. The entries without a star are optimal with respect to both second preimage
and collision cryptanalyses when message modification is exploited. However, the starred
entries are only optimal with respect to second preimage cryptanalysis, see Table 5.3.
Second preimage cryptanalysis on CubeHash. Any differential path with raw
probability greater than 2−512 can be considered as a (theoretical) second preimage
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cryptanalysis on CubeHash with 512-bit digest size. In Table 5.2 the entries which do
not correspond to a successful second preimage cryptanalysis (i.e., y > 512) are shown
in gray, whereas the others have been highlighted. For example, our differential path for
CubeHash-6/4 with raw probability 2−478 indicates that by only one hash evaluation we
can produce a second preimage with probability 2−478. Alternatively, it can be stated
that for a fraction of 2−478 messages we can easily provide a second preimage.
5.4.5 Collision cryptanalysis on CubeHash variants
Table 5.2 includes our best differential paths found with respect to raw probability or
equivalently second preimage cryptanalysis. Nevertheless, when it comes to freedom
degrees use for collision cryptanalysis, these trails might not be the optimal ones. In
other words, for a specific r and b, there might be another differential path which is
worse in terms of raw probability but is better regarding the collision cryptanalysis
complexity if we use some freedom degrees speedup. As an example, for CubeHash-
5/96 with the path which has raw probability 2−127 (given in equation (A.2)), using
our method of section 5.3 the time complexity can be theoretically reduced to about
268.7 (partial) evaluation of its condition function. However, there is another path with
raw probability 2−134 (given in equation (A.4)) which has theoretical time complexity
of about 231.9 (partial) evaluation of its condition function. This behavior can be
explained as follows. As previously observed in [74, 44, 238, 195, 179], conditions in early
steps of the computation can be more easily satisfied than those in later steps. This
is due to message modifications, (probabilistic) neutral bits, submarine modifications
and other freedom degrees use. Similar techniques are used implicitly when using a
dependency table to find a preimage of the condition function (and thus a collision
for the compression function). This motivates to search for differences ∆ such that
α(∆)∨β(∆) is sparse at the end. However, in general, this is not the case for trails of
Table 5.2 since most of them are sparse in the beginning and dense at the end. This
is due to the diffusion of the linearized compression function in the forward direction.
In order to find differential trails which are sparse at the end, one can work with the
inverse linearized round transformations, refer to [148] for more details. Table 5.3 shows
the best paths we found regarding the reduced complexity of the collision cryptanalysis
using our method of section 5.3. While most of the paths are still the optimal ones with
respect to the raw probability, the starred entries indicate the ones which invalidate
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this property. Some of the interesting differential paths for starred entries in Table 5.3
are given in appendix A.2. The second entries in Table 5.3 show the reduced time
complexities of the collision cryptanalysis using our method of section 5.3 whereas
the first entries are the complexities without message modification, that is, the − log2
values of the probability of the differential paths. To construct the dependency table,
we have analyzed the Condition function at byte level, see Remark 7. Therefore, the
time complexities might be improved if the dependency table is analyzed at a bit
level instead. The complexity unit is (partial) evaluation of their respective Condition
function. We remind that the full evaluation of a Condition function corresponding to a
t-iteration differential path is almost the same as application of t iterations (rt rounds)
of CubeHash. We emphasize that the complexities are independent of digest size. All
the complexities which are less than min
(
2512−4b, 2c/2
)
, see Remark 8, can be considered
as a successful collision cryptanalysis for CubeHash-r/b if the hash size is bigger than
c bits. In particular, the complexities bigger than 2256 for b ≤ 64 (considering 512-bit
digests) and bigger than 2128 for b = 96 (considering 256-bit digests) are worse than
generic attacks, hence shown in gray. The successfully cryptanalyzed instances have
been highlighted.
Effect of threshold value on cryptanalysis. Recall that a threshold value th was
used to construct the dependency table, see section 5.3.2. The astute reader should
realize that the complexities of Table 5.3 correspond to the optimal threshold value. To
see the effect of the threshold value on the complexity, we focus on seven instances of
CubeHash: CubeHash-3/64, -4/48, -5/96, -6/96, -4/32, -3/48, and -3/32. The first three
instances are the ones for which the theoretical complexities are practically reachable
and we have managed to find their real collision examples, see the next subsection.
The other four instances are the ones whose theoretical complexities are just above the
practically reachable values and are most probably the ones for which real collisions will
be found in near future either using more advanced methods or utilizing a huge cluster
of computers. Table 5.4 shows the effect of the threshold value on the complexity for
these seven instances.
Real collisions for CubeHash-3/64, -4/48 and -5/96. For CubeHash-3/64, we
use the 2-iteration message difference ∆ = ∆0||∆1 of equation (A.1). Equation (A.1)
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r \ b 1 2 3 4 8 12 16 32 48 64 96
1 1225 221 46 32 32 – – – – – –
1121.0 135.1 24.0 15.0 7.6 – – – – – –
2 1225 221 46 32 32 – – – – – –
1177.0 179.1 27.0 17.0 7.9 – – – – – –
3 4238 1881 798 478 478 400 400 400 368? 65 –
4214.0 1793.0 720.0 380.1 292.6 153.5 102.0 55.6 53.3 9.4 –
4 2614 964 195 189 189 156 156 156 134? 134? 38
2598.0 924.0 163.0 138.4 105.3 67.5 60.7 54.7 30.7 28.8 7.0
5 10221 4579 2433 1517 1517 1250? 1250? 1250? 1250? 205 134?
10085.0 4460.0 2345.0 1397.0 1286.0 946.0 868.0 588.2 425.0 71.7 31.9
6 4238 1881 798 478 478 394 394 394 309 309 90
4230.0 1841.0 760.6 422.1 374.4 256.1 219.9 180.0 135.7 132.0 51.0
7 13365 5820 3028 2124 2124 1748 1748 1748 1748 455? 260?
13261.0 5709.0 2940.0 2004.0 1892.0 1423.0 1323.0 978.0 706.0 203.0 101.0
8 2614 2614 1022 1009 1009 830 830 830 655? 655? 151
2606.0 2590.0 982.0 953.0 889.0 699.0 662.0 524.3 313.0 304.4 80.0
Table 5.3: Differential paths for CubeHash with the least collision complexity.
The table corresponds to the differential paths which provide the best collision cryptanal-
yses when message modification is exploited using our method of section 5.3. The first
number is the log2 value of the collision complexity without message modification (i.e., the
− log2 probability of the path or the number of condition bits) whereas the second number
is the log2 value of the theoretical reduced collision complexity using message modification.
For b ≤ 64, any entry with log2 complexity less than 256 indicates a theoretical collision
cryptanalysis for 512-bit digest values. For CubeHash-r/96, any entry with log2 complexity
less than 128 indicates a theoretical collision cryptanalysis for digest values of size bigger
than 256 bits, see Remark 8. Some of the corresponding differential paths can be found
in appendices A.1 (for entries without a star) and A.2 (for starred entries). The entries
without a star are optimal with respect to both second preimage and collision cryptanaly-
ses when message modification is exploited. However, the starred entries are only optimal
with respect to the collision cryptanalysis, see Table 5.2.
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Variant y \ th 0.0 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
3/64 65 16.3 11.3 11.4 10.6 10.2 10.4 9.9 9.4 10.4 10.4 11.4
4/48 134 50.8 38.3 34.6 33.6 32.3 38.4 35.0 32.2 30.7 32.3 37.7
5/96 134 48.0 35.2 34.1 32.1 32.2 32.6 32.0 31.9 31.9 42.0 42.0
6/96 90 58.0 55.1 55.0 55.0 54.3 53.4 52.8 51.0 51.0 52.7 54.6
4/32 156 75.2 67.4 67.4 63.7 69.0 62.0 54.8 54.7 60.7 66.0 63.9
3/48 368 99.7 90.6 87.2 80.3 67.6 61.2 65.3 53.3 65.1 83.4 102.6
3/32 400 91.0 63.3 61.5 57.1 61.8 55.6 70.9 70.7 79.7 82.4 98.9
Table 5.4: Effect of the threshold value on the collision cryptanalysis complex-
ity for CubeHash. This table shows the theoretical log2 complexities of the improved
collision cryptanalysis versus the threshold parameter (which is used for constructing the
dependency table, see section 5.3.2) when freedom degrees are exploited using our method
of section 5.3 for some CubeHash instances.
also includes the erasing block difference ∆2, required for collision construction. Ap-
pendix A.3 includes the values of Mpre and M = M0||M1 for collision on CubeHash-
3/64 with 512-bit digest size. In other words, Condition∆(M,V ) = 0 holds for the
corresponding condition function where V is the content of the internal state after
processing the message prefix Mpre. According to section 5.4.3, the pair M ′ and M ′′
where
M ′ = Mpre||M0||M1||M2||M suf ,
M ′′ = Mpre||(M0 ⊕∆0)||(M1 ⊕∆1)||(M2 ⊕∆2)||M suf ,
is a collision for CubeHash-3/64 for any message block M2 and any message suffix M suf
of arbitrary length.
For CubeHash-4/48, we use the 2-iteration message difference ∆ = ∆0||∆1 of equa-
tion (A.3). It also includes the erasing block difference ∆2, required for collision con-
struction. The values of Mpre and M = M0||M1, for collision on CubeHash-4/48 with
512-bit digest size, are provided in appendix A.4. Based on these values, collisions for
CubeHash-4/48, similar to the way we explained for CubeHash-3/64, can be constructed.
For CubeHash-5/96, we use the 1-iteration message difference ∆ = ∆0 of equa-
tion (A.4). It also includes the erasing block difference ∆1, required for collision
construction. The values of Mpre and M = M0, for collision on CubeHash-5/96
with 512-bit digest size, are provided in appendix A.5. Therefore, the pair M ′ =
Mpre||M0||M1||M suf and M ′′ = Mpre||(M0 ⊕ ∆0)||(M1 ⊕ ∆1)||M suf is a collision for
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CubeHash-5/96 for any message block M1 and any message suffix M suf of arbitrary
length.
Note that a collision pair for a given r and b can be easily transformed to a collision
pair for the same r and bigger b’s by appending enough zeros to each message block.
Practice versus theory. We provided a framework which is handy in order to an-
alyze many hash functions in a generic way. In practice, the optimal threshold value
may be a little different from the theoretical one. Moreover, by slightly playing with
the neighboring bits in the suggested partitioning corresponding to a given threshold
value (Algorithm 4), we may achieve a partitioning which is more suitable for applying
the attacks. In particular, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 contain the theoretical complexities for
different CubeHash instances under the assumption that the Condition function behaves
ideally with respect to the first issue discussed in section 5.3.2. In practice, deviation
from this assumption increases the effective complexity. For particular instances, more
simulations need to be done to analyze the potential non-randomness effects in order
to give a more exact estimation of the practical complexity.
In the following we compare the practical complexities with the theoretical values
for some cases for which their complexities are practically reachable. Moreover, for
some CubeHash instances for which their complexities are unreachable in practice we
try to give a more precise estimation of their effective complexities.
Our tree-based search implementation for the CubeHash-3/64 case with th ≈ 0.3
has median complexity 221 instead of the 29.4 of Table 5.4. The median decreases to
217 by backtracking three steps at each depth instead of one, see section 5.3.2. We
expect the practical complexities for other instances of CubeHash with three rounds to
be slightly bigger than the theoretical numbers in Table 5.3. These cases need to be
further investigated.
Our detailed analysis of CubeHash-4/32, CubeHash-4/48 and CubeHash-4/64 shows
that these cases perfectly match with theory. According to Table 5.3, for CubeHash-
4/64 (with th ≈ 0.33) and CubeHash-4/48 (with th ≈ 0.30) we have the theoretical
complexities 228.8 and 230.7, respectively. We experimentally achieve median complex-
ities 228.3 and 230.4 respectively. For CubeHash-4/32 (with th ≈ 0.30) the theoretical
complexity is 254.7. In the tree-based search algorithm, we need to satisfy 44 bit con-
ditions at step 18, i.e., |Y18| = 44. This is the node which has the highest cost and if
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it is successfully passed, the remaining steps will easily be followed. In other words, a
single surviving candidate at this node (which means 2q
′
19 = 1 referring to Algorithm 3)
suffices to make the remaining condition bits null with little cost. Our simulations
show that on average we need about 210 (partial) evaluations of the condition function
per one surviving candidate which arrives at depth 18. Hence, our estimation of the
practical complexity is 210 × 244 = 254 which agrees with theory.
Our detailed analysis of CubeHash-5/96 shows that it perfectly matches with theory.
According to Table 5.3, for CubeHash-5/96 (with th ≈ 0.30) we have the theoretical
complexities 231.9. See also Table A.1, the corresponding dependency table. We ex-
perimentally find collisions in almost the same time. In CubeHash-5/64 case (with
th ≈ 0.24), the costliest node is at depth 20 for which 70 bit conditions must be sat-
isfied, i.e., |Y20| = 70. A single surviving candidate at this node suffices to make the
remaining condition bits null with little cost. Our simulation shows that on average
about 27.0 (partial) evaluations of the condition function are required per one surviving
candidate which arrives at depth 20. Hence, our estimation of the practical complexity
is about 27.0+70 = 277.0, versus theoretical value 271.7.
In CubeHash-6/16 case (with th ≈ 0.12), the costliest node is at depth 9 for which
204 bit conditions must be satisfied, i.e., |Y9| = 204. We need 212 candidates to
successfully pass this node, i.e., q′10 = 12; see Algorithm 3. Our simulation shows that
on average about 25 (partial) evaluations of the condition function are required per one
surviving candidate which arrives at depth 9. Hence, our estimation of the practical
complexity is about 212+5+204 = 2221, versus theoretical value 2219.9.
In CubeHash-7/64 case (with th ≈ 0.25), the costliest node is at depth 24 for which
201 bit conditions must be satisfied, i.e., |Y24| = 201. Only one surviving candidate
at this node suffices to make the remaining condition bits null with much less cost.
Our simulation shows that on average about 27 (partial) evaluations of the condition
function are required per one surviving candidate which arrives at depth 24. Hence,
our estimation of the practical complexity is about 27+201 = 2208, versus theoretical
value 2203.0.
We emphasize that for these latter cases we did not attempt to play with the neigh-
boring bits in the partitioning. We believe, in general, complexities can get very close
to the theoretical ones if one tries to do so.
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Comparison with the previous results. The first analysis of CubeHash was pro-
posed by Aumasson et al. [13] in which the authors showed some non-random properties
for several versions of CubeHash. A series of collision examples on CubeHash-1/b and
CubeHash-2/b for large values of b were announced by Aumasson [12] and Dai [95].
Collision cryptanalysis was later investigated deeply by Brier and Peyrin [66]. We
cryptanalyzed not only the untouched variants but also improved on all the existing
results.
5.5 Generalization
In sections 5.2 and 5.3 we considered modular-addition-based compression functions
which use only modular additions and linear transformations. Moreover, we concen-
trated on XOR approximation of modular additions in order to linearize the compres-
sion function. This method is, however, quite general and can be applied to a broad
class of hash constructions, covering many of the existing hash functions. Additionally,
it lets us consider other linear approximations as well. We view a compression function
H = Compress(M,V ) : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}v → {0, 1}h as a binary finite state machine
(FSM). The FSM has an internal state which is consecutively updated using message
M and initial value V . We assume that FSM operates as follows, and we refer to such
Compress functions as binary-FSM-based. The concept can also cover non-binary fields.
The internal state is initially set to zero. Afterwards, the internal state is sequen-
tially updated in a limited number of steps. The output value H is then derived by
truncating the final value of the internal state to the specified output size. At each
step, the internal state is updated according to one of these two possibilities: either
the whole internal state is updated as an affine transformation of the current internal
state, M and V , or only one bit of the internal state is updated as a nonlinear Boolean
function of the current internal state, M and V . Without loss of generality, we assume
that all of the nonlinear updating Boolean functions (NUBF) have zero constant term
(i.e., the output of zero vector is zero) and none of the involved variables appear as
a pure linear term (i.e., changing any input variable does not change the output bit
with certainty). As we will see, this assumption, coming from the simple observation
that we can integrate constants and linear terms in an affine updating transforma-
tion (AUT), is essential for our analysis. Linear approximations of the FSM can be
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achieved by linearizing AUTs and NUBFs. To this end, an AUT is replaced with a
linear transformation by ignoring its constant term (note that the only difference be-
tween an affine transformation and a linear one is the possible existence of an additive
constant term). Moreover a NUBF is replaced with a linear function. Similar to sec-
tion 5.2 this gives us a linearized version of the compression function which we denote
by Compresslin(M,V ). As we are dealing with differential cryptanalysis, we take the
notation Compresslin(M) = Compresslin(M, 0). The argument given in section 5.2 is
still valid: elements of the kernel of the linearized compression function (i.e., ∆’s s.t.
Compresslin(∆) = 0) can be used to construct differential trails.
Let nnl denote the total number of NUBFs in the FSM. We count the NUBFs by
starting from zero. We introduce four functions Λ(M,V ), Φ(∆), Λ∆(M,V ) and Γ(∆)
all of output size nnl bits. To define these functions, consider the two procedures which
implement the FSMs of Compress(M,V ) and Compresslin(∆). Let the Boolean function
gk, 0 ≤ k < nnl, stand for the kth NUBF and denote its linear approximation as in
Compresslin by gklin. Moreover, denote the input arguments of the Boolean functions g
k
and gklin in the FSMs which compute Compress(M,V ) and Compresslin(∆) by the vectors
xk and δk, respectively. Note that δk is a function of ∆ whereas xk depends on M and
V . The kth bit of Γ(∆), Γk(∆), is set to one iff the argument of the kth linearized NUBF
is not the all-zero vector, i.e., Γk(∆) = 1 iff δk 6= 0. The kth bit of Λ(M,V ), Λk(M,V ),
is the output value of the kth NUBF in the course of evaluation of Compress(M,V )
through the execution of FSM, i.e., Λk(M,V ) = gk(xk). Similarly, the kth bit of Φ(∆),
Φk(∆), is the output value of the kth linearized NUBF in the course of evaluation of
Compresslin(∆) through linearized version of FSM, i.e., Φk(∆) = gklin(δ
k). The kth bit
of Λ∆(M,V ), Λ∆k (M,V ), is evaluated in a more complex way: apply the kth nonlinear
Boolean function on the XOR-difference of the arguments which are fed into the two
Boolean functions which compute Λk(M,V ) and Φk(∆), i.e., Λ∆k (M,V ) = g
k(xk⊕ δk).
Refer to Table 5.1 for a list of these symbols along with the ones used in sections 5.2
and 5.3.1. We can then present the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let Compress be a binary-FSM-based compression function. For any
message difference ∆, let {i0, . . . , iy−1}, 0 ≤ i0 < i1 < · · · < iy−1 < nnl be the positions
of 1’s in the vector Γ(∆) where y = wt
(
Γ(∆)
)
. We define the condition function
Y = Condition∆(M,V ) where the jth bit of Y , 0 ≤ j ≤ y − 1, is computed as
Yj = Λij (M,V )⊕ Λ∆ij (M,V )⊕ Φij (∆). (5.6)
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Then, if ∆ is in the kernel of Compresslin, Condition∆(M,V ) = 0 implies that the pair
(M,M ⊕∆) is a collision for Compress with the initial value V .
Proof. First, we present the following definition, a generalization of Definition 7.
Definition 8. We say that a message M (for a given V ) conforms to (or follows) the
trail of ∆ till before applying the ith NUBF iff
Λk(M,V )⊕ Λ∆k (M,V ) = Φk(∆), (5.7)
for 0 ≤ k < i. Moreover, we say that the message M (for a given V ) conforms to (or
follows) the trail of ∆ iff the equation (5.7) holds for 0 ≤ k < nnl.
To explain the Definition 8, imagine we have three procedures which implement
the FSMs to compute Compress(M,V ), Compress(M ⊕∆, V ) and Compresslin(∆). If a
message M (for a given V ) conforms to the trial of ∆ till before applying the ith NUBF,
it means that at every step before the ith NUBF the difference of the internal states
of the two FSMs which compute Compress(M,V ) and Compress(M ⊕∆, V ) equals the
internal state value of the FSM which computes Compresslin(∆). This is guaranteed
by equation (5.7) because the only nonlinear operations during this period are the
applications of the first i−1 NUBFs. Note that if a message M conforms to the trial of
∆ for a given V , we then have Compress(M,V )⊕ Compress(M ⊕∆) = Compresslin(∆).
For simplicity, let the Boolean function g stand for the ith NUBF and denote its
linear approximation as in Compresslin by glin. Moreover, denote the input arguments
of the Boolean functions g and glin in the FSMs which compute Compress(M,V ) and
Compresslin(∆) by the vectors x and δ, respectively. According to our notation Γi(∆) =
1 iff δ 6= 0, and Λi(M,V ) = g(x), Φi(∆) = glin(δ) and Λ∆i (M,V ) = g(x⊕ δ). Now the
role of Γi(∆) becomes visible.
If Γi(∆) = 0, we have δ = 0, and hence g(x) ⊕ g(x ⊕ δ) = glin(δ). In this case the
equation Λi(M,V )⊕ Λ∆i (M,V )⊕ Φi(∆) = 0 is satisfied by itself, and therefore we do
not need to introduce a condition bit, see equation (5.6). In other words the message
M automatically conforms to the trial of ∆ for the initial value V till before applying
the (i+1)-st NUBF, provided that it conforms to the trial of ∆ till before applying the
ith NUBF.
However, if Γi(∆) = 1, we have x 6= x ⊕ δ. Therefore, if the message M conforms
to the trial of ∆ till before applying the ith NUBF, it will also conform to the trial of
∆ till before applying the (i + 1)-st NUBF iff g(x) ⊕ g(x ⊕ δ) = glin(δ). That is, we
need to impose one condition bit as in equation (5.6). Remember we supposed that
g has no linear term, the reason for which is as follows. If g has some linear terms
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and if the difference δ is nonzero only in some of those linear inputs, the equation
g(x) ⊕ g(x ⊕ δ) = glin(δ) is held by itself. In this case, the imposed condition bit is
redundant.
The following proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 6. Suppose that Compresslin is a linearized version of a given binary-FSM-
based compression function Compress(M,V ). For a given ∆ in the kernel of Compresslin
and for an initial value V , a message M conforms to the trail of ∆ iff the corresponding
condition function satisfies Condition∆(M,V ) = 0. Moreover, for a random initial value
V , a random message M is a conforming one with probability 2−Γ(∆).
5.5.1 Modular addition case
Let’s review the compression functions involving only linear transformations and mod-
ular addition of n-bit words. We deeply studied this subject in sections 5.2 and 5.3.
The modular addition Z = X + Y can be computed by considering one bit memory c
for the carry bit. Let X = (x0, . . . , xn−1), Y = (y0, . . . , yn−1) and Z = (z0, . . . , zn−1).
We have
ci+1 = cixi ⊕ ciyi ⊕ xiyi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 2
zi = xi ⊕ yi ⊕ ci for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
where c0 = 0. It can be argued that a compression function which uses only linear
transformations and nadd modular additions can be implemented as a binary-FSM-
based compression whose total number of NUBFs is nnl = (n− 1)nadd. All the NUBFs
are of the form g(x, y, z) = xy⊕xz⊕yz. The XOR approximation of modular addition
in section 5.2 corresponds to approximating all the NUBFs g by the zero function,
i.e., glin(x, y, z) = 0. Having the notation of sections 5.3.1, 5.2 and 5.5 in mind (see
also Table 5.1) we deduce that the input argument of the kth NUBF is (Ak,Bk,Ck);
whereas that of the kth linearized NUBF is (αk,βk, 0). Therefore, we have Λk(M,V ) =
g(Ak,Bk,Ck) and Φk(∆) = glin(αk,βk, 0). Moreover, we deduce Γk(∆) = αk ∨ βk ∨ 0
and Λ∆k (M,V ) = g(Ak ⊕αk,Bk ⊕ βk,Ck ⊕ 0). As a result we get
Yj = Λij (M,V )⊕ Λ∆ij (M,V )⊕ Φij (∆)
= g(Ak,Bk,Ck)⊕ g(Ak ⊕αk,Bk ⊕ βk,Ck ⊕ 0)⊕ 0
= (αij ⊕ βij )Cij ⊕αijBij ⊕ βijAij ⊕αijβij
(5.8)
whenever αij ∨ βij = 1; this agrees with equation (5.5).
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5.5.2 Note on the different linear approximations
Various combinations of different linear approximations of the NUBFs provide a diverse
range of linear approximations of the compression function. However, one should be
careful to avoid approximations which might lead to contradictions due to dependency
between different approximations. In fact the probability 2−Γ(∆) would not be a good
estimate in this case if there are strong correlations between approximations. In the
case of linear approximation of modular addition of n-bit words, we have (n−1) NUBFs
for the carry bits, out of which n− 2 are of the form xy ⊕ xc⊕ yc and one of the form
xy (corresponding to the carry of the LSB). There are eight linear approximations for
the earlier Boolean function (because it effectively depends on three variables) and
four linear approximations for the later one (because it effectively depends on two
variables). This shows the possibility of 4 × 8(n−2) different linear approximations.
For one particular linear approximation, if the difference of the two addends are α
and β the output difference γ is uniquely determined. In [162] the notation of “good”
differential is introduced to distinguish those differentials which can happen with non-
zero probability. A differential α, β → γ is not “good” iff for some i ∈ [0, n − 1],
αi−1 = βi−1 = γi−1 6= αi ⊕ βi ⊕ γi [162]. The exact probability of “good” differentials
can be computed from Algorithm 2 of [162]. In general, it might not be easy to take
redundancies into account. However, cryptanalysts should try their best. We also
would like to emphasize that although there exists an exponential number of linear
approximations (in terms of nnl) for the compression function, it would be better in
practice to concentrate on those for which highly probable linear differential paths are
found easily. For example, by approximating the NUBFs with the zero function or
sparse linear functions, the h × m matrix H which satisfies Compresslin(∆) = H∆ is
likely sparser, making it easier to find differential paths with good raw probability.
5.6 Application to MD6
MD6 [206], designed by Rivest et al., was a first round SHA-3 candidate that provides
security proofs regarding some differential attacks. The core part of MD6 is the function
f which works with 64-bit words and maps 89 input words (A0, . . . , A88) into 16 output
words (A16r+73, . . . , A16r+88) for some integer r representing the number of rounds.
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Each round is composed of 16 steps. The function f is computed based on the following
recursion
Ai+89 = Lri,li
(
Si ⊕Ai ⊕ (Ai+71 ∧Ai+68)⊕ (Ai+58 ∧Ai+22)⊕Ai+72
)
, (5.9)
where Si’s are some publicly known constants and Lri,li ’s are some known simple linear
transformations. The 89-word input of f is of the form Q||U ||W ||K||B where Q is a
known 15-word constant value, U is a one-word node ID, W is a one-word control word,
K is an 8-word key and B is a 64-word data block. For more details about function f
and the mode of operation of MD6, we refer to the submission document [206].1 We
consider the compression function H = Compress(M,V ) = f(Q||U ||W ||K||B) where
V = U ||W ||K, M = B and H is the 16-word compressed value. Our goal is to find a
collision Compress(M,V ) = Compress(M ′, V ) for arbitrary value of V . We later explain
how such collisions can be translated into collisions for the MD6 hash function.
According to our model (section 5.5), MD6 can be implemented as an FSM which
has 64 × 16r NUBFs of the form g(x, y, z, w) = x · y ⊕ z · w. Remember that the
NUBFs must not include any linear part or constant term. We focus on the case
where we approximate all NUBFs with the zero function. This corresponds to ignoring
the AND operations in equation (5.9). This essentially says that in order to com-
pute Compresslin(∆) = Compresslin(∆, 0) for a 64-word ∆ = (∆0, . . . ,∆63), we map
(A′0, . . . , A′24, A′25, . . . , A′88) = 0||∆ = (0, . . . , 0,∆0, . . . ,∆63) into the 16 output words
(A′16r+73, . . . , A′16r+88) according to the linear recursion
A′i+89 = Lri,li
(
A′i ⊕A′i+72
)
. (5.10)
For a given ∆, the function Γ is the concatenation of 16r words A′i+71∨A′i+68∨A′i+58∨
A′i+22, 0 ≤ i ≤ 16r − 1. Therefore, the number of bit conditions equals
y =
16r−1∑
i=0
wt(A′i+71 ∨A′i+68 ∨A′i+58 ∨A′i+22). (5.11)
Note that this equation compactly integrates cases 1 and 2 given in section 6.9.3.2
of [206] for counting the number of active AND gates. Algorithm 5 in appendix A.7
shows how the Condition function is implemented using equations (5.6), (5.9) and( 5.10).
1In the MD6 document [206], the control word W and the linear function Lri,li are respectively
denoted by V and gri,li .
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Using a similar linear algebraic method to the one used in section 5.4.4 for Cube-
Hash, we have found the collision difference of equation (5.12) for r = 16 rounds with
a raw probability p∆ = 2−90. In other words, ∆ is in the kernel of Compresslin and
the condition function has y = 90 output bits. Note that this does not contradict the
proven bound in [206]: one gets at least 26 active AND gates.
∆i =

F6D164597089C40E i = 2
2000000000000000 i = 36
0 0 ≤ i ≤ 63, i 6= 2, 36
(5.12)
In order to efficiently find a conforming message pair for this differential path, we need
to analyze the dependency table of its condition function. Referring to our notation
in section 5.3.2, our analysis of the dependency table of function Condition∆(M, 0) at
word level (units of u = 64 bits) shows that the partitioning of the condition function
is as in Table A.2 for threshold value th = 0. For this threshold value clearly pi = 0.
The optimal values for qi’s (computed according to the complexity analysis of the same
section) are also given in Table A.2, showing a total attack complexity of 230.6 (partial)
condition function evaluation.1 By analyzing the dependency table with smaller units
the complexity may be subject to reduction.
Having set V to zero (which corresponds to choosing null values for the key, the
node ID and the control word in order to simplify things), we found a message M ,
given in the appendix A.6, which makes the condition function null. In other words,
the message pairs M and M ⊕∆ are colliding pairs for r = 16 rounds of f . This 16-
round colliding pair provides near collisions for r = 17, 18 and 19 rounds, respectively,
with 63, 144 and 270 bit differences over the 1024-bit long output of f .
Now let’s discuss the potential of providing collisions for reduced-round MD6 hash
function from collisions for reduced-round f . The MD6 mode of operation is optionally
parametrized by an integer L, 0 ≤ L ≤ 64, which allows a smooth transition from the
default tree-based hierarchical mode of operation (for L = 64) down to an iterative
mode of operation (for L = 0). When L = 0, MD6 works in a manner similar to
that of the well-known Merkle-Damg˚ard construction (or the HAIFA method). Since
in the iterative Merkle-Damg˚ard the first 16 words of the message block are used as a
1By masking M38 and M55 respectively with 092E9BA68F763BF1 and DFFBFF7FEFFDFFBF after ran-
dom setting, the 35 condition bits of the first three steps are satisfied for free, reducing the complexity
to 230.0 instead. See Table A.2.
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chaining value, and as our difference in equation (5.12) is non-zero in the first 16 words,
we do not get a collision but a pseudo-collision. Nevertheless, for 16-round MD6 in the
tree-based hierarchical mode of operation (i.e., for 1 ≤ L ≤ 64), we get a hash collision.
We emphasize that one must choose node ID U and control word W properly in order
to fulfill the MD6 restriction on these values as opposed to the null values which we
chose. This is the first real collision example for 16-round MD6. The original MD6
submission [206] mentions inversion of the function f up to a dozen rounds using SAT
solvers. Some slight nonrandom behavior of the function f up to 33 rounds has also
been reported [150].
5.7 Summary
We presented a framework for an in-depth study of linear differential attacks on hash
functions. We applied our method to reduced round variants of CubeHash and MD6.
As of April 2010, our results on CubeHash are still by far the best known collision
cryptanalyses. However, in [132] our results on MD6 were slightly improved by finding
better linear differential paths. MD6 is of no interest any more as it was only among
the first round SHA-3 candidates and was withdrawn by the designers just before the
start of the second round. In contrast, CubeHash is one of the promising candidates
in the second round.
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6Conclusion
The field of design and analysis of symmetric cryptographic components is a fascinating
realm of research activity. The struggle between primitive designers and cryptanalysts
has kept the field very lively. Cryptographers over the years have learned to include
a tunable parameter in their design in order to provide flexible security/performance
trade-offs. It is scientifically interesting to explore how much the number of mathe-
matical operations can be reduced to construct a cipher that does not cower against
cryptanalysts. On the other hand, the cryptographic community and standardization
organizations have also learned that the best way to achieve a cipher which can stay
alive for a long period of time is to go through public evaluations. Cipher designers
choose the security parameter such that their schemes are fast enough while still keep-
ing some reasonable level of confidence on their designs. Cryptanalysts on the other
hand try to break reduced-round variants, which are faster, and get as close as possible
to the security parameter set by the designers. In this thesis we cryptanalyzed vari-
ous stream cipher and hash function design proposals, including several candidates of
the ECRYPT eSTREAM project and NIST SHA-3 competition. Although we cannot
break the schemes in many cases, our results have either remained the best so far or
inspired newer improved results.
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Appendix A
A.1 The best differential paths found for CubeHash re-
garding raw probability
Here we give the differential trials for highlighted entries of Table 5.2 and the entries
of Table 5.3 which are not starred. A differential path is denoted by (∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆t)
where ∆ = ∆0||∆1|| . . . ||∆t−1 is in the kernel of Compresslin and ∆t is the corresponding
erasing block difference. Recall that each ∆i consists of b bytes and Compresslin linearly
maps ∆ in t iterations into the last 128− b bytes of the final state. The erasing block
difference ∆t is then the contents of the first b bytes of the state, hence only depending
on ∆. Nevertheless, we also provide this value for convenience. See sections 5.4.2
and 5.4.4 for more details. Note that a differential path for a given r and b can be
easily transformed to a differential path for the same r and bigger b’s by appending
enough zeros to each difference block. Therefore, we present the differential path for
the smallest valid b.
A.1.1 Differential paths for CubeHash-1/?
CubeHash-1/4 with y = 32:
(∆0, . . . ,∆4) = (00000001, 00000000, 40400010, 00000000, 00000010)
CubeHash-1/3 with y = 46:
(∆0, . . . ,∆4) = (010000, 000000, 104040, 000000, 100000)
CubeHash-1/2 with y = 221:
(∆0, . . . ,∆8) = (0080, 0000, 2200, 0000, 228A, 0000, 0280, 0000, 2000)
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A.1.2 Differential paths for CubeHash-2/?
CubeHash-2/4 with y = 32:
(∆0,∆1,∆2) = (00000001, 40400010, 00000010)
CubeHash-2/3 with y = 46:
(∆0,∆1,∆2) = (010000, 104040, 100000)
CubeHash-2/2 with y = 221:
(∆0, . . . ,∆4) = (0040, 1100, 1145, 0140, 1000)
A.1.3 Differential paths for CubeHash-3/?
CubeHash-3/64 with y = 65:
∆0 = 400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000080000000000000008000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
∆1 = 000000000004100000000000000010000000000000000000
800020800000008008000208080000000000000000000000
41000010000000000140000000000000
∆2 = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002000
000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000010
(A.1)
CubeHash-3/48 with y = 364:
∆0 = 000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000
000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
∆1 = 000202800002000000020280000200000000000000000000
000000000000000040000101000000004000010100000000
∆2 = 202022000000000020202200000000004000000500000000
400000050000000040440040404400404044004040440040
∆3 = 080000000800020808000000080002080000000000000000
000000000000000000040000000000000004000000000000
CubeHash-3/12 with y = 400:
∆0 = 000200000000000000020000
∆1 = 000000000000000000000000
∆2 = 800A2A8200000000800A2A82
∆3 = 000000000000000000000000
∆4 = 000020000000000000002000
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CubeHash-3/4 with y = 478:
(∆0, . . . ,∆4) = (00000100, 00000000, 41400515, 00000000, 00000010)
CubeHash-3/3 with y = 798:
(∆0, . . . ,∆4) = (000280, 000000, 0A2A8A, 000000, 080020)
A.1.4 Differential paths for CubeHash-4/?
CubeHash-4/95 with y = 38:
∆0 = 000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000002000000020008000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000004101000000000
0000100000000000000000000000000000000280000002
∆1 = 010000000000000001400001000000000000000000000000
082000000820000080000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000100000000000000000000000000200000082000
CubeHash-4/36 with y = 130:
∆0 = 002000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000001000
∆1 = 000220020000000000022002000000000000000000000000
000000000000000001000110
∆2 = 000020000000000000002000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000010
CubeHash-4/12 with y = 156:
∆0 = 040000000000000004000000
∆1 = 004400400000000000440040
∆2 = 000400000000000000040000
CubeHash-4/4 with y = 189:
(∆0,∆1,∆2) = (00001000, 01000110, 00000010)
CubeHash-4/3 with y = 195:
(∆0,∆1,∆2) = (000200, 200022, 000002)
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A.1.5 Differential paths for CubeHash-5/?
CubeHash-5/96 with y = 127:
∆0 = 400000000000000040000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040
000000000000004000000000000200000000000000000000
∆1 = 010001110100011100000000000000008008002A00000000
080000220000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000011040000000000004000010101000111
000000000000000000002208000000000800200000000000
(A.2)
CubeHash-5/64 with y = 205:
∆0 = 040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000008000000000000000800000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
∆1 = 000000000004005000000000000010400000000000000000
000222020002028020202200082020000000000000000000
01400510000000000040040100000000
∆2 = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002000
000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000010
A.1.6 Differential paths for CubeHash-6/?
CubeHash-6/87 with y = 90:
∆0 = 000000000000000000000001000000000020000000200000
000000000000000000000000000000000000008000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000
400001010000000000200008002000
∆1 = 044404000000000001040400000000000800A0000800A000
000000000000000000000000000000008000020200000000
000000000000000000000000000000000404000100000000
0004000000000000002080000800A0
CubeHash-6/48 with y = 309:
∆0 = 000000000002000000000000000200000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000
∆1 = 00000000800A2A8200000000800A2A820000000000000000
000000000000000000000000414005150000000000000000
∆2 = 000000000000200000000000000020000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000
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CubeHash-6/36 with y = 351:
∆0 = 000100000000000000010000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000800000
∆1 = 400515410000000040051541000000000000000000000000
000000000000000020A0828A
∆2 = 000010000000000000001000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000008
CubeHash-6/32 with y = 394:
∆0 = 00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000001000000000000000100
∆1 = 00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000414005150000000041400515
∆2 = 00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000100000000000000010
CubeHash-6/12 with y = 394:
∆0 = 000000400000000000000040
∆1 = 414510500000000041451050
∆2 = 000400000000000000040000
CubeHash-6/4 with y = 478:
(∆0,∆1,∆2) = (00000100, 41400515, 00000010)
A.1.7 Differential paths for CubeHash-7/?
CubeHash-7/96 with y = 251:
∆0 = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000040000000
000000004000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000002000000000000000000000
000200000000000000000040000000000000004000000000
∆1 = 0000000002800A2000000000000A28820000000000000000
514454405144544000000000100140050000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000080080200
00000000800A200200000000000000005144544040440040
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CubeHash-7/64 with y = 447:
∆0 = 000080000000000000008000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000040000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000
∆1 = A880A2888800808000000000000000005004011400000000
154004000000000000000000004510400000000040011000
0000000000000000880A288A08000888
∆2 = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000020000000000000002000
A.1.8 Differential paths for CubeHash-8/?
CubeHash-8/88 with y = 151:
∆0 = 000000000000000800000000080002084000000140000001
000000000000000000000000000000000000000004040001
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020808
00000000080008884000000100001041
∆1 = 000000008808000800000000080800020040011000400110
000000000000000000000000000000000000000001040400
000000000000000000000000000000000000000008000208
00000000080000000040011040000100
A.2 The best differential paths found for CubeHash re-
garding collision complexity
Here we give the differential trials for some starred entries of Table 5.3. Please see the
descriptions in appendix A.1.
CubeHash-3/48 with y = 368:
∆0 = 000000000000000000000000000000004000000000000000
400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
∆1 = 800020800000008080002080000000800000000000000000
000000000000000040400010000000004040001000000000
∆2 = 880800080000000088080008000000000040011000000000
004001100000000011001010110010101100101011001010
∆3 = 000000028000020200000002800002020000000000000000
000000000000000001000000000000000100000000000000
116
A.2 The best differential paths found for CubeHash regarding collision
complexity
CubeHash-4/36 with y = 134:
∆0 = 000000080000000000000008000000000000000000000000
000000000000000004000000
∆1 = 880080000000000088008000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000440040
∆2 = 080000000000000008000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000040000
(A.3)
CubeHash-5/96 with y = 134:
∆0 = 080002080800020800000000000000004000010000000000
004001100000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000800A000000000000800088808000208
000000000000000040011000000000000045104000000000
∆1 = 800000000000000080000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000400000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080
000000000000008000000000000400000000000000000000
(A.4)
CubeHash-7/61 with y = 455:
∆0 = 040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000008000000000000000800000000
00000000000000000000000000
∆1 = 000000000450040100000000001400010000000000000000
88A880A288008080880A288A880800080000000000000000
01451040000000005001440000
∆2 = 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002
000000000000000200000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000001
CubeHash-7/96 with y = 260:
∆0 = A00802080000000028000200000000000000000000000000
010001110100011104500401000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000008008202A00000000
080208A00000000000000000000000000145115101000111
∆1 = 000000000000000000000000000000000000040000000000
000004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000002000000000000000000000000
000000000000200000000000000400000000000000040000
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A.3 Collisions for CubeHash-3/64
Mpre = 9B91E97363511AC3AF950F54DBCFD5DF91BC26BDD759104D
F15B37847A4F7015E15A8844ABA3075A3816AE13E583F276
40193317724464649F9BE819EB582ECC
M0 = B22A98139CC0C8606525818EE6DD7775CF25B34196DC51F4
641E56ACB918296BBD082AD01D7481EECC950B6C176C45B6
23CFE1E2638B16255F61E806F34DE91C
M1 = 4D9E9CD62ED12CBDBA1E0B631856DCFE5BD996571CFF6E94
A52242382E154FA6AEB44AC0A247CB298550C7B82BDCA924
E81D5E51E997CA67FBDD86FF15D04A0D
A.4 Collisions for CubeHash-4/48
Mpre = 741B87597F94FF1CC01761CA0D80B07CC2E6E760C95DF9A5
08FFCBABDA11474E2CCEA7AC62A7C822BE29EDCBA99D476C
M0 = 1D30F8022F4AE8DBD477FA1F7DE37C1AF2516BC6FA4657F9
E51539C10EC114DA3B8264DD9361FE07C3D56E88E8512201
M1 = 014A11BFE2FF346FC306D1E430EE80268785A9F841562C9A
88A6BF5858E95362F541ACF41C2FDCC1C49470DF1DFAEFDC
A.5 Collisions for CubeHash-5/96
Mpre = F06BB068487C5FE1CCCABA700A989262801EDC3A69292196
8848F445B8608777C037795A10D5D799FD16C037A52D0B51
63A74C97FD858EEF7809480F43EB264CD66318632A8CCFE2
EA22B139D99E48888CA844FBECCE3295150CA98EB16B0B92
M0 = 3DB4D4EE02958F578EFF307A5BE9975B4D0A669EE6025663
8DDB6421BAD8F1E4384FE1284EBB7E2A72E165871E44C51B
DA607FD91DDAD41F4180297A1607F9022463D2592B73F829
C79E766D0F672ECC084E841BFC700F053095E8658EEB85D5
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5361E9B8579F7CD1, 8B29C52CA2AB51E4, 0BCF2F1E1B116898, 022C254B88191A11,
F0F1CE9D9A7F63B8, 9FB5B2CE87B7D7F5, E7C78F28EEB4F5C7, C5E8C19CEFC07365,
F88B84529ED90209, 8FACF593AE7390CF, 03A93466247C6B54, B12C70C10904143D,
D92EE67244C300D6, 35EEA586ECCC8A77, 9DCF031C64B528F8, C84807607ADCD418,
367E95EE3CB0FC67, 578A2C716FCC5016, B0C30EA5521F61EF, 7F665B24762D5894,
4196BAF0596A7784, ED5F9A8F183B4BCC, 6077463601FCFE46, 495366B1273E119B,
6E11A21AE5B3A48F, 38082264A0F68F93, 4ED510C2DFA9FF98, 35C5ACEC5E9A1756,
1F6731C861879ECD, 8CECD7B4F761CE82, 332A50854FDA8FE6, 588498B1021E9C23,
CB1FFA21CF89C7A5, 63A6871C77848410, 92A550CB4607F31C, 97024803F162E055,
E2D6EA5A57D2DBF3, AEB418A0F1F01CC5, 090A9304040038C1, 5417960E3D9A06A5,
714215C196813F35, BABAD7A4C154F2C3, 71AF3FD02B543940, FA08624B825648DD,
730D61FF48759275, CF85BA5A06D6AED4, 2E12B3150452C65A, 93C7A9FC314220B4,
81B128A4EF361456, BFE652098170C212, 77540989DC246845, 796F353D07721071,
D82776A3CBFEC586, 1132E4391152F408, CE936924CFFB22AA, D338852F80450282,
4F41AB82E790EEF6, F05378CB6BD36203, 5E506F47C6EC4617, FE6FB5A03BDE8E1C,
AB33EA511EEBAEDC, 7D40F8D4F0C62BF4, 1174E2B748B9CC2E, 1EB743671A31547D
A.7 Condition function for CubeHash and MD6
Algorithms 5 and 6 respectively show how the Condition function can be constructed
for MD6 and CubeHash. It is presumed that the input ∆ is in the kernel of their
respective condition functions. Note that, in case the Condition function needs to be
evaluated several times for a fixed differential path ∆ (as is the case for the tree-based
search algorithm), we can precompute that part of the function which is independent
of the input message M .
A.8 Partitioning example for CubeHash
Table A.1 shows the input and output partitionings of the Condition function of CubeHash-
5/96 for the difference ∆ in equation (A.4).
A.9 Partitioning example for MD6
Table A.2 shows the input and output partitionings of the Condition function of MD6
with r = 16 rounds for the difference ∆ in equation (5.12).
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i Mi Yi qi
0 – ∅ 0.00
1 {2, 6, 66} {1, 2} 2.00
2 {10, 1, 9, 14, 74, 5, 13, 65, 17, 70} {5} 1.35
3 {73, 7, 16, 19, 18, 78, 25, 37, 41} {23, 24} 2.00
4 {69, 77, 24, 33} {21, 22} 2.00
5 {50, 89} {12, 13} 2.00
6 {20, 27, 45, 88} {11} 1.15
7 {57, 4} {38} 1.00
8 {80} {7, 8} 2.00
9 {38, 40, 81, 3, 28, 32} {34} 1.24
10 {49} {41} 1.00
11 {58} {19, 20, 42, 43} 4.00
12 {91} {16, 17} 2.00
13 {23, 34, 44, 83} {29, 30} 2.07
14 {90} {14} 1.07
15 {15, 26} {15} 1.07
16 {36} {37, 55} 2.31
17 {42, 46, 48} {25, 26} 2.12
18 {56} {18, 31, 40} 3.01
19 {59} {48, 79} 2.00
20 {84, 92, 0} {35} 1.00
21 {82} {9, 10, 27, 28, 32, 33} 6.04
22 {31, 51} {44, 56, 64} 3.03
23 {71} {6} 1.00
24 {11, 54, 67} {3} 1.00
25 {75} {78} 1.00
26 {21, 55} {46, 59} 2.00
27 {63} {50} 1.00
28 {79} {45, 49, 65, 70} 4.00
29 {12} {71} 1.06
30 {22} {58, 67, 81, 82, 83} 5.00
31 {29, 62} {63} 1.03
32 {87, 95} {53, 54, 74, 76, 85} 5.01
33 {39, 47} {39} 1.01
34 {53, 8} {69, 88, 89} 3.30
35 {30} {77, 86, 94, 98} 5.04
36 {60, 61} {62, 91, 101, 102} 4.35
37 {35, 52} {61, 90, 103} 4.22
38 {43} {36, 57, 60, 104, 111} 5.77
39 {64} {0} 1.33
40 {68} {4} 2.03
41 {72} {97, 100, 121} 8.79
42 {76} {66, 80, 92, 93} 13.39
43 {85} {47, 112} 16.92
44 {93} {51, 52, 68, 72, 75, 87, 95} 22.91
45 {86, 94} {73, 84, 96, 99, 105, . . . , 110, 113, . . . , 132, 133} 31.87
Table A.1: Partitioning example for CubeHash. This table shows the input and
output partitionings of the Condition function of CubeHash-5/96 for the difference ∆ in
equation (A.4). Numbers in Mi are message byte indices, whereas numbers in Yi are
condition bit indices. The total complexity of the attack is dominated by the last step in
which 31 condition bits must be satisfied.
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Algorithm 5 : Condition function for MD6
Inputs: r, ∆, M , and V .
Outputs: y and Y = Condition∆(M,V ).
1: (A0, . . . , A88) := Q||V ||M
2: (A′0, . . . , A
′
24, A
′
25, . . . , A
′
88) := 0||∆
3: j := 0
4: for i = 0, 1, . . . , 16r − 1 do
5: Ai+89 := Li
(
Si ⊕Ai ⊕ (Ai+71 ∧Ai+68)⊕ (Ai+58 ∧Ai+22)⊕Ai+72
)
6: A′i+89 := Li
(
A′i ⊕A′i+72
)
7: D := A′i+71 ∨A′i+68 ∨A′i+58 ∨A′i+22
8: T := (Ai+71 ∧Ai+68)⊕ (Ai+58 ∧Ai+22)
9: T ′ :=
(
(Ai+71 ⊕A′i+71) ∧ (Ai+68 ⊕A′i+68)
)⊕ ((Ai+58 ⊕A′i+58) ∧ (Ai+22 ⊕A′i+58))
10: for all bit positions k = 0, 1, . . . , 63 such that Dk = 1 do
11: Yj := Tk ⊕ T ′k
12: j := j + 1
13: end for
14: end for
15: y := j
i Mi Yi qi
0 – ∅ 0
1 {M38} {Y1, . . . , Y29} 29
2 {M55} {Y43, . . . , Y48} 6
3 {M0,M5,M46,M52,M54} {Y0} 1
4 {Mj |j = 3, 4, 6, 9, 21, 36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 49, 50, 53, 56, 57} {Y31, . . . , Y36} 6
5 {M41,M51,M58,M59,M60} {Y30, Y51} 2
6 {Mj |j = 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, {Y52, . . . , Y57} 6
33, 34, 37, 43, 44, 47, 48, 61, 62, 63}
7 {M27} {Y37, . . . , Y42} 6
8 {M13,M16,M23} {Y50} 1
9 {M35} {Y49} 1
10 {M14,M15,M19,M28} {Y58, Y61} 2
11 {M30,M31,M32} {Y59, Y60, Y62 . . . , Y89} 30
Table A.2: Partitioning example for MD6. This table shows the input and output
partitionings of the Condition function of MD6 with r = 16 rounds for the difference ∆
in equation (5.12). Numbers in Mi are message word indices, whereas numbers in Yi are
condition bit indices. The total complexity of the attack is dominated by the last step in
which 30 condition bits must be satisfied.
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Algorithm 6 : Condition function for CubeHash
Inputs: r, b, t, ∆ = ∆0|| . . . ||∆t−1, M = M0|| . . . ||M t−1, and V = (V0, . . . , V31).
Outputs: y and Y = Condition∆(M,V ).
1: (S0, . . . , S31) := V
2: (S′0, . . . , S
′
31) := (0, . . . , 0)
3: j := 0
4: for t ′ from 0 to t− 1 do
5: XOR M t
′
into the first b bytes of the state S {see the footnote on page 89}
6: XOR ∆t
′
into the first b bytes of the state S′ {see the footnote on page 89}
7: for round from 1 to r do
8: for i from 0 to 15 do
9: α := S′i, β := S
′
i⊕16, A := Si, B := Si⊕16
10: Add Si into Si⊕16 but XOR S′i into S
′
i⊕16
11: D := α ∨ β
12: C := A⊕B ⊕ Si⊕16 {carry word}
13: T =
(
(α⊕ β) ∧ C)⊕ (α ∧B)⊕ (β ∧A)⊕ (α ∧ β) {see equation (5.5) or (5.8)}
14: for all bit positions k = 0, 1, . . . , 31 such that Dk = 1 do
15: Yj := Tk
16: j := j + 1
17: end for
18: end for
19: for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 do rotate Si and S′i to the left by seven bits end for
20: for 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 do swap Si and Si⊕8 as well as S′i and S′i⊕8 end for
21: for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 do XOR Si⊕16 into Si and S′i⊕16 into S′i end for
22: for i ∈ {16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29} do swap Si and Si⊕2 as well as S′i and S′i⊕2 end
for
23: for i from 0 to 15 do
24: α := S′i, β := S
′
i⊕16, A := Si, B := Si⊕16
25: Add Si into Si⊕16 but XOR S′i into S
′
i⊕16
26: D := α ∨ β
27: C := A⊕B ⊕ Si⊕16 {carry word}
28: T =
(
(α⊕ β) ∧ C)⊕ (α ∧B)⊕ (β ∧A)⊕ (α ∧ β) {see equation (5.5) or (5.8)}
29: for all bit positions k = 0, 1, . . . , 31 such that Dk = 1 do
30: Yj := Tk
31: j := j + 1
32: end for
33: end for
34: for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 do rotate Si and S′i to the left by eleven bits end for
35: for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11} do swap Si and Si⊕4 as well as S′i and S′i⊕4 end for
36: for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 XOR Si⊕16 do into Si and S′i⊕16 into S′i end for
37: for i ∈ {16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30} do swap Si and Si⊕1 as well as S′i and S′i⊕1 end
for
38: end for{r rounds}
39: end for{t iterations}
40: y := j
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